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FOREWORD
In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian
Security to the Year 2000." No region of the world has greater
potential for expanded influence on American interests. This
compendium of papers from the conference examines the security
policies being pursued by many of the key Asian actors--China,
the Koreas, Pakistan, and the nations of Southeast Asia,
particularly those in ASEAN. The contrib-utors to this volume
paint the picture of a dynamic and diverse Asia on the verge of
the new century. Each author identifies the critical issues which
frame both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign,
economic, and security policies.
Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of SSI has carefully edited
their works and provided the excellent introductory overview
which follows this foreword. SSI is pleased to publish this
volume as a contribution to the national security debate on this
important area of the world.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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OVERVIEW
Dianne L. Smith
The end of the Cold War transformed the global security
environment in Asia. Old security and military ties based on the
superpower rivalry underwent serious examination and
transformation, as regional issues gained greater importance.
With a shift away from military threats, national security
concerns have expanded beyond external threats to a state's
territorial integrity; states face economic threats, the
possibility of social cataclysm, ideological or religious
conflict, environmental problems, heightened violence and crime,
proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, and
transnational issues such as drugs, refugees, and international
terrorism.
Six authors examine the influence of these factors on Asian
security in the next decade. William J. Taylor, Jr., and Abraham
Kim first survey the new dynamics of Northeast Asian security,
focussing on the changed relationships between Russia, China,
Japan, and the United States. They then examine the Koreas in the
changing northeast region. The post-Cold War era has deepened the
isolation and economic deterioration of Pyongyang and,
conversely, permitted the gradual democratization, rapid economic
growth, and enhanced international stature of Seoul. However,
Northeast Asia has been left with ever-increasing uncertainties.
For both Koreas the rapid strengthening of China, the potential
for Japanese remilitarization, and the uncertain stability of
Russia are worrying. But, the greatest issue for both Koreas
remains the terms for the reunification both say they seek. The
Nuclear Agreed Framework has taken the nuclear crisis off
international agendas for the time being, but that agreement is a
frail framework on which to hang our hopes for peaceful
reunification. In the meantime, the political-military situation
along the Demilitarized Zone remains fragile.
Paul H. B. Godwin argues that Chinese foreign policy is
caught in the contradiction between domestic goals (which require
China to maintain a constructive relationship with the
international system) and Beijing's military security objectives
and modernization goals (which Asia and the United States view as
potentially threatening to regional security). China's response
to American criticism has been to charge Washington with trying
to start a new Cold War in Asia and drive a wedge between China
and its neighbors, and to detract attention from its own nuclear
weapons tests, weapons acquisitions, and modernization programs.
When these actions are combined with renewed claims over the
Spratly Islands and use of force to intimidate Taiwan, fear of an
ascending China has little to do with American policy or intent.
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China's Asian neighbors prefer to accommodate China and let
America act as a balance. Beijing's perception of Washington
seeking to contain China may be rooted as much in its
understanding of its neighbors' security logic as in the
underlying intent of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific
region. Sino-American relations are potentially more critical and
hazardous for regional peace and security in the new millennium.
China's past willingness to confront Washington is a foreboding
precedent.
Robert Wirsing questions whether Pakistan's security in the
"New World Order" is going from bad to worse. It faces major
challenges to its security: its ties to major power wielders have
grown perilously thin, no major power seems willing to come its
rescue in a crisis, the arms gap with India widens, and its
internal stability and political unity are being seriously eroded
by ethnic and sectarian strife. Her options to solve these
problems are narrow. Turning her back on South Asia (or at least
the Hindu core of it) and embracing pan-Islam is too dangerous;
domestic liberalization tackles external security problems mainly
by trying to forget them. Regional cooperation, according to
Wirsing, is the most viable option, but there is no insurance
that Pakistan will be willing to implement it. Pakistan and India
both need to take initial steps to resolve the pivotal issue of
Kashmir, but neither seems convinced that the situation is
sufficiently urgent to warrant the prolonged and heavy
expenditure of political capital required to bring both sides
seriously to the bargaining table. Redefining Pakistan's security
in terms that the West might find acceptable will prove
difficult, if not impossible, but until this changes, the rest of
the world can help India and Pakistan with constant encouraging
dialogue and with concrete and evenhanded political, military,
and economic gestures toward the region that discourage fighting.
But, in the end, Wirsing argues, making South Asia more secure is
mainly a task that South Asians must perform.
Marc Jason Gilbert contends that the security architecture
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is firmly
rooted in its experience as part of the so-called "shatterbelt,"
the region that stretches from Southeast Asia across the
Himalayas through Central Asia to the Caucasus and Anatolia and
onward to Southern Europe. Successive waves of disparate ethnic
groups have settled here without wholly displacing their
predecessors, thus ensuring that among them will be legacies of
both prolonged conflict and co-existence, coupled with dynamic
urban civilizations and traditionally weak geopolitical and
economic structures. As a result, the art of survival has most
often depended upon artful compromise, accommodation,
multilateral approaches to common problems brokered between
internal factions, regional partners, and/or extra-regional
powers. States in the shatterbelt have experienced great
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achievement when they work together and terrible tragedy when
they do not, as the recent histories of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
and Vietnam make clear. This heritage has shaped ASEAN's modus
operandi and explains the association's unwillingness to
transition to a European-style defense alliance. This pattern of
pacific, informal, and consensus-seeking strategic posture,
promoting economic growth as the best medicine for its security
problems, has its critics, but the ASEAN states have avoided
major confrontations and bid others to apply that strategy beyond
the confines of Southeast Asia.
Finally, Perry Wood argues that the transformation of
Southeast Asia into a center of economically vibrant states with
a claim to a political leadership role in Asian and world affairs
is being realized. The ASEAN states are working to extend their
"peace" to Indochina and usher in an unprecedented era of
regional cooperation and development. Unfortunately, contrary
trends are apparent; the end of superpower dominance has left
many states increasingly worried about external security and some
are assuming a higher regional military profile as a consequence,
which may increase the risk of limited conventional wars and
armed conflicts in the next century. The ASEAN states are
attempting to preserve strong security ties with Washington, but
the United States appears increasingly preoccupied with its
internal affairs and complacent regarding the region's role in
America's wider global interests. Regional security cannot rest
with America, but it can encourage the ASEAN nations to continue
to enhance their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation
and improve the transparency of their defense programs. The ASEAN
states will never be allied with Washington, but their common
concerns and shared interests form the basis for an independent,
but coordinated, approach to regional affairs which can work to
build a 21st century Asia congenial to both the United States and
the indigenous nations.
Russia, China, the ASEAN nations, India, Pakistan, the new
Central Asian republics, Japan, and North and South Korea all
seek to redefine their security strategy to the Year 2000. Their
success or failure will directly bear on the strategic interests
of the United States in a significant way.

vi

vii

viii

ix

x

xi

CHAPTER I
THE KOREAS IN THE CHANGING NORTHEAST REGION
William J. Taylor, Jr.
and
Abraham Kim
Introduction.
The Cold War era was a period of "hostile peace and
stability"--hostile because of the constant struggle and tension
between the forces of democracy and communism exemplified by
Soviet-sponsored "wars of national liberation" and the "reign of
nuclear terror" and stable, in retrospect, because nations knew
friend from foe and could calculate their interests accordingly.
Cold War security interests subordinated all other concerns, and
points of potential tension were avoided among "Free World"
allies in order to sustain firm coalitions in the face of the
Communist threat in its various forms.
The end of the Cold War brought a mixed bag of challenges to
the Northeast Asia region. Although the Soviet threat to the
region was removed, residue from the Cold War remains. The
communist regimes of North Korea and China are still a reality,
and the Korean peninsula remains divided. At the same time, the
principles and relationships that once thrived and served as the
immovable foundation of political ties during the Cold War are
now open for reexamination and question. Uncertainty and
instability abound. The challenge now facing the countries of the
Asia-Pacific region is to adjust to this transforming
environment.
These global and regional changes have affected the two
Koreas, particularly in the area of security. The end of the
Soviet threat has not brought increased stability and peace to
the Korean peninsula; rather, increased uncertainty and multiple
challenges will prevail in the coming years.
End of the Cold War: Moscow's New Foreign Policy.
Without question, the most significant global change in
recent years was the demise of the Soviet Union. For decades,
American allies in the Asia-Pacific region lived under the
constant threat of Soviet military aggression. But, within a few
dramatic years, the Soviet empire collapsed, and the threat
evaporated. From the ashes, an ailing Russia, plagued by economic
chaos and political strife, emerged seeking economic assistance
from any country willing to help.
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Within the Russian government a lack of consensus exists on
the overall foreign policy strategy to draw needed aid and
economic cooperation from other countries. Initially, President
Boris Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and other "proWestern" reformers focused on improving relations with the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, and other allies who were seen as
potential donors and investors.1 Their goal was to integrate
Russia into the group of industrialized countries as a political
and economic partner. But, they soon discovered that this was a
false hope. They failed to draw adequate support and acceptance
from these nations. Alexei Arbatov, a deputy of the Duma
legislature, explains the reason for Russia's lack of success:
"[The pro-Western Russian policy makers] underestimated the
uniqueness of the Russian state and its heritage, as well as
Western reservations about too rapid convergence."2
By mid-1992, a reorientation of Russian foreign policy had
taken place. The pro-Western leaders' control over foreign policy
gave way to more conservative groups, such as the Security
Council (a top policy-making body established in 1992) and the
legislature. The Russian government refocused its diplomatic
priorities toward improving relations with the former Soviet
Republics, Central Eastern Europe, and the developing Asian
countries.3 By the end of 1993, Moscow had adopted policies more
independent from the West; it now pursued two general foreign
policy aims: to defend Russia's "national interest" and to
achieve prominence in the international community.
The shift in Russia's foreign policy made tensions between
the industrialized world and Moscow inevitable, especially as the
Russian government pursued what it considered as its own vital
"national interests." For example, the Russian conflict in
Chechnya drew much criticism from the Western European nations.
On January 19, 1995, the European Parliament voted to postpone
the signing of an interim trade and economic agreement between
Russia and the European Union in response to Moscow's atrocities.
In the subsequent month, tensions between Washington and Moscow
grew as the U.S. Government sought to stop the Russians from
constructing a nuclear plant in Iran. The Russian government
refused to back down, arguing that Washington's aims were to
eliminate its competitors rather than protect international
security.4
Current political developments within Russia suggest that
the future of Moscow's ties with the West will be increasingly
turbulent. Most notable is the growing nationalist sentiment
among politicians and the populace to restore the "Great Power"
status of Russia. More people are accusing the West of hindering
Russia's attempt to take its rightful place in the world
community and for being the catalyst of the country's many social
and economic ills. Nationalist and Communist parties which
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subscribe to these beliefs are becoming more vocal and popular
among the Russian people. The large victory for the Ultranationalist and Communist forces in the December 1995
parliamentary election attests to their growing strength. The
Russian Federation Communist Party alone succeeded in capturing a
third of the 450 legislative seats in the Duma. Combined with the
nationalist groups, the "red" party, along with its political
comrades, hold a majority in the Duma.5 Moreover, the recent
resignation of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Deputy Prime
Minister Anatoly Chubais, and other like-minded reformers--and
their replacement with hardliners--marked the end of the proWestern faction within the Yeltsin Administration. The era of a
Russia compliant with the West is over. The question is, what
will the future of Moscow's relationship with the Western powers
be as Russia proceeds down a more hardline and nationalist path?
Russia's Ties to Northeast Asia: Sources of Instability.
Moscow recognized clearly the important diplomatic
opportunities and vast economic resources available in the
Northeast Asia region. The Russian government actively sought to
establish ties with Northeast Asia's economic giants, but these
new-forming ties became a source of tension, resurrecting some
old problems and creating new ones in the region.
Among the dynamic Asian countries, Russia saw the importance
of Japan's growing regional and global role. To tap into the
resources of Asia, seeking better relations with Japan was an
important task. From the beginning, however, trouble plagued
Russia's attempts. Central to Russo-Japanese relations is the
Northern territories dispute. During the closing days of World
War II, Soviet forces occupied the Kurile Islands (or Northern
territories) as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. In
the mid-1950s, Moscow and Tokyo began talks over Soviet
occupation of the Kurile Islands. Under the banner of "peaceful
coexistence," Nikita Khrushchev made gestures over the islands
issue to win the favor of the newly-elected Japanese Prime
Minister, Ichiro Hatoyama, who promoted a more independent
foreign policy than the previous, pro-U.S. Yoshida
Administration. Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to
undermine American influence in Japan and the U.S.-Japanese
mutual security pact, and to normalize relations with Japan.6 In
1956, Moscow made an agreement with the Japanese government to
return the two smaller islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the
completion of a peace treaty between the two countries. However,
the promise was short-lived. Moscow unilaterally retracted its
pledge in 1960.7
Almost 30 years passed before discussions between Japan and
Russia on the Northern territory issue began again. New talks on
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the islands started, following a visit to Tokyo by Edward
Shervardnaze in December 1988. Tokyo and Moscow agreed to
establish a joint working group to study the dispute and,
hopefully, bring about a resolution and conclude a peace treaty
between the two governments, but little was resolved.
President Boris Yeltsin and the new Russian government
continued the previous administration's endeavor to restore
Russo-Japanese relations. To do so, they understood that a more
flexible attitude toward the Northern Territories dispute was
paramount. The Russian government agreed to three concessions: to
support the demilitarization of the disputed islands; to
reconfirm the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration in which
Moscow agreed to return the smaller islands after the conclusion
of a peace treaty; and to discuss the disputed ownership of the
Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands (the two larger islands). By
demonstrating an open mind on the Kurile Islands issue, Yeltsin
hoped to win the favor of Tokyo and draw much needed economic
assistance into Russia.8
These concessions drew heavy criticism from conservative
groups within the Russian leadership and the military. Critics
argued that the islands were of extreme strategic importance.
First, they said, the islands served as a natural line of defense
for the Russian Far East, as well as the Sea of Okhostk, where
Soviet ballistic missile submarines were stationed. Moreover, the
islands were critical in safeguarding the passageway for ships
traveling from Russia's Vladivostok naval base to the Pacific
Ocean.9
Moderate groups in the government also joined the opposition
to Yeltsin's policies. Although not as extreme as conservative
groups in rejecting any form of territorial transfer, they saw
that the islands could be used as a bargaining chip in a grand
tension-reduction plan among Japan, the United States, and China
to ensure Russian security in the region.10
The strong opposition among Russian elites forced Yeltsin
and his supporters to reevaluate their policy for a quick
territorial transfer. Internal Russian opposition to the demands
of the Japanese government to return the islands led President
Yeltsin to postpone two trips to Tokyo, which angered the
Japanese government. Yeltsin finally traveled to Tokyo in July
1993, but refused to yield to the pressures of the Japanese
government to explicitly reaffirm the 1956 declaration. Instead,
he simply stated that he would uphold all international
agreements and treaties made between the Soviet Union and Japan.11
The two countries have yet to resolve this contentious issue.
Japanese public attitudes toward Russia have been negatively
affected, not only by the lack of significant progress on the
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island issue and the postponement of Yeltsin's trips to Tokyo,
but also by reports that Russia has been dumping nuclear waste
into the Sea of Japan.12 Moreover, continuous reports from Japan's
Defense Agency that Russia may be a potential medium or long-term
military threat further harmed Japan's view of Russia. Following
Gorbachev's announcement of reductions in Soviet military forces
in May 1989, Russia's military presence in the Far East has
quantitatively declined, but qualitatively improved, with
continual military equipment modernization. Moscow shifted a
large portion of its state-of-the art military arsenal,
especially combat forces that were once stationed in Eastern
Europe, from west of the Urals to the eastern region. Twenty-six
army divisions supported by high-tech equipment, such as T-80
tanks, MI-24 Hind air-to-ground attack helicopters, and other
top-line vehicles, still remain positioned in the Far East
region. In addition, Russia has deployed approximately 1,000
combat aircraft comprised of fourth generation fighters and
strategic bombers, such as the Su-25 Frogfoot, MiG-29 Fulcrum,
MiG-31 Foxhound and Tu-22M Backfire. The powerful Pacific fleet
consists of 675 ships (65 major surface ships and 65 submarines)
with a total displacement of 1,680,000 tons.13
Russian military activities and exercises have decreased
since the end of the Cold War, and general military readiness, as
witnessed in Chechnya, has declined due to Russia's economic
crisis and low military morale. With the lack of internal
stability and resources, it is unlikely that Russia will be a
significant military player, let alone a security threat, in the
Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. But Russia has
gone through periods like this before, when domestic
considerations and difficulties diverted its attention away from
the Pacific. In each case, the preoccupation passed, and Russia
returned to the region with new vigor. There is little reason to
expect that it will be different this time. The question is, how
long before Russia revives its strength in the region? No one can
know for sure, but 20 years would be a reasonable time frame,
assuming that no further disasters befall its transition.
Anticipating Russia's recovery, Japan, China, and the United
States are all attempting to establish normal relationships with
Moscow. However, with Russia's legacy of hostility and aggression
in the region and under current expectations, it is reasonable to
assume that the resurgence of Russia could be a destabilizing
factor.14 Japan's Defense Agency expressed these anxieties in a
recent White Paper:
The future developments of Russian forces are unclear
because of unstable domestic political and economic
conditions in Russia. Accordingly, the developments of
the Russian forces in the Far East become uncertain.
The existence of Russian forces in the Far East still

5

constitutes a destabilizing factor for the security of
this region.15
However, these sources of tension have not evolved into
major diplomatic crises between Russia and Japan. In fact, the
two countries often have put problematic issues such as the
Northern Territories dispute on hold and carried on cordial
cooperation. Japan has gone so far as to contribute aid to
Russia, although sometimes with reservations. The end of the Cold
War has removed Russian and Japanese ideological enmity, but the
seeds of tension remain between the two regional powers which
have a history of conflict. With a precarious Russian political
future and an Asia-Pacific region in transition, the future of
Russo-Japanese relations is uncertain.
China: A Central Player's Rapproachment with Russia.
Another significant development in the East Asia region has
been the rapprochement between China and Russia. Since the
establishment of official diplomatic ties in 1989, Beijing and
Moscow have cooperated in many areas that make it hard to believe
that little more than a decade ago, these two governments were
implacable foes. Of special note are the military ties that have
formed between Moscow and Beijing. Arms sales between the two
countries have been active. In December 1992, they signed a joint
communique agreeing to strengthen military cooperation through
the Chinese purchase of Russian military arms. Russia agreed to
supply China with Su-27 Flankers, Su-31 trainers, MiG-31
Foxhounds, Tu-22M Backfire medium-range bombers, T-72 tanks, S300
surface-to-air missiles, and IL-76M Candid transports. Moreover,
four Kilo class submarines have been delivered, and talks are
underway for Beijing to purchase 22 more.16 According to a recent
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report,
China's total purchase of Russian arms and equipment in 1991-1994
was estimated as between $4.5-6 billion.17
More alarming than military sales are technological
transfers and cooperation between the two countries. A Memorandum
of Understanding on Sino-Russian Military Equipment and
Technology Cooperation was signed in 1992. Since then, the
Chinese government has employed hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian
military scientists in its defense industries. Most of these
individuals work on developing high-tech armaments and nuclear
weapons.18 One military expert, Tai Ming Cheung, described the
situation:
Chinese military and military industrial delegations
visit Moscow and many other Russian cities on virtually
a continuous basis today. The Chinese Embassy in Moscow
has considerably expanded its military representation
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to be able to handle this heavy volume of traffic.19
This active military tie is based on a marriage of
convenience. Russia, in need of hard currency, found China more
than willing to purchase Russian high-tech military equipment and
state-of-the-art military technology. For the Chinese government,
finding advanced arms sellers available among the world's
democracies has been more than difficult because of the Tiananmen
Square incident and because most other countries have important
commercial ties to Taiwan.
Moreover, both sides' flexibility in deals with each other
has made them even more attractive partners. For example, one
report described a deal made by Russia's Komsomolsk-na-Amure
Aviation Plant to sell Su-27 fighter aircraft to China. The plant
agreed to accept part of its payment in the form of canned meat
for its workers. Such a deal would have been absurd for British,
French, and American defense industries, but for two needy
countries such as China and Russia, the deal made sense.20
Why should Russo-Chinese military cooperation be viewed as a
threat? Chinese expansionism has been an area of concern for many
neighboring countries in Asia. China's active duty military, at
2.9 million personnel, is the largest military force in the
world. Numerically, the Chinese navy ranks third in the world.
According to one estimate, if all the ASEAN21 countries and Taiwan
were to combine their fleets, China would still possess a
slightly larger navy. Many Chinese warships are equipped with
outdated weapons systems, but some are known to be of "1980
vintage," equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
missiles and reasonably capable defense systems. China has long
lacked military projection capabilities for its navy and air
force, but it is clear that Russia is slowly providing the
technology and modern equipment to advance Chinese power
projection.22
During the Cold War, China pursued an aggressive nuclear
weapons program for deterrence and warfare. Today, China
possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world--14
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that, absent missile
defense systems, can hit virtually anywhere in the world, 60
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), one nuclear-armed
submarine, and countless tactical nuclear warheads. While the
United States and Russia have worked to reduce their nuclear
forces, China has continued to modernize and develop its nuclear
weapons and delivery systems.23 It continues nuclear tests in the
face of a consensus for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
Undoubtedly, China is one of the most dynamic countries in
the world. While the world reeled from a global recession during
1990-1993, China's economy expanded at an annual growth rate of
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13 percent. In 1995, China's economic growth rate reached 9
percent, far above the average global growth rate of 2.7 percent,
and even the average Asian growth rate of 7.9 percent. Growth in
1996 is forecast to be 9.7 percent.24 In 1993, an estimated $90
billion poured into China, equaling the total aggregate foreign
investment of the previous 14 years. Moreover, economists
forecast that China's imports will reach $1 trillion by the year
2000.25
China's vast military capability is clearly a source of
anxiety for many neighboring countries, but what heightens this
fear is China's booming economy. Although China's current
military now may be considered obsolete, combined with its
astounding potential economic strength and the technological base
that accompanies industrialization, modernizing China's military
into a force with regional and global power projection will soon
become a reality.
The question is, once China achieves combined capabilities,
how will Beijing project "power" in its various forms and for
what purposes? The question is very much on the minds of Asians,
expressed well in Washington by the new Japanese Foreign
Minister. Noting that China's defense spending has been
increasing by about 20 percent annually, he said, "Japan is not
defining China as an enemy, a threat or a risk," adding that,
nevertheless, Beijing's military buildup must be taken into
account as "an objective fact."26
U.S. Engagement in Asia: Losing Ground?
The end of the Cold War has periodically called into
question the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region. For more than
40 years, the United States had the major strategic objective of
containing the spreading influence of communism in the region. To
achieve this objective, America extended favorable aid and trade
to its Asian allies, attempting to nurture their economies,
establish stable governments, and station military forces in
strategic areas to offer security for these countries and U.S.
interests against threatening Communist forces.
The Soviet threat is gone, but the geo-political danger of
instability and conflict is not. There are internal
contradictions and latent regional problems that pose an
uncertain future which is recognized in U.S. policy. "It is [the
U.S. military] presence that the countries of the [Asia-Pacific]
region consider a critical variable in the East Asia security
equation . . . [and] the most important factor in guaranteeing
stability and peace."27
For at least the short term, Washington recognizes the
importance of the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region
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and has described the security details of our strategy of
engagement in the United States Security Strategy for the East
Asia Pacific Region. This report expressed three basic
principles. The first is "reinforcing alliances to identify their
new basis after the Cold War." The second is to maintain a
forward-based troop presence. These forces would provide for
continuing deterrence against belligerent countries (e.g., North
Korea), ensure U.S. involvement in emerging Asian affairs, and
protect U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The third is
the development of regional institutions, not to supplant
existing treaties and understandings with American allies, but to
build confidence among countries in the region.28
U.S. government policy statements have affirmed America's
commitment to Asia. Some in Asia may doubt the Clinton
administration's commitment, however, given the example of the
absence of President Clinton from the Asia-Pacific Economic
Council (APEC) meeting in Osaka, Japan, during November 1995.
Despite the understandable reason behind the President's
cancellation (the budget battle), some have called his failure to
attend this conference and to meet with Japanese Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama a blow to APEC and U.S.-Japan relations,
especially in light of the growing debate over U.S. troop
presence in Okinawa after the rape case of the Japanese school
girl.29
Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region foresee a "slow
but continuous" American withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific area,
continuing the process begun during the Nixon administration with
the 1969 Guam Doctrine, stipulating that Asian countries should
be more responsible for their own defense. This was followed by
subsequent military reductions in the region and even discussions
of pulling out U.S. troops--for example, President Carter's 1978
attempt to reduce ground troops in South Korea; the 1992 U.S.
East Asian Initiative to cut troops in South Korea by 6,500,
which was later postponed due to the North Korean nuclear threat;
closure of Philippine bases; and, reluctance to commit U.S.
troops to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Asian countries
believe that the U.S. military presence will continue to
diminish, creating a power vacuum that China, Japan, or perhaps
even India or Russia may try to fill.30
The fears of the Asian governments have been exacerbated by
increasing domestic political concern in some quarters that U.S.
military strategy is outdated and that the costly U.S. military
presence abroad needs to be reduced in Asia. Critics complain
that American defense policies have not changed much from the
Cold War period, despite the absence of a Soviet threat and the
increased importance of economic cooperation and development:
[Current US defense policy] offers a military
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substitute for the failure of the United States to
produce an effective trade and investment strategy
toward East Asia . . . [This defense policy is] a sign
of U.S. policy's bankruptcy in the new global economic
center of gravity, East Asia.31
Some scholars argue that although the United States may
maintain a military presence, its economic position and
importance in the region will decline, as exemplified by
America's losing economic battle with Japan in the 1980s and
early 1990s. U.S. aid, investment, and trade in Asia were
comparable to Japan in the 1980s, but over time Japan outstripped
the United States. "U.S. failure to adequately attend to its
economic interests in the Asian-Pacific region, coupled with
Washington's proclivity toward tactical, rather than strategic,
geo-economic thinking toward the region, looms as the next
‘crisis' in U.S. external economic relations."32
Critics blame a sense of "American complacency" that is
undercutting American economic presence in the region. They argue
that Americans have ignored the business opportunities that exist
in Asia and have disregarded the significant threat that Japan
and other Asian countries pose. U.S. businesses, rather than
establishing a long-term presence in the developing Asian
economies through investments in the manufacturing and
distribution sectors, focus on immediate, high profits from small
volume trade with Asian countries. These same scholars attribute
America's complacency to two assumptions: first, that countries
which suffered the atrocities of Japanese expansionism during
World War II, such as the ASEAN countries, would not permit the
Japanese to dominate the region economically, and second, that a
large and expensive U.S. military presence in the region would
provide adequate leverage to grant U.S. initiatives to gain
economic advantages.33
These assumptions, however, may be questionable. First of
all, time heals wounds. As generations pass, the atrocities of
World War II have become more distant psychologically. Secondly,
Japanese investments increasingly are attractive to Asian
governments and consumers. For example, leaders in Singapore,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand all have urged Japan to
demonstrate greater regional leadership.34
The bottom line is that economic and security equations have
been switched.
Where once America's role as the security guarantor of
the region ensured certain derivative economic
benefits, now that the United States has become a
secondary economic presence in Asia, there is no reason
to believe that Americans will continue to support a

10

big security presence there unless the economic tide
can be stemmed.35
Inevitably, increasing economic tensions, over time, will
put pressure on the security relationship. The questions are:
how long will America's large and expensive security presence
last, given declining U.S. defense budgets and a relatively
declining economic presence; alternatively, can the United States
develop an effective strategy to shore up its economic presence?
The problem is that, while the United States is in the region, it
is not a part of the region. In 1995, the U.S. Department of
State talked about the American role as the "honest broker" in
the Asia-Pacific. But what Asians know is that brokers, no matter
how honest they may be, are not necessarily investors. New U.S.
strategy must place the United States as an in-place regional
power, both in political-military and economic terms.36
The Fear of Japanese Militarism.
The question of regional security and America's military
commitments in Northeast Asia raise the issue of "Japanese
militarism." Since 1945, the United States has guaranteed Japan's
external security, while Japan maintained a limited self-defense
force. Sometimes, however, there were apparently contradictory
U.S. pressures for Japan to protect sea lanes that were 1,000
miles beyond its coast. However, this unique security treaty
between the United States and Japan allayed the fears of Asian
countries of an expansionist Japan. But, given the changed
international environment and Japan's evolution toward regional
and global leader,
[Japan] can no longer be a passive follower of global
and regional developments and must become a major
shaker and mover of international affairs . . . . It is
clear that Japan has the potential to so change itself
and its policy.37
As the justification for the U.S. presence in Japan is
increasingly called into question, Asian countries increasingly
are suspicious of Japan's long-term outlook for its security. The
inability of Japan to come to terms fully with its activities
before and during World War II until recently contributed to
Asian countries' concerns. Moreover, the public outcry from the
recent case of American servicemen raping a young Japanese girl
in Okinawa has shaken U.S.-Japan security ties and has made U.S.
troop presence in Okinawa a major political issue in Japan. In a
recent speech to Japan's Diet, the newly-elected Prime Minister,
Ryutaro Hashimoto, stated that, although the U.S.-Japan military
alliance is essential, the 47,000 U.S. troops in Okinawa will be
reduced.38 The question is, by how much will U.S. troops be
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reduced? How will this affect the strategic balance in the
region? And, will this reduction set a precedent as a solution
for future problems between Japan and the United States?
The defense policy announced in November 1995 suggests that,
at least for the foreseeable future, the Japanese government will
not expand its military. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces
will be reduced from 180,000 to 145,000 over the next 10 years.
The number of tanks will be cut from 1,200 to 940. The Japanese
Maritime Self-defense Force (JMSDF) will slash 20 percent of its
60 surface vessels and halve its minesweeping fleet. The
Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) will cut 10 percent of
its 350 fighters. Moreover, the military will be called to play a
greater role in disaster relief and anti-terrorism.39 Despite
these cuts and more defensive posturing, Asian countries still
eye suspiciously Japan's long-term military strategy. What causes
fear among these countries is that the great economic strength
that Japan has accumulated over the years can translate itself
into military prowess and expansionism if Tokyo chooses to do
so.40
Although Japan's military force is designed for defending
the Japanese islands, it possesses one of the most capable and
modern military establishments in the region. Japan could achieve
an imposing, modern warfare potential, as well as a highly
effective self-defense capacity. For example, the JASDF and JMSDF
are estimated to have one of the most competent high-tech warfare
capabilities in the world, possessing such systems as F-15 Eagle
fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
and Patriot Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).41
The Japanese nuclear program has also drawn attention. It is
estimated that Japan's plutonium reprocessing program has enough
weapons-grade, reprocessed plutonium for over 300 nuclear weapons
by the year 2000. However, by 2010, some estimates predict that
Japan's supply of plutonium could reach 80-90 tons, enough
material to produce as much as 10,000 nuclear weapons. In
addition, Japan is expected to acquire Tomahawk missiles and have
long-range capabilities through the development of its space
program.42
There is considerable debate whether Japan will assert
itself as a major military power in the region. Given
uncertainties in Japan about the transition period in Asia, the
potential threat of Chinese military power, and the state of
U.S.-Japan relations, a more independent defense policy is
likely. A breakout of regional conflicts in such places as the
Korean peninsula or the South China Sea could push Japan into
remilitarization and military nuclearization. Given historical
animosities in Northeast Asia, such events could lead to an
extremely volatile region.
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As dangerous as these trends may seem, recent developments
on the Korean peninsula present just as great a threat to
regional security. Secretary of State Warren Christopher recently
described the Korean crisis as "ended."43 This is a mischaracterization of the Agreed Framework signed in 1994. Other
regional crises have detracted attention from the emerging
instability on the peninsula.
Impact on the Korean Peninsula.
What do all these trends imply for the Korean peninsula? The
end of the Cold War certainly changed the balance between the
North and South. From 1945 through the 1980s, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -North Korea and the Republic
of Korea (ROK) -South Korea sustained a relatively even military
balance, with the Soviet Union and China supporting the DPRK and
the United States aligned with and supporting the ROK.
This rough balance began to change in the late 1980s. Soviet
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's agreement to participate in
the 1988 Seoul Olympics was an early sign of things to come. The
Soviets started to demand hard currency from the DPRK for
military equipment and support, and began to warm relations with
Seoul, seeking South Korea's capital, technology, and management
expertise. To ameliorate North Korea's objections, Moscow
promised Pyongyang in May 1988 that no diplomatic relations would
be established with Seoul. But soon after the Olympics, Moscow
and Seoul signed a preliminary trade agreement with the South
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation and invited South Korean
companies to invest in Moscow and Leningrad. Again, the Soviet
government assured Pyongyang that Moscow would not establish
formal political ties with Seoul. Pyongyang clearly did not
believe the Soviets and accelerated development of their nuclear
weapons program--despite Pyongyang's 1985 signing of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).44 In 1989, it was clear that formal
diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union would
occur. Economic and political exchanges increased, which
culminated in the meeting of Gorbachev and ROK President Roh Tae
Woo in San Francisco where both governments agreed to eventual
formal diplomatic ties.45 On September 30, 1990, Moscow and Seoul
established formal diplomatic relations; in December, the South
Korean President made his first official trip to Moscow in which
South Korea offered a $3 billion credit for South Korean goods
and later extended an additional $3 billion credit. On April 20,
1991, President Roh Tae Woo hosted Gorbachev on Cheju Island,
where Gorbachev proposed to negotiate a treaty of friendship and
cooperation.46
The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russian
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President Boris Yeltsin did not bring any change to the growing
Russian preference of South Korea over the North. Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev visited Pyongyang in January 1992
as a special envoy of President Boris Yeltsin. His trip was not
to reaffirm Moscow's ties to Pyongyang, but the reverse; he was
there mainly to discuss a reinterpretation of the military clause
and weaken Moscow's commitment to the existing bilateral Treaty
of Friendship. Although the trip ended with no real consensus,
the treaty was essentially dead.47 In March 1992, Boris Yeltsin
sent Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on a goodwill tour to China,
Japan, and South Korea. Blatantly, North Korea was left out of
the itinerary.48
South Korea further strengthened its position with the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China in August
1992. President Roh Tae Woo's "Northern Policy" (establishing
relations with Moscow and Beijing to undermine North Korea)
worked, and the ROK won major diplomatic victories over the DPRK.
This, however, did not mean that unification would soon occur or
even that the Korean peninsula would stabilize. In fact, the
reward for these diplomatic victories is, in some ways, a more
unstable peninsula and possibly a precarious future. Winning over
the Russians and Chinese did not increase the leverage of Seoul
over Pyongyang. In fact, the cooling ties between Moscow and
Pyongyang quickly eliminated a major outside player who could
serve as a catalyst to prevent dangerous North Korean politicalmilitary posturing. Beijing remains the last significant force
beyond Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo which might induce Pyongyang
to accommodate the wishes of the international community. Beijing
in recent years urged North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons
program and continue discussions with South Korea. But, Chinese
officials report that their leverage with Pyongyang has decreased
significantly since the establishment of formal relations with
Seoul in August 1992.49
Clearly North Korea's isolation has created some major
problems for both North and South Korea, the paramount problem
being the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. With the loss of
support from Beijing and Moscow, Kim Il-sung confronted the
DPRK's decline in credibility in relations with the ROK and the
United States. North Korea could no longer depend on the Soviet
nuclear umbrella for defense against "the imperialists."50
Pyongyang perceived this new reality as a menacing threat to its
security, stability, and very survival. Thus, when Pyongyang
realized that the loyalty of the USSR was in question, it
accelerated its nuclear program. By the time Gorbachev met with
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco, Soviet
officials were well aware of the advanced nature of North Korea's
nuclear program and informed the American government of the
DPRK's progress.51
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The North Korean government used its nuclear weapons
program, or the appearance of developing a nuclear weapons
program, as a bargaining tactic. This strategy proved to be a
great success for Pyongyang, while a source of grave
embarrassment for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. By
manipulating the international community's fear of its nuclear
program and relying on the DPRK's most common diplomatic tactic
of "brinkmanship," Pyongyang attracted more attention and
exercised more influence over the United States, South Korea, and
Japan than since the Korean War. Again and again, the North
Koreans have pushed the outside world--and in particular the
United States--to the brink of a major international crisis to
achieve their aims. It is a familiar pattern in their diplomatic
behavior to push an incident involving "the imperialists" as far
as they safely can to find out what kind of resistance they meet,
then back off, and gain whatever concessions and propaganda value
they can. Wagering bets that they cannot cover, Pyongyang has
often managed to win, gathering concessions for retreating from a
position that it could not cover, were the United States and its
South Korean and Japanese allies truly to call its bluff. Given
the calculus of political, military, economic, and social
"power," realistically North Korea should not have the ability to
coerce the United States, South Korea, and Japan in the way that
they often do. But through shrewd diplomacy and a stark military
lifestyle, the DPRK repeatedly convinces the West--and the United
States in particular--that it is better to buy off North Korea
than to challenge it.
Some Realities on the Korean Peninsula.
The end of the Cold War has not decreased the long-standing
DPRK threat to South Korea. North Korea has about 65 percent of
its 1.1 million, well-equipped armed forces deployed forward
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a posture that is akin to
"hugging Seoul." Under present military circumstances, the U.S.ROK Combined Forces Command, backed up by U.S. reinforcements,
would win any mid-to high-intensity conflict on the Korean
Peninsula in 120 days or less--but Seoul would be utterly
destroyed in the first few days.52 Given the broad extent of Seoul
after years of urban sprawl, that could mean devastation for
roughly 11 million people and over 25 percent of South Korea's
economy. Also affected would be the roughly 60,000 American
military and civilian personnel and their dependents living in
the South, mainly in the Seoul area. This is an awesome fact for
Seoul and Washington to contemplate. In addition, the DPRK's
chemical-and biological-(if not nuclear) capable Nodong 1 and
Nodong 2 missiles can
reach Japan; a much longer-range missile is
under development.53
These military factors provide the backdrop for DPRK
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brinkmanship. Those who argue that the DPRK would never attack
south, knowing that this would be a literal act of suicide, are
not supported by North Korean rhetoric:
Comrades: Today, our people's army has the heavy and
honorable task of reunifying the fatherland with guns
in the nineties without fail and completing the Juche
revolutionary cause, the socialist cause to the end. .
. . Only when we strengthen the people's army, can we
crush all challenges of the enemy with revolutionary
guns and firmly guarantee the honorable Kim Jong-il
era. . . . If the fatherland is not reunified, no
officer or man or soldier can say that they have
fulfilled their duty and they also do not have the
right to die. . . .54
There are even scenarios under which a North Korean attack
south would not equate with suicide. For example, with severe
domestic economic problems and massive hunger, the North
leadership seeks to divert the attention of its people by
magnifying the external threat from South Korea and its
imperialist allies. Additionally, they also question the
political resolve of South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang
senses the significant political instability and ongoing
constitutional crisis in the South. North Korea also assessed
that the United States was militarily overstretched by
deployments in Bosnia, Haiti, the Persian Gulf States, and
elsewhere, and was plagued by political gridlock in a
presidential election year.
What if Pyongyang launched a very short-warning attack and,
despite suffering massive losses to the high-tech systems of the
U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, quickly moved to encircle
Seoul in a limited attack, halted, made its case to the world
community concerning ROK military provocation born of its own
political instability, and sued for peace? With tens of thousands
of Americans and millions of South Koreans still trapped in the
Seoul area, what should be the U.S. response? Or Japan's
response? Russia or China? The United Nations Security Council?
Does the DPRK have one, two, or more deliverable nuclear weapons?
Would they use the chemical and biological weapons we know they
can deliver by multiple means? In such a scenario, would an
attack be irrational or suicidal?
North Korea's Economic Crisis.
With the fall of North Korea's East European communist
trading partners and the end of the "cordial and generous"
economic trade relations with China and the Soviet Union in 1991,
the North Korean economy became virtually paralyzed. Pyongyang
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looked to these countries for machinery, advanced industrial
equipment, fuel, and other vital imports to sustain its economic
development.55 In 1990, Moscow ended its barter trade with North
Korea and demanded hard currency for its exports. Pyongyang,
unable to pay, reduced its trade with the former Soviet Union
from just over $1.7 billion (at official ruble-dollar exchange
rates) in 1990 to approximately $600 million in 1991--a drop of
more than 70 percent in Soviet imports. Imports from the former
Soviet Union continued to drop in 1992 and 1993, until import
levels sank to less than 10 percent of the average volume of
imports that were annually entering the DPRK between 1987-1990.56
Among the traded goods, crude oil was dramatically affected.
Petroleum imports dropped from 800,000 tons to 30,000 tons in
1991 and 1992.57 China followed suit and ended its favorable trade
relations with North Korea. In 1992, Beijing raised its oil
prices close to international market prices and demanded that
exports from China be paid with hard currency--the DPRK's
scarcest resource.
The sudden demands by North Korea's "allies" and the drop of
fuel imports caused a severe energy crisis in North Korea,
further exacerbated by a reduction in DPRK coal production.58 This
decline in energy supplies produced devastating effects on the
economy. Due to the lack of energy and raw materials, "North
Korean watchers" estimated that many of Pyongyang's industries
were working at less than half-capacity.59 The economy contracted
by 3.7 percent (1990), 5.2 percent (1991), 7.6 percent (1992),
4.3 percent (1993), and 1.7 percent (1994) respectively.60
Food production also dropped sharply. Grain production fell
by 12.2 percent in 1990, 8.9 percent in 1991, 3.6 percent in
1992, and 9.0 percent in 1993.61 In 1994, North Korea finally
reversed this downward spiral and achieved a 6.2 percent growth;62
despite this improvement, North Korea's agricultural sector still
could not meet the demands of its populace. The gains of 1994
quickly vanished the following year as waves of unprecedented
floods and bad weather destroyed arable lands and exacerbated the
country's food problems; the Food and Agricultural Organization
and the World Food Programme estimated that North Korea's final
1995 grain production would only reach 4 million tons in 1995,
far below the 7 million tons North Korea needed.63 With the
average North Korean citizen eating only two meals a day and
receiving but one-fourth of the basic nutritional requirement,
United Nations relief officials fear that natural disasters may
cause mass starvation. A recent World Health Organization report
stated that more than 20 percent of children under 5 years may be
already suffering from malnutrition, potentially increasing
sharply the infant mortality rate.64 World relief organizations
and foreign governments--including South Korea--have responded to
the DPRK's distress call by offering food shipments, medicine,
and other humanitarian support, but Pyongyang claims foreign
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assistance has been far from adequate.
Seoul, however, believes that the shortages in the north
have been exaggerated. South Korean officials argue that
Pyongyang could ease the suffering of its citizens if it were
willing to tap into the enormous stockpile of food stored to
supply the DPRK's massive armed forces in wartime.65 Moreover,
North Korea's crisis is a symptom of its economic isolation and
the inefficiencies of a socialist economy. The question is, how
much longer can the DPRK continue in a deteriorating state before
the country begins to unravel? Probably a lot longer than many
analysts think--if the United States, South Korea, and Japan
continue the present humanitarian program involving millions of
tons of oil and rice.
Under the growing pressures of a deteriorating economy,
Pyongyang has been forced to adopt policies that go beyond an
orthodox communist command economy, but only under controlled
conditions to prevent the disruption of the Communist Party's
control. The most notable such effort has been to establish a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the remote Rajin-Sonbong region,
where it hopes to attract foreign capital and technology. The
North Korean leadership is currently trying to sell the zone's
many attractive benefits--tax breaks, a cheap and highly skilled
labor force, and a potentially large consumer market. Although
many foreign countries have shown interest, few have actually
invested. An underdeveloped infrastructure, the lack of a banking
system, an unstable political environment, and a poor credit
history are among the many uninviting characteristics that
discourage international investment. South Korean companies have
traditionally been among the most enthusiastic investors into
North Korea, but Seoul has restricted new investments as long as
Pyongyang persists in its recalcitrant rhetoric, efforts to
destabilize Seoul, and foot-dragging on the full resolution of
the nuclear weapons issue. Without the lead of South Korean
companies, it is unlikely other foreign countries will risk
investing, particularly when there are other more secure and
lucrative markets available, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. The
prospects for the Rajin-Sonbong SEZ as a remedy to North Korea's
economic deterioration are slim.
South Korea's Economy.
Since the early 1960s, South Korea has experienced
extraordinary growth. South Korea's gross national product (GNP)
increased from $1.35 billion in 1953 to $376.9 billion in 1994.
Per capita annual income during the same period rose from $67 to
$8,483, an increase of more than 126-fold. In 1995, South Korea's
per capita GNP is expected to top $10,000. During the period
1970-1994, the ROK's annual economic growth averaged 8.1
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percent.66 Estimates are that in 1992 South Korea's total GNP
stood 14 times greater than that of North Korea. South Korea's
phenomenal growth has been attributed to such factors as its
highly-skilled and educated labor force working at low wages; the
adoption of foreign technology and capital; an export-led growth
strategy; and close state-business relations, which have incurred
mammoth political problems.67
Seoul's warming relations with Moscow and Beijing opened new
economic opportunities for South Korea's economy. Bilateral trade
between Russia and South Korea has increased enormously; for the
period of 1988-1991, trade averaged an annual growth rate of 68.1
percent. In 1987, trade was a mere $151 million, but by 1994, it
had reached more than $2.2 billion.68 More impressive yet are
China-South Korea economic relations. Even before China opened
direct trade ties with the ROK, indirect trade grew rapidly in
the 1980s. The ROK-operated trade promotion organization (KOTRA)
and the Chinese Chamber of International Commerce, which had
established offices in each capital, reached a bilateral trade
volume of $5.8 billion for 1991.69 By 1995, the trade volume
increased to almost $17 billion. Today, South Korea is China's
fifth largest trading partner, and China is South Korea's third
largest.70 South Korean officials predict that the total trade
between the two countries could reach $50 billion by the year
2000.71
The Nuclear Issue.
The nuclear question on the Korean peninsula has provided
several occasions for the DPRK to use brinkmanship to push the
United States to accede to North Korean demands. Over the past
several years, Pyongyang has repeatedly violated its legal
obligations under the Nuclear NPT and stonewalled the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), taking relations with
the United States close to the brink of war in the summer of
1994. Tensions then were at one of the highest points since the
Korean War. Having sent a message to Seoul and Washington in
April that they would not extract the fuel rods from their 5megawatt nuclear reactor without IAEA inspection and supervision,
they did just that. In brief, they lied.72 Then, using a standing
invitation for Jimmy Carter to visit and offering an approach
which Jimmy Carter told the world on Cable News Network (CNN) was
"new" (the light water reactor offer), the North began backing
off to get from Washington the very concessions subsequently
granted in the Agreed Framework, signed in Geneva on October 21,
1994.73
The DPRK has reasons for this behavior. Even before the
death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, it was clear that the North's
leadership had concluded that the United States lacked the will
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and staying power to manage a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
They decided to go on the offensive by playing their nuclear
card. They believed that the United States was unwilling to call
their bluff--especially because Seoul became very nervous about
the military threat brought on by sanctions. Major questions that
surround the nuclear issue remain, and Pyongyang now believes it
can play its trump card again when the need arises for
concessions from Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo.74
Pyongyang gave up very little in the Agreed Framework--only
the near-term capability to process more weapons-grade plutonium.
This "sacrifice" is minor, especially in light of what they
received from Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo: millions of tons of
free oil for many years to come; diplomatic equality in
negotiations with the United States which, despite U.S.-ROK
solidarity efforts, has tended to marginalize Seoul; progress
toward ending its external diplomatic isolation while giving up
none of the internal isolation upon which the Juche system
depends; retention of secrecy about its past and present nuclear
weapons program for at least another 5 years; and free
construction of the infrastructure for light water reactors, with
the potential to acquire later the start-up technology from a
non-U.S. source.
It is important to note that the political-military value of
nuclear weapons for North Korea does not come from possessing a
large number of nuclear devices, but from possessing, or being
believed to possess, a sufficient number of deliverable nuclear
weapons to make it a credible nuclear player.75 Whatever the
actual status of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Agreed
Framework permits Pyongyang to conceal details until it is ready
to reveal them--which it will probably do in the walkup to
another crisis to gain major concessions.
What kind of challenge does the North Korean nuclear weapons
program pose for South Korea and the region? First, if Pyongyang
does have one or more deliverable nuclear weapons, it can pose a
direct threat to its neighboring countries. Second, Pyongyang
extracts diplomatic leverage out of the strong suspicions that it
has (or is developing) deliverable nuclear weapons. Third, a
North Korean nuclear program may influence the decision of other
countries to adopt nuclear weapons.76
Collapse and Reunification.
The rapidly declining economic condition and uncertainties
about Kim Jong-il's hold on power lead many to ponder the
possibility of North Korea's collapse.
Seoul fears that a huge migration would occur after a
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collapse of communist power as North Korean refugees sought to
escape hunger and poverty. As one South Korean economist
commented, "Imagine what would happen if even a thousand North
Korean refugees came and camped on the banks of the Han River. .
. . We couldn't handle it."77
A more pressing and even more problematic question is what
the North Korean military would do in a scenario of a imminent
collapse of the DPRK. The answer is that the military would obey
its orders. Would it attack the South if ordered to do so?
Certainly, it would. Isolated, paranoid, wracked by the "bunker
mentality" to take a last grasp at victory or go down buttressed
by possession of one or two deliverable nuclear weapons, the DPRK
government might order an attack south with conventional weapons,
take Seoul, halt, and sue for peace (in the belief that their
nuclear weapons would deter a counterattack). In an even worse
case scenario, it might use them as a final act of insanity.
Immediate reunification of the Korean peninsula also has its
downside. Although both North and South Korea purportedly want
reunification, such an act in the immediate future would have a
devastating effect on South Korea. Some reports estimate that
Seoul would have to invest somewhere between $200 billion to $1
trillion to rebuild and modernize North Korea, but no one really
knows the true cost. South Korea could not afford an immediate
reunification without suffering mass disruption of its society
and economy. After seeing the disruption of the rapid German
unification and the problems that ensued, many in Seoul's
political hierarchy now seek an alternative by which they
gradually close the large economic disparity between North and
South Korea before reunification takes place.78
But for now, Pyongyang determines when and if (and how)
reunification would take place--not Seoul, and certainly not
Washington.
The Road Ahead.
The two Koreas stand in stark contrast across the board. The
North is a rapidly decaying dictatorship with the military
capability to inflict severe damage to Seoul and Japan; it has no
allies. The South has advanced significantly as a democracy, has
a vibrant economy, and has a strong ally in the United States
dedicated to its security.
Unfortunately, for the near-term security of the Northeast
Asia region, the two Koreas share one thing--severe domestic
crises. For North Korea, the crisis is triggered by a crumbling
economy and a severe food shortage, approaching famine. For South
Korea, a severe political scandal and ruptured party politics
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perhaps impel the nation toward constitutional crisis.
Pyongyang, eager to divert the attention of its people away
from their domestic problems and, perhaps, sensing political
weakness in South Korea, and military over-extension and
political gridlock in United States, has put its forward-deployed
forces along the DMZ on a high state of alert. The government in
Seoul, nervous about DPRK military capabilities and intentions
and perhaps itself hoping to divert the attention of its
population away from domestic political troubles, has placed its
forces on a higher level of alert as well. This mirror-imaging
has created high tensions along the DMZ. Wars begin in such
circumstances based on accident or miscalculation.
None of the major actors in the Northeast Asia region
coordinate their policies toward North Korea very well. The
fragile new coordination between the United States, South Korea,
and Japan in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) cannot mask important differences in other aspects of
policy toward North Korea among Russia, China, the United States,
South Korea and Japan. At least the United States, the ROK, and
Japan reached a trilateral cooperation agreement on November 17,
1995, in Osaka and met in Honolulu on January 24 and 25, 1996, to
discuss aid to North Korea. But, certainly, there is no crisis
consultative mechanism in place among the region's major actors.
Relations between the two Koreas are approaching a dangerous
crossroads.
Conclusion.
The post-Cold War era deepened the isolation and economic
deterioration of the DPRK and, conversely, permitted the gradual
democratization, rapid economic growth, and enhanced
international stature of the ROK. However, the Northeast Asia
region has been left with ever-increasing uncertainties. For both
Koreas, the rapid strengthening of China, the potential for
Japanese remilitarization, and the uncertain stability of Russia
are worrying. But the greatest cause for concern for both Koreas
remains the terms for the reunification both say they seek. The
nuclear Agreed Framework has taken the nuclear crisis off the
agendas of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo for the time being, but
that agreement is a frail framework on which to hang our hopes
for peaceful reunification. In the meantime, the politicalmilitary situation at the DMZ remains fragile.
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CHAPTER II
CHINA'S SECURITY POLICY ENTERS THE 21st CENTURY:
THE VIEW FROM BEIJING
Paul H. B. Godwin

. . . a strong and prosperous China is an irreversible
historical trend that no outside force can contain.
Introduction.
China's foreign policy is caught in a contradiction. On the
one hand, Beijing's domestic development goals require China to
maintain a constructive relationship with the international
system, especially Asia and the West, in order to sustain the
investment and trade essential for continued economic growth and
modernization. On the other, Beijing's military security
objectives are driving it to maintain defense modernization goals
which Asia and the United States increasingly view as potentially
threatening to the region in the long term.1 China is, therefore,
creating fears within Asia and in the United States that could
undermine Beijing's fundamental domestic development goals.
For some years, Beijing has protested that its security
policy is defensive and that its military acquisitions and
defense expenditures are modest, designed only to enhance China's
ability to defend itself. Within Asia, these protestations are
viewed with considerable skepticism.2 Beijing's defense budgets
increase year after year. Its military capabilities improve with
the assistance of European, Israeli, and especially Russian
technology transfers, and a renewed sense of nationalism appears
to be the driving force behind Chinese security policy.3
This essay will explore Beijing's response to the growing
contradiction between a foreign policy devoted to managing, if
not resolving, conflicts and potential conflicts with the many
states on its borders, and defense programs and policies creating
serious apprehension across Asia.
The Origins of China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy.
Beijing's leaders suffered a series of profound shocks as
the Cold War came to its close. With the Sino-Soviet dispute
about to be publicly concluded at the May 1989 Gorbachev-Deng
summit in Beijing, television cameras from around the globe
recorded a city out of control. Thousands of students occupied
Tiananmen Square, and hundreds of thousands of their supporters
blocked the surrounding streets and avenues. Humiliated, Deng
Xiaoping faced a divided leadership as he sought to bring order
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to the political heart of China. Failing to do so with the
moderate use of police and military forces, Deng compelled a
reluctant Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to use lethal
force. On the night of June 3-4, order was brutally restored.
Beijing's leaders then faced the sanctions and abhorrence of that
part of the world they needed most if Deng's goals for developing
China were to succeed--the West accompanied by a reluctant Japan.
Even as China was being viewed as a pariah state in the
West--a repressive throwback to the darkest days of Mao or
Stalin--the people of Eastern and Central Europe cast off their
Marxist-Leninist regimes. Communism's retreat continued as
Gorbachev dissolved the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Ultimately, the USSR itself disintegrated and the Union Republics
became sovereign entities. China had become the sole remaining
communist state of any consequence. Its socialist counterparts in
Cuba, Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were
impoverished societies whose economic and political futures were
very much in doubt; even in the Mongolian People's Republic
communism was tossed aside.
As Marxist-Leninist regimes crumbled in Europe and the USSR,
many Western observers asked whether the agony of Tiananmen
signaled the beginning of the end for China's communism. It was
not only the death throes of European Marxism-Leninism that led
to this question. Authoritarian regimes in the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan had modified their political systems and moved toward
more open and participatory processes as economic development
progressed. Dictatorial regimes of whatever ideological bent were
seen in the West as polities that had outlived the value they
once had--primarily that of ensuring order and stability as their
societies passed through the political and societal instabilities
that must evidently accompany the complex processes of
modernization and the creation of market economies.
China's aging political elite could not but recognize the
exhilaration and sense of victory in the West as the Cold War
ended and the USSR crumbled. Nor could they miss the sense of
triumph as a coalition of Western and non-Western states,
organized and led by the United States, crushed the armed forces
of Iraq in a brief, brilliant military campaign that emphasized
American technological prowess. From the fall of 1989 to December
1991, China's leaders watched the West's jubilant course. What
they also saw was their own military security become more
certain. If the new Russia should seek in the future to become a
world military power, it would not be for decades. Around China's
periphery, no state, or any probable combination of states,
presented a significant military threat. There were definite
apprehensions in Beijing that focused on Japan and India, but
there was no major imminent or near-term military threat to
China's security--nor would there be for at least the next
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decade.
This military security, nonetheless, came at a price. As
Soviet-American rapprochement was enhanced over the Gorbachev
years, so the perceived value of China to the United States
deteriorated. The use of lethal force to suppress political
expression brought about more than Western sanctions and the
status of pariah state to Beijing, it severed the only remaining
strong cord binding China to American public opinion--the promise
that economic development would lead to political reform. The
violence around Tiananmen Square violated that implied promise.
China's belligerent response to Western, especially American,
sanctions was given further emphasis by the collapse of MarxistLeninist regimes and the ensuing commitments to democracy and
market economies. China's moves toward a mixed economy were now
seen as a charade masking an archetypal communist totalitarian
regime. To the West, the luster of Deng's reforms had faded.
Adding to China's isolation, Beijing's own "independent
foreign policy," pursued since the fall of 1982, ultimately found
China without friends or allies. Originally designed to provide
China maneuvering space between the two superpowers' global
confrontation, the USSR's fall from superpower status and
ultimate collapse removed the lever Beijing sought to manipulate
through its independence. Beijing's post-1982 security strategy
had been based on the assumption that a multipolar world would
gradually emerge as the two superpowers reduced themselves to
positions of only marginal influence through their mutually
deleterious competition. This gradual deterioration of superpower
influence would occur as China rebuilt its "comprehensive
national power" to a position where Beijing could play a major
role in the emerging multipolar international system.4
The unexpected and swift extinction of one of the two
superpowers did more than simply upset Beijing's strategic
timetable. The United States demonstrated diplomatic leadership
in its use of the United Nations Security Council to establish a
broad political coalition opposed to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait
and bind together a multinational military coalition that swiftly
and decisively defeated Iraq's seemingly powerful military
forces. China's post-1982 security strategy had assumed a
balanced erosion of the superpowers' global influence. The
emergence of the United States from the Cold War as the world's
sole military superpower invalidated China's strategic
assumptions, abrogating the underlying logic of Beijing's core
security strategy.
Beijing, therefore, entered the post-Cold War era militarily
more secure than at any time since the first Opium War of 184043, but facing condemnation and punitive sanctions from the
Western powers and a reluctant Japan led by the United States.
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Furthermore, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War
security value of China to the United States had evaporated.
China consequently faced an alienated United States that, as the
Cold War's victor, had become the single most influential actor
in the international system. Beijing's own certainty that its
relationship with Washington had been transformed from Cold War
cooperation to post-Cold War contention was confirmed by the U.S.
sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in the fall of 1992. The sale of
advanced fighter aircraft abrogated the 1982 agreement limiting
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and symbolized Washington's intent to
use its new status in the world to seek "hegemonism" through
"power politics."
Thwarting Isolation: China's Diplomatic Offensive.
Following China's post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation,
Beijing established a strategy of zhoubian (circumference or
omnidirectional) diplomacy designed to break out of its political
quarantine.5 Beijing essentially set out to overwhelm the United
States with a diplomatic offensive designed to offset any support
Washington might seek in its efforts to punish and isolate China.
The essence of this strategy was to establish "good neighbor"
relations with all of the states on China's periphery or
"circumference." With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
U.S. emergence as the world's sole remaining superpower, this
policy became central to China's strategy for responding to a
monopolar world. In one very important sense, this strategy was
extremely successful. China normalized relations with Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, and Israel, with a total of 15
countries establishing full diplomatic relations with Beijing in
1992 alone. Trade and commerce with Asia expanded, and Japan
restored the Official Development Aid (ODA) it had suspended
under American pressure in response to the Tiananmen tragedy.
Indeed, the most significant symbolic event of the year was a
state visit by Japan's Emperor Akahito in October--the first
visit of any Emperor of Japan to China.
Even as Beijing's good neighbor strategy was showing success
in Asia and elsewhere, relations with the United States were
entering yet another downswing. In 1993, the new Clinton
administration linked future extension of Most Favored Nation
(MFN) trading privileges directly to improvements in China's
human rights record. It charged Beijing with transporting poison
gas components to Iran; with violating its agreement to abide by
the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
and with illegally transporting chemical weapons precursors on
the vessel Yinhe. Finally, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution
calling on the International Olympic Committee to deny Beijing's
bid to host the 2000 Olympics. In response to what Beijing saw as
U.S. "hegemonism and power politics," the fall of 1993 saw China
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essentially globalize its zhoubian diplomatic strategy. Beijing
set out to strengthen its ties throughout Asia, including
Central, Southwest and South Asia, and expand its trade linkages
with Latin America and Europe. To undermine the Clinton
administration's human rights MFN linkage, Beijing cultivated
contacts with U.S. corporations conducting extensive business in
China, seeing them as allies in gaining MFN extension. The
administration's 1994 de-linking of human rights with the
extension of China's MFN privilege confirmed in Beijing the
success of this latter strategy.
Persistent American attempts to limit China's missile and
nuclear technology sales and continuing friction over human
rights issues paralleled Beijing's success in undermining U.S.
efforts to isolate and punish it for the Tiananmen crackdown and
human rights violations. The most serious blow to Sino-American
relations came in the summer of 1995, when the United States
reversed its previous policy and allowed Taiwanese President Li
Teng-hui to make a private visit to the United States. China
responded to Li's visit by suspending the military contacts
reopened by the United States in the fall of 1993; shelving its
"unofficial" cross-Strait talks with Taipei; and launching a
series of military exercises designed to coerce Taiwan from
making further steps toward de jure independence from the
mainland. An October summit meeting between Presidents Jiang
Zemin and Clinton in New York defused the immediate crisis in
Sino-American relations, but failed to resolve the Taiwan dilemma
or any of the other issues driving China and the United States
apart. As 1995 drew to a close, the United States and China faced
each other with suspicion and no little hostility. In Beijing's
eyes, the United States was seeking to exploit its presumed postCold War status as the world's remaining superpower.
China, however, in the words of James C. Hsiung, sees itself
as "too big to punish and too important to isolate."6 Beijing's
violent response to President Li's visit intended to demonstrate
clearly that China was not to be deterred by American military
power and was willing to challenge Washington's implicit
commitment to Taiwan's defense. The military exercises around
Taiwan were blatant, coercive diplomacy designed to intimidate
Taipei. As such, they served to heighten Asia's apprehensions
over China's emergence as a great power, especially over
Beijing's military security strategy and defense programs.
Defense Policy and China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy.
The origins of China's current defense policy precede the
Cold War's end by a decade or more. In the early 1980s, Beijing's
strategists concluded that the vigorous security policy and
defense buildup pursued by the Reagan administration were
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creating a shift in the balance of power between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The new balance, while giving the
United States an advantage, would result in a global stalemate
between the two superpowers that could continue into the 1990s,
and perhaps into the 21st century.7 This same shift in the global
power balance and ensuing superpower standoff would serve to
prevent the outbreak of a new world war and even further
discourage any potential Soviet attack on China. Beijing's
analysts interpreted the shifting global balance as central to an
ongoing transformation of the international system. With the USSR
and the United States deadlocked in a mutually debilitating
confrontation, the growing economic strength of Europe and Asia
would permit them greater independence from Moscow and
Washington. Thus, Chinese analysts concluded, the overall trend
in the international system was toward a multipolar world that
would continue to dilute superpower preeminence.
This emerging multipolarity was not viewed as entirely
favorable to China's security, even though it made global war
unlikely and further diminished the possibility of a Soviet
attack on China. Beijing's analysts concluded that reduced
superpower influence meant that there was increased probability
of small-scale wars flaring up along China's periphery,
especially where border and territorial disputes had once been
suppressed by the bipolar dynamic of Soviet-American
confrontation.8 The 1985 decision of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) Central Military Commission (Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui-CMC) to redirect China's defense policy and the PLA's
preparations for war (zhanbei) reflected this perception of the
potential military implications of a multipolar international
system. The Chinese armed forces were instructed that they were
no longer to prepare for an "early, major, and nuclear war."
Henceforth, they were to prepare for what the CMC declared to be
the most likely form of military confrontation in the future-local, limited war (jubu zhanzheng) on China's periphery.9 With
this decision, Beijing's defense policy shifted from a strategy
designed primarily to deter the military menace from the USSR to
a strategy predicated on the potential for limited, localized
wars around China's borders and maritime territories.
Over the years since the 1985, redirection of China's
national military strategy, transition to the requirements of
local, limited wars, and maritime territorial defense required
the PLA to modify significantly the concepts of operations that
had become the core of its strategy and to expand the missions of
its navy. Modifying these concepts of operations and changing
naval missions highlighted the limitations inherent in much of
the PLA's obsolescent arms and equipment.
During the many years when Beijing's national military
strategy was based primarily on defending continental China
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against a possible Soviet attack, the PLA could compensate for
its obsolescent arms by utilizing concepts of operations based
upon protraction, attrition, and the threat of nuclear
retaliation--the so-called "people's war under modern
conditions." The core strategy of continental defense, including
the capability to conduct offensive operations short distances
outside China's borders--fighting "outside the gate"--relied on
the sheer size of the PLA and its ultimate defense of falling
back into China's interior and exhausting the adversary through
protracted war. Even this strategy was not the preferred option
for China's military strategists, and in the late 1970s and early
1980s they sought to devise a strategy that would disrupt and
blunt the attack closer to the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian
borders.10 Nevertheless, this adaptation of "people's war under
modern conditions" still used the PLA's overwhelming numbers to
blunt an assault, with attrition grinding down the attacking
forces to the point that the attack had to be terminated.
The distinguishing characteristic of the new strategy was
its intent to defeat the adversary close to China's borders,
avoiding an endless retreat into the interior. A national
military strategy focused on the defense of China's periphery
and maritime territories, however, raised new demands on the PLA
that numbers alone could not resolve. If, as China's military
strategists assumed, these wars would be short and intense, then
the PLA's concepts of operations had to change from principles
based on protraction and attrition to operations based upon
speed, mobility, and lethality. Similarly, weapons fielded by
China's armed forces had to be capable of greater range and
accuracy under all-weather, day and night conditions in order to
ensure success in the critical early engagements of a limited
war.11 People's war, where the enemy was drawn into China and
ultimately defeated by a society fully mobilized for protracted
conflict, was no longer a feasible strategy. In future limited
wars, it was essential that standing forces trained and equipped
for quick, effective responses to crises involving the threat or
application of military force be ready at all times.12
As part of the military adjustment to the CMC's new defense
guidance, in the summer of 1985, Yang Dezhi, then the PLA Chief
of Staff, announced plans to reorganize the armed forces and
drastically reduce them by one million men. He expressed the view
that "the strength of an army is not determined by the number of
troops, but by the quality of its commanders and fighters, the
quality of its arms, and the degree of rationality of its systems
and foundations."13
As the Cold War drew to its close in the late 1980s, the
organizational and doctrinal changes required by the PLA to
implement the new military strategy were well underway. China
reduced the 11 military regions to 7; restructured the PLA's 36
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army corps into 24 combined arms "group armies" (jituanjun);
transformed the headquarters of the Artillery and Armored Corps
into sub-departments of the PLA General Staff Department; and
reduced the staffing of headquarters organizations.
These organizational changes complemented the force
reduction that had cut the PLA from 4.238 million to 3.235
million personnel, including civilian positions. Beijing
eliminated large amounts of obsolescent equipment; it took 10,000
artillery pieces, over 1,100 tanks, 610 naval vessels, and some
2,500 aircraft out of service.14 Yang Dezhi's "leaner and meaner"
PLA was beginning to emerge, accompanied by a new system of
recruitment, promotion, and professional military education
designed to build a younger, more educated officer corps
competent in modern combined arms joint service warfare.
China conducted exercises in 1988 to test the PLA's
capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to "border
clashes, accidents and local warfare."15 These maneuvers
introduced forces that were to attract considerable attention as
the years passed. "Special forces" or "fist" (quantou) units
undertook commando-like operations during the exercises, and
"rapid-reaction" (kuaisu) units appeared for the first time. The
PLA designated the 15th Group Army (Airborne) as a rapid-reaction
unit,16 as was the newly reestablished [1980] PLA Navy (PLAN)
Marine Corps, headquartered with the South Sea Fleet in
Zhanjiang, Guangzhou province.17 Their deployment with the South
Sea Fleet clearly identified PLAN Marines as the "fist" or rapidreaction unit for operations in the South China Sea. Soon, each
military region was reported developing fast and rapid reaction
units.
The CMC revised naval missions in 1985 to focus on Taiwan
and the South China Sea, both of which were seen as containing
the seeds of military conflict. Beyond these requirements,
however, China's 18,000 kilometers (km) of coastline and some
3,000,000 square km of territorial waters containing numerous
islands to defend led to a systematic review of China's naval
defense requirements.18 Liu Huaqing, the navy's commander from
1982 to 1988, instructed the PLAN to prepare a report by the end
of the 1980s, laying out the principles and requirements for
successful fulfillment of these missions. As a result, in the
late 1980s, PLAN's missions were to safeguard China's territorial
integrity; to prevent a sea-based invasion of China; and, over
the long term, to build a survivable sea-based nuclear
retaliatory force. Naval analysts called for a change in strategy
from coastal defense (jinhai fangyu) to offshore defense (jinyang
fangyu). In essence, they wanted the navy's defense perimeter to
be extended from coastal waters out to between 200 and 400
nautical miles, and even further in defense of territorial claims
in the South China Sea. PLAN strategists sought an offshore-
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capable navy by 2000, and a "blue water" navy (yuanyang haijun)
by 2050. These missions would require increased fleet
replenishment capabilities, improved amphibious warfare
capabilities, and air cover to protect patrols and sea actions
extending some 600 miles from China, and even further for
potential blue water operations.
Defense Policy and Military Technology.
Revising defense policy underscored the PLA's recognition
that its obsolescent weapons and equipment simply were incapable
of supporting the military operations envisioned by the new
strategy. Even prior to the Gulf War, deficiencies in the PLA's
armaments had led Beijing to open a military technology
relationship with the United States, Israel, and Western Europe.
Sanctions applied to China following the Tiananmen tragedy
suspended most of the ongoing programs at a time when the
obsolescence of the PLA's arms was highlighted by the 1985
defense guidance. Normalization of relations with Moscow in 1989,
however, enabled Beijing to initiate a defense technology linkage
with the Soviet Union in 1990 that continued after the USSR's
1991 disintegration.19 Severe financial needs within the former
Soviet Union's defense industrial base, combined with Moscow's
desire to affirm a cordial relationship with China, led to what
has become Beijing's most fruitful military partnership. Russian
cooperation came at a time when the military operations fought by
American forces in the Desert Storm campaign were seen by Chinese
military analysts as demonstrating technology's supreme
importance in contemporary and future warfare. Following that
war, the rubric under which the PLA trained for war changed from
preparation for local, limited war to "limited war under hightech conditions" (gaojushi tiaojian xia jubuzhan).
Liu Huaqing, promoted to senior vice chairman of the CMC and
for many years the military official most responsible for
directing the technological renovation of China's armed forces,
expressed his doubts about the PLA's capabilities to conduct
modern warfare in 1993. Liu observed in the pages of the Chinese
Communist Party's (CCP) journal, Quishi, that the PLA "fails to
meet the needs of modern warfare and this is the principal
problem with army-building;"20 his model for modern warfare and
the reference point for China's capabilities was specifically the
Persian Gulf conflict.21 Liu Huaqing's concerns covered both
training and equipment, contending that in neither case was the
PLA prepared to conduct combat operations in the manner now
required for success in war.
His commentary underlined the fact that negotiations with
Moscow begun in 1990 had resulted in the sale of considerable
weaponry to China. Initially, Beijing purchased a regiment of 26
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Su-27 Flanker interceptors, 10 IL-76 Candid heavy-lift transport
aircraft, some 24 Mi-17 Hip helicopters, and perhaps 100 to 150
S300 (SA-10 Grumble) air defense missiles (with U.S. Patriot
capabilities). In 1995, China bought two additional regiments of
Su-27s and four Kilo-class (type 636) diesel-electric submarines
(SSK). Reports that China is considering a variety of Russian
weapons and equipment, including airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) equipment or complete aircraft, aerial refueling
aircraft, MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-31 Foxhound combat aircraft,
licensed production of advanced jet engines for combat aircraft,
licensed production of Su-27s, and a variety of other types of
equipment, accompanied these known purchases.
Speculation about future purchases stems from President
Boris Yeltsin's declaration during his December 1992 visit to
Beijing that Russia was willing to sell China "the most
sophisticated armaments and weapons," and Moscow's acknowledged
sales that year of US$1.2 billion.22 A 5-year military cooperation
accord signed in Beijing by Russian Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev in 1993, and yet another Sino-Russian defense technology
agreement signed in December 1995, followed Yeltsin's public
commitment. Over the years since 1991, both China and Russia have
become sensitive to the concerns raised in Asia and the United
States over what is clearly an expanding defense technology
partnership. Prior to the military relationship with Moscow,
Beijing's defense modernization program was viewed as severely
constrained by the known weaknesses inherent in China's defense
S&T (science and technology) and industrial base. The Russian
linkage is viewed as supplying Beijing with far more than
advanced weapons and equipment. Licensed production of advanced
military systems accompanied by technical assistance to China's
defense industries is already believed to be underway. A Chinese
foreign ministry spokesman reflected these widely spread
apprehensions when he observed that the 1993 agreement did "not
relate, in any way, to the subject of cooperation in military
production and arms sales."23
These Russian transfers have been accompanied by an
expanding defense technology relationship with Israel, most
particularly with the F-10 advanced fighter program under
development with the Chengdu Aviation Industrial Corporation in
Szechuan province.24 The Chengdu plant also produces China's F-7
fighter, a variant of the MiG-21 Fishbed, that has undergone
considerable updating with European assistance since the 1980s.
It is generally assumed that Israeli assistance to the F-10
includes technology from Israel's cancelled Lavi advanced fighter
program, and that China is seeking a Russian engine to power the
aircraft.
Naval forces are also undergoing modernization programs
utilizing extensive technologies from France, the United Kingdom,
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Italy, and the United States, with much of the imports occurring
before the 1989 sanctions were applied. Production of two new
classes of surface combatants, the Luhu-class guided missile
destroyer (DDG) and the Jiangwei-class guided missile frigate
(FFG), has begun, and the first of a new series of dieselelectric submarines--the Song-class--is undergoing sea-trials.
These combatants are being joined by the production of underway
replenishment vessels and new amphibious warfare ships.
Improvements in strategic and short-range ballistic missiles
complement modernization programs focused on enhancing the PLA's
conventional general purpose forces.25 Three new solid-fueled
strategic missiles have been developed. The road or rail-mobile
Dongfeng (East Wind--DF)-41 with an anticipated initial
operational capability (IOC) around the year 2010 has a range of
12,000 km and an 800 kilogram (kg) payload. It will replace the
current DF-5A liquid-fueled, 13,000 km-range intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). A second strategic system, the DF-31
and its derivative Julang (Big Wave--JL)-2, will be both groundand submarine-based. The DF-31 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile
system with a 700 kg payload and a range of 8,000 km. Its offshoot, the JL-2, with an identical range and payload, will arm
the follow-on to China's single Xia-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Two tactical, solid-fueled,
mobile, short-range ballistic missiles (M9 and M11), designed for
battlefield use with conventional warheads, parallel development
of these strategic systems. Both systems were developed for the
export market. The M-9, known as the DF-15 when deployed by the
PLA, has a range of 600 km and a 500 kg warhead. The M-11 reaches
out 300 km with a 500 kg payload.
Discussions within China's military academies and research
centers of the possible need to modify Beijing's nuclear weapons
doctrine accompanied development of new strategic systems.26 Their
analyses indicate that some military strategists wish to change
from a strategy of "minimum deterrence," where a relatively small
number of single-warhead systems capable of inflicting
considerable countervalue damage are viewed as sufficient for
effective nuclear deterrence, to a strategy of "limited nuclear
deterrence." A strategy of limited nuclear deterrence requires a
far larger number of increasingly accurate strategic weapons than
China currently deploys because both counterforce and
countervalue targets must be threatened, and theater nuclear
weapons (TNW) must be available to strike battlefield targets to
ensure escalation control. China's current deployment of some 17
ICBMs, 70 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and one
SSBN with 12 weapons27 is insufficient to support any strategy
beyond minimum deterrence. Nonetheless, the fact that military
strategists are reconsidering Beijing's basic approach to nuclear
deterrence demonstrates a lack of confidence in China's current
strategy and nuclear force structure, especially as theater and
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ballistic missile defenses (TMD/BMD) become more plausible as the
21st century approaches. Deployment of defensive systems would
seriously erode China's confidence in its nuclear deterrent.
Despite the weaknesses present in China's military
capabilities, as Beijing looks to the next century, there is now
a focus and purpose to current defense programs not so clearly
evident a decade ago. More importantly for China's near-term
concerns, limitations inherent in the obsolescent arms and
equipment of the PLA's conventional general purpose forces
combine with logistical support and command and control
weaknesses to hinder severely Beijing's ability to project and
sustain military forces in the Asian region for any length of
time--the problem of "short arms and slow legs."28 Patterns of
acquisition and modernization underway for the past decade now
clearly demonstrate the intent to develop a regional force
projection capability sometime in the early part of the 21st
century. Military exercises, technology, and weapons procurement
all point to an intent to deploy forces capable of sustained
military operations some distance from the mainland. These slowly
emerging capabilities have been observed in the context of what
is seen as assertive, if not aggressive, policies toward all
issues involving Chinese sovereignty.29
Beijing's use of belligerent military exercises around
Taiwan following President Li Teng-hui's private visit to the
United States in June 1995, designed to warn Taipei that a claim
of de jure independence would result in war, is viewed as but the
most recent example of China's deliberate use of force to achieve
its foreign policy objectives. Earlier, Beijing's occupation of
Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands (claimed by both China and
the Philippines) led to a sharp, potentially military
confrontation between Beijing and Manila in February 1995. This
encounter served as a reminder of the small March 1988 SinoVietnamese naval engagement over yet another Spratly reef.
It is this pattern of military modernization and perceived
assertiveness that has raised concerns across Asia and in the
United States, especially when Beijing declares that China no
longer faces a significant military threat from any major power.
For the past several years, Beijing has adamantly denied that its
military modernization programs are anything but "defensive," but
has been eminently unsuccessful in easing these apprehensions
despite the well-known weaknesses within China's armed forces and
defense industrial base.
Facing the Paradox--China's Defense of Its New Policies.
Beijing recognizes that its economic development and defense
modernization programs, combined with its assertive sovereignty
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claims, have led to profound misgivings about China's future
course as its economic and military strength increase.30 Not the
least of the criticism directed against Beijing was the lack of
transparency in all of its defense programs. Most major states
now publish a defense White Paper in one form or another, but
China had not done so until very recently. Finally, after several
years of unremitting criticism from several Asian states and the
United States, Beijing did publish a White Paper in November 1995
entitled China: Arms Control and Disarmament.31 While not
containing the detail found in white papers from countries such
as Australia or Japan, Beijing's response is considered a
reasonable first step toward a more transparent defense policy.
Publication at this time, however, was prompted by Assistant
Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye's November 14-18, 1995, visit,
and to counter the pervasive image of a China "threat,"
intensified by Beijing's attempts to intimidate Taiwan and the
clash with Manila over Mischief Reef earlier in the year. The
document was undoubtedly a gesture to Nye, demonstrating a desire
to develop closer military-to-military ties with the United
States through its support for "arms control" and "transparency,"
and to portray Beijing as a responsible partner in international
security affairs--a portrayal much of Asia finds difficult to
accept.
China rejects the argument that resurgent nationalism,
combined with its evident willingness to use force, has sharpened
speculation that the rise of China could have the same disastrous
consequences for the 21st century as did the rise of Germany and
Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Beijing has its own
explanation for these new policies. Expansion and conquest are
not simply functions of increasing power, the Chinese assert, but
of the nexus formed by power, national interests, security
environments, and cultural traditions. China's history and
Beijing's current policies demonstrate that China has no such
expansionist proclivities.32 These protestations will do little,
however, to ease the concerns of those who fear Beijing.
Whereas national survival drove Beijing's defense policy
and military strategy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, with the
disappearance of this threat to China's survival, argue some
analysts, Beijing's security strategy seeks to preserve an
international environment where China can pursue its domestic
development objectives. In pursuit of these goals, Beijing's
defense policy seeks to prevent "wars of aggression" from
threatening the nation's economic achievements and to preserve
China's territorial integrity. Within this environment, threats
to China's security consist of territorial disputes and
secessionist movements stirred up by ultra-nationalism.33
This virulent form of nationalism, which emerged with the
end of the Cold War, has made inroads into Taiwan and "a number
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of minority regions."34 Especially in Taiwan, the new leadership
that has taken over from the old-generation Kuomintang (KMT)
members is not committed to reunifying China. Li Teng-hui
represents this new generation that actively seeks separation
from China, beginning with Taipei's quest for "dual recognition"
in 1989. The Spratly Islands represent yet but another border
problem, but the dispute itself is depicted as "overblown" by the
Western media.35 Facing these and other localized territorial
disputes, Beijing's fundamental defense policy is designed to
deter potential wars along China's borders, protect its economic
interests, and maintain its land, sea, and air territorial
integrity. Because improving scientific and technological
capabilities will allow China to better exploit its marine and
sea-bed resources, Beijing needs a strong navy to protect its
maritime resources and sea lanes.36
Beijing's military strategy to achieve these ends is defined
in terms that are in accord with analyses found in China's
military journals over the past decade. In the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s, the need to defeat a superior adversary threatening
China's survival required a strategy of protracted "people's
war." Future conflicts will not be for survival, but are more
likely to be high-tech, limited wars not fought directly on
China's soil. Under these conditions, China must have sufficient
military strength to deter such wars and to defeat an adversary
at its borders should deterrence fail.37 Because of these military
requirements, despite the absence of a major military power
threatening China, defense modernization is still considered to
be a cornerstone of Beijing's security policy.
The disappearance of any immediate major military threat,
however, has reduced the pressure for urgent military investment.
As with the official explanations of China's defense budget over
recent years, Beijing's military expenditures are interpreted by
comparing annual percentage increases with the declining amount
they take from China's gross national product (GNP). Thus, while
annual defense expenditures from 1991 through 1995 increased 12.7
percent, 12.6 percent, 12.6 percent, 21.5 percent, and 12.3
percent respectively, the expansion of China's economy over these
same years reduced the actual defense burden to the point where
it now absorbs only 1.7 percent of the GNP.38
Beijing's diplomatic efforts are tailored to complement its
defensive security policy and to demonstrate China's peaceful
intentions. To ease concern over China's military modernization
programs and allay regional apprehensions, Beijing has
intensified a program of military-to-military contacts. In 1994
alone, CMC Vice-chairman Liu Huaqing visited Thailand, Indonesia,
and Singapore; Chief of Staff Zhang Wannian visited Malaysia; and
Defense Minister Chi Haotian visited Russia, Pakistan, and India.
China's confidence-building policy included hosting the United
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States' Secretary of Defense, Russia's Chief of Staff, the
Commander-in Chief of Thailand's armed forces, the Laotian
Defense Minister, and Pyongyang's Chief of Staff.39
This diplomacy has been accompanied by what the Chinese
depict as systematic efforts to resolve peacefully the border
disputes and tensions China has with its neighbors. Beijing's
sovereignty disagreement with Japan over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea has been shelved without prejudice.
China seeks to follow the same approach with claimants to the
South China Sea territories, who, together with Beijing, have
convened regular expert working conferences to determine just how
joint development should be undertaken without jeopardizing
sovereignty. This cooperative approach to border and territorial
disagreements is pursued around China's entire periphery. In
1993, Beijing and New Delhi signed an agreement to ensure mutual
security along their mutual border; both have reduced the forces
they deploy along their frontiers. Moscow and Beijing have
resolved 95 percent of their border dispute. In Central Asia,
diplomats and military representatives from Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and China have completed 14
rounds of discussions on border troop reductions.40 Chinese
analysts therefore insist that Beijing's policy is to seek
peaceful resolution of all its border disagreements, and that
charges to the contrary are unfounded. In particular, they
protest that the image of China as a "threat" to its neighbors is
not only unwarranted, but is fabricated by hostile powers,
especially the United States, as part of their strategy to
"contain" China.
"Containing" China.
Suspicion simmering in Beijing that U.S. policy seeks not to
engage (jie chu) but to contain (e zhi) China intensified
following Washington's granting of a visa to President Li Tenghui. Increasingly, Chinese analysts and official statements
suggest that there is a systematic attempt by the United States
and other unnamed "Western countries" to present willfully the
image of an aggressive China that will, as it grows more
powerful, threaten the stability of Asia. Chinese analysts
contend that Beijing's aspirations to sustain a peaceful
international environment, develop China economically, and build
a defense capability sufficiently strong to deter war and protect
its sovereignty are opposed by "a few Western countries" led by
the United States. Their goal is seen as preventing China from
becoming too strong too quickly.41 In obstructing China, these
countries support separatist movements in minority areas and
Taiwan; influence international public opinion to exaggerate the
differences between China's central government and the provinces;
overstate and embellish intra-party disputes; and magnify
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differences between the government and society.42
Despite Washington's public commitment to a prosperous,
unified, and open China, these analysts view America's actual
policy objective as seeking to restrain Beijing's emergence as a
great power. They interpret U.S. actions as demonstrating this
ambition. Why does the United States commit to sustain
indefinitely 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region and
enhance its security relationship with Japan? Why induce "some
countries" to make sovereignty claims against China? Why does the
United States sell "offensive" weapons to Taiwan while strictly
controlling military technology transfers to China? Why did
Washington permit Li Teng-hui to visit the United States and
allow the President to "drop in" and visit with the Dalai Lama,
both of whom are trying to split China? Why does the United
States insist that China enter the World Trade Organization (WTO)
as a developed country despite its clear status as a developing
country? Why does Washington attack Beijing's family planning
program when China already has too large a population? Why does
the United States use human rights as an issue to stir up trouble
within China? All of these efforts are viewed as clear indicators
that the U.S. true policy toward China is not "comprehensive
engagement," but, more accurately, "comprehensive containment."
Because the United States cannot gain international support for a
policy of containment, Washington is charged with adopting the
dual tactic of both engagement and containment, referred to by
some American observers as "soft containment" (ruan e zhi).43
China's belief that the United States is treating it as
potentially hostile, and therefore seeks to restrain Beijing's
power, originates in Washington's post-Tiananmen sanctions and
what Beijing saw as an American attempt, in effect, to isolate
China diplomatically. The U.S. aspiration to contain China is now
viewed as stemming from the American objective to maintain its
"hegemonistic" domination of world politics. Restraining China's
emergence as a great power will be frustrated, Beijing's analysts
insist, because China is already too strong to contain,
especially when the United States can gain so little support for
such a policy;44 "as long as we . . . make no mistakes, a strong
and prosperous China is an irreversible historical trend that no
outside force can contain."45
Conclusions.
Beijing's recognition of a contradiction in the core of its
foreign policy came from internal analyses and an expanding
chorus of troubled voices across Asia and in the United States.
A major component of Beijing's response has been to charge
Washington with trying to start a new Cold War in Asia, and with
seeking to drive a wedge between China and its neighbors.
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Nonetheless, this attack on the United States is actually
designed to deflect concerns in Asia stemming from China's
nuclear weapons tests, equipment and military technology
acquisitions from Russia, and an endless series of essays in PLA
professional journals expressing pride in the success of the
China's military modernization programs and exercises. When these
actions are combined with the aggressive reassertion of China's
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and blatant use of military
force to intimidate Taiwan, fear of an ascending China has little
to do with American policy or intent.
Defending its foreign policy by highlighting efforts to
build confidence and security building measures through border
agreements and high-level military exchanges has not compensated
for the concerns stemming from Beijing's assertive, if not
belligerent, approach to those issues it views as central to its
sovereignty. Indeed, Beijing's more accommodating attitude toward
contending claims to South China Sea territories seems to have
originated in ASEAN's46 uniformly troubled reaction to the
Mischief Reef affair, rather than any considered decision to be
more forthcoming in resolving the disputes. When placed in the
context of Beijing's proclamation of military modernization
successes, the image China presents is far more that of an
emerging regional power whose economic and military strength
permits it to choose when and where it will accommodate its
neighbors.
As China enters the 21st century, Beijing has clearly
defined its military security policy (to defend national
sovereignty and territories) and its defense strategy (to develop
military modernization programs to give it the capability to do
so). These capabilities are directed not only at counteracting
the current and future strengths of China's immediate neighbors,
but also those of major powers, particularly the United States,
who may seek to intervene in what Beijing defines as its
"internal affairs." Viewed in this light, China's nuclear weapons
programs are directed at deterring any attempt to intervene
through nuclear threats, such as those used by the United States
during the Korean War and during the Taiwan Strait crises of the
middle and late 1950s.
The extent to which Beijing will ameliorate in the 21st
century what now appears to be a Westphalian Realpolitik approach
to security with a strategy that accepts the principle that
national security can be realized within a multilateral security
community remains the region's outstanding question. For the
moment, at least, Beijing's ambition to play what it perceives as
China's rightful role in Asian international security affairs
appears to overcome any predisposition to resolve the paradox
between force and diplomacy in its foreign policy.
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Nor does economic interdependence seem to dull the edge of
China's military modernization programs or Beijing's use of force
to achieve paramount foreign policy objectives. Rather, Beijing
is using the attraction of its vibrant economy to induce
cooperation from its neighbors even as China's military
capabilities increase. In this sense, Asia's response to China's
ascending economic and military strength has been to assist in
Beijing's domestic development goals induced by profit and,
perhaps, the belief that as China grows stronger it will also be
more confident and therefore less suspicious of the world around
it. It is equally probable, however, that Asian capitals view
China's ascent to regional preeminence as inevitable; therefore,
prudence requires bandwagoning rather than balancing. To the
extent that China must be balanced, they see this role as best
reserved for the United States. Thus, Beijing's perception of the
United States as seeking to contain China may well be rooted as
much in its understanding its neighbors security logic as in the
underlying intent of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific
region. Should this, in fact, be the basis of Beijing's security
logic for the 21st century, Sino-American relations will become
both more critical and more hazardous for regional peace and
stability as that century unfolds. China's past willingness to
confront the United States is a foreboding precedent.
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CHAPTER III
PAKISTAN'S SECURITY IN THE "NEW WORLD ORDER":
GOING FROM BAD TO WORSE?
Robert Wirsing
Introduction.
Pakistan's security environment today bristles with
developments that are every bit as ominous as any in previous
decades. Pakistan's ties to major power wielders in the
international community have grown perilously thin, and no major
power seems likely to come to its rescue in the event of crisis.
The arms gap (conventional and nuclear) between Pakistan and
India is as wide as ever, and chances are it will grow wider yet.
Pakistan's internal stability and political unity are being
seriously eroded by intensifying ethnic and sectarian strife,
like that which is turning Karachi, the country's principal port
and industrial hub, into a global emblem of uncontrolled violence
and lawlessness. Pakistan's deepening involvement in (direct or
proxy) military hostilities with its neighbors, India and
Afghanistan, threatens to spiral into still more serious armed
conflict, thwarting all efforts to promote regional cooperation
and increasing doubts even about the integrity of the contested
stretches of its lengthy international borders.
In recent decades, Pakistan's leaders have displayed
considerable prudence in managing Pakistan's security policy.
They deserve commendation, in particular, not only for having
kept Pakistan out of a major war with its neighbors, especially
India, during the quarter century since defeat at New Delhi's
hands in 1971, but also for having resisted the temptation to
move further up the ladder of nuclear weapons development. But,
in the face of stunning recent reversals in Pakistan's
geostrategic fortunes, fundamental shifts in its security
environment (most importantly, the abrupt and nearly complete
rupture, upon the collapse of Soviet Communism, in Pakistan's
Cold War-motivated alliance with the United States) and the
swift, severe, and parallel deterioration in the first half of
the present decade in the country's relations with two of its
neighbors, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to be
excessively preoccupied with national security and, potentially,
a heightened risk of war.
The subcontinent's nuclear peril obviously exists. In
neither Pakistan nor India, however, does one find in ruling
circles much interest in fighting (even less in funding!) an allout war, certainly not one fought with nuclear weapons. Indian
and Pakistani leaders have already gotten the message, even if
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they do not accept all of its implications.
As Pakistan approaches the 50th anniversary of its founding
in 1947, its security predicament seems to have grown no less
severe (and maybe worse) than ever before. The costs of this for
Pakistanis--in almost any way that one might reckon them--have
been great in this century, and they will be just as great (or
greater) in the next, whether or not there is war. Hence, even if
we grant that Pakistan's security policies have been relatively
successful thus far, we should not hesitate to consider at least
some modification of them to meet the challenges of the next
century.
A review of Pakistan's options in this regard--identified
broadly here as the Pan-Islamic (transnational religious
identity) Option, the Domestic Liberalization (demilitarizing,
democratizing, or "decentering") Option, and the South Asian
Regional Cooperation (SARC) Option--reveals no simple answers.
Each entails considerable risk, and unqualified virtue (certainty
of payoff in terms of Pakistan's future security) is self-evident
in none of them. Quick, self-directed escape from its costly and
perilous circumstances, for the moment at least, thus appears
unlikely.
Time seems not to be on Pakistan's side, and however
unpalatable the policy alternatives may seem, its leaders'
willingness to risk applying them cannot be put off indefinitely.
The most promising immediate policies converge upon the third
(SARC) Option. The SARC Option stops well short of the
politically impractical, India-centered, and, not infrequently,
utopian regionalist projects that Pakistan has, understandably,
dismissed in the past. Measures that could set in motion a
process of accommodation with Pakistan's arch-rival, India,
particularly in relation to Kashmir, are recommended.
Pakistan's Security Situation, 1996.
Sandy Gordon recently argued that the end of the Cold War
had differential results in South Asia; India emerged the winner
and Pakistan the loser. He wrote:
Far from having lost out as a result of the end of the
Cold War, India is poised to emerge in the early 21st
century as a far more important and influential power
in the Indian Ocean region, and even globally, than it
was in the latter part of the 20th. Some of the
constraining factors in India's rise to power,
particularly domestic and regional South Asian
instability, are still present and will continue to
snap at India's heels for some years to come. But the
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end of the Cold War has also enabled India to jettison
some of the more burdensome foreign and economic
policies that had constrained it in the past.1
In sharp contrast, Gordon concluded, "Pakistan, which has
long been India's only serious competitor in South Asia, has lost
out seriously as a result of the end of the Cold War. While India
suffers from internal instability, Pakistan's problems are
potentially far more serious."2
India's ability to take advantage of the potential benefits
to it of the Cold War's end may be exaggerated. The insurgencies
in its politically-disturbed periphery--Kashmir, the Punjab,
Assam and the tribal areas of the northeast--are proving
extremely expensive and difficult to eradicate. Enormous problems
of rural poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and
overpopulation remain largely unaddressed. Most authoritative
studies of contemporary India's political institutions speak more
of their frailty and decline than of their durability and
promise.3
Nevertheless, Gordon's placement of Pakistan on the losing
side in South Asia undoubtedly hits close to the mark. Being "on
the losing side" in the post-Cold War world is revealed in four
areas: loss of international support, a permanent arms gap,
ethnic and sectarian hostilities, and military confrontation with
India and Afghanistan.
Loss of International Support.
Surely the most obvious and unambiguous (and least
unexpected) sign of Pakistan's post-Cold War slippage in standing
was Washington's apparent decision, made very quickly following
the Soviet Union's unilateral and unconditional withdrawal from
Afghanistan in February 1989, to shed itself of its costly and
politically burdensome role as Pakistan's military and diplomatic
backer. This decision took its most massive material form in
October 1990, when President George Bush, after a year's warning,
declared his inability to meet presidential certification any
longer. This action, required annually by the 1985 Pressler
Amendment, to confirm that Pakistan "does not possess" a nuclear
explosive device, thus cut off the flow of economic and military
assistance for Pakistan inaugurated a decade earlier. That step,
which resulted in Pakistan's sudden free-fall from near topranking among a 100 or so recipients of U.S. security assistance
for much of the 1980s into full-fledged nuclear pariah status in
the 1990s, had been foreshadowed the preceding March by the
entirely symbolic, but--for Pakistan--equally shattering
revelation that the Bush Administration no longer considered
India and Pakistan bound by the provisions of the late 1940s
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United Nations (UN) resolutions stipulating that a plebiscite be
held to settle the matter of Kashmir's territorial affiliation.4
The nearly complete Pressler Amendment-mandated aid-cutoff
has now entered its 6th year. Joint efforts by the Clinton White
House and Pakistan's (mainly Republican) sympathizers in the
Republican-controlled 104th Congress finally resulted in
agreement between both houses on October 24, 1995, on a tightly
worded amendment (the Brown Amendment) to Section 620E of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It authorized a one-time delivery
to Pakistan of $368 million in U.S. military equipment contracted
for prior to October 1, 1990. The Brown Amendment explicitly
excluded from the exemption the 28 F-16 combat aircraft which
Pakistan had also ordered and for which it had already paid $658
million, though the amendment authorized the government to
reimburse Pakistan as much as it could from the sale of the
aircraft to third parties.5
These moves by Washington to put U.S.-Pakistan relations on
a more normal footing are certainly to be welcomed. They pave the
way for increased bilateral cooperation on a great many matters
of mutual interest; perhaps equally as important, they imply
America's recognition that its interests in South Asia do not
begin and end with nuclear nonproliferation. The Pressler
Amendment's passage may have made some sense in the middle of the
last decade. It was a compromise arrangement that at least kept
at bay Washington's army of energetic anti-proliferation gadflys,
who might otherwise have obstructed congressional support of the
executive branch's Afghanistan-driven security assistance program
for Pakistan. But it obviously did very little to ease the threat
of nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, while having a
positively devastating impact on Pakistan's military capabilities
relative to India. Congress was mistaken in thinking that
Pakistan could be starved into nuclear abstention by conditioning
U.S. aid on termination of its nuclear weapons program.
Overlooked, apparently, were India's much older, more advanced,
and larger nuclear program, the relative immunity of that program
from Washington's pressure due to India's greater size and
military power, and--above all--Pakistan's natural dread of an
Indian nuclear monopoly.
Washington's decision to unclog the aid pipeline to Pakistan
scarcely begins to address Pakistan's security dilemma. After
all, the Brown Amendment, in authorizing a one-time lifting of
the ban on weapon sales, did not repeal the Pressler Amendment or
sanction reopening of major military sales. Neither did it
reverse Washington's earlier decision to force Pakistan's return
of eight leased U.S. frigates and destroyers, replacement of
which will be extremely costly for the Pakistani Navy. No one can
reasonably contend, moreover, that delivery of $368 million worth
of arms, including 24 M198 howitzers, 135 anti-tank TOW
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launchers, 28 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 3 Orion P-3C
reconnaissance aircraft, and assorted other spare parts and
items, will, by itself, seriously rattle the India-Pakistan arms
balance, when annual combined arms spending by these two
countries in recent years runs in the vicinity of $12 billion.6
No persuasive case, finally, can be made that there is a "hidden
agenda" of renewed alliance with Pakistan in the U.S. Department
of Defense's current plans for joint military exercises, military
education exchanges, or expanded "cooperation with Pakistani
military forces in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and
peacekeeping activities."7 In the face of Washington's remarkable
recent upgrading of India's global importance, and the still more
impressive growth in U.S. economic ties with India, the existence
of any such Pakistan-led agenda strains credulity.
Beyond the immediate arms sale issue, in any event, lies the
greater security problem for Pakistan--the gradual drying up of
any promising alliance prospects to serve Pakistan's stock
requirement for great-power insurance against Indian military
might.8 An "Islamic bloc" solidly aligned behind Pakistan has
failed utterly to materialize. There are signs of slackening as
well in the fidelity to Pakistan even of China, the consistency
of whose support for Pakistan over the past 30-odd years has
been, at least by American standards, quite remarkable. In
China's case, at least, the signs are not all negative. Fairly
credible reports surfaced during the summer of 1995 that Beijing
had exported to Pakistan in late 1992 over 30 nuclear-capable M11 ballistic missiles.9 China continues to maintain a very close
working relationship with Pakistan's avionics and other defense
industries.10 But, Beijing has retreated in recent years to a
conspicuously neutral position on Kashmir, unquestionably an
important litmus test of friendship from Islamabad's point of
view, and China's steadily expanding rapproachement with India,
as Sandy Gordon has observed, "has provided India with a
significant peace dividend in the context of its competition with
Pakistan."11
Permanent Arms Gap.
A second ominous feature of Islamabad's post-Cold War
security environment is the arms gap that exists between Pakistan
and India. What is particularly ominous about this gap, of
course, is not that it exists. After all, a large disparity in
both the size and equipment of their armed forces has been a
constant from the moment these forces were parceled out to the
two sides at the time of Partition. Use of the term "ominous"
does not mean to imply in any way that Pakistan's armed forces
deserve to be described as puny, pintsized--a mere David pitted
against the Indian Goliath. India and Pakistan are both
unquestionably formidable military powers; among the so-called
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developing countries, there are very few militaries, in fact,
that deserve to stand in the same column with either of them.
India without any doubt possesses the capability on fairly short
order literally to devastate Pakistan--or at least a fair share
of it. But Pakistan, even if fighting was restricted to
conventional weapons, just as surely has the capability to
inflict terrible, and unacceptable, damage upon India. The
ominous part of the gap, from the Pakistani point of view, stems
rather from India's greater ability to widen it, at least over
the long haul, and to do so more autonomously of external
constraints than has ever been true for Pakistan. India, in
other words, with its vastly greater size, resources, population,
economy, technically-trained workforce, and defense industrial
infrastructure can set a harsher pace, if and when it chooses,
with regard to the acquisition of both conventional and nuclear
arms.
Tables 1-6 (see pages 92-95) indicate that in comparisons of
military expenditure, number of troops, arms imports, arms
production, defense industry employment, and size of defense
sector enterprises, India has generally ranked first or second
among developing countries in most categories, and never less
than third. Pakistan does not appear in all the tables, but when
it does, it ranks between 7th and 12th among developing
countries.12 When it comes to indigenization of arms production,
an indicator as much of security decision-making autonomy as of
military capability, the gap between India and Pakistan is
unmistakably--and irremediably--huge.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in these comparative figures
to dispute the contention, made most recently by Amit Gupta,
that, in its attempts to build military capability, India
encounters the same kinds of structural constraints, economic and
otherwise, facing Pakistan and other Third World states, and that
it will be no small matter for India to overcome these
constraints and to "make the jump to major power status."13
Substantial cutbacks in the rate of growth of defense
expenditures during the past decade by India and Pakistan testify
to the difficulties both sides had in sustaining major defense
outlays in the face of chronic weaknesses in their economies and
depressed social indicators, such as poor health conditions and
low rates of literacy.14 Should India and Pakistan not succeed
with present economic reform efforts, their budgetary
difficulties will surely deepen. Pakistan, at least, could take
comfort from the fact that over the past three decades it had
registered the region's fastest average annual growth in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)--7 percent, while India's growth rate,
with the exception of 1995, which reached a remarkable 6.2
percent, had generally hovered at less than 5 percent. However,
Pakistan's more recent growth rates (3.9 percent in fiscal year
1993-1994 and 4.7 percent in fiscal year 1994-1995 in the face of
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Pakistan's annual population growth (seemingly fixed at 3.1
percent)--contrasted with India's recent performance--left it
currently with little to cheer.15
None of this alters the fact that in the South Asian
regional context,
Indian military supremacy is a permanent
fixture of life.16 While India's military achievements may seem
minor in comparison with the great military powers of the
advanced industrial world, in relation to Pakistan, where any
aspiration to major power status would have to be judged purely
fanciful, India's achievements in the military realm stand out
very sharply indeed. Only time will tell, of course, but
Pakistani security planners have little choice but to take
seriously the forecasts of two Australian defense experts, Paul
Dibbs and Sandy Gordon. Writing in Jane's Intelligence Review,
Dibbs predicted in May 1995 that the military capabilities of
Asia's three major indigenous powers, China, Japan, and India,
provided they managed to sustain economic growth, would all be
"substantially greater" by the year 2010;17 Gordon, in one of the
most solid studies of Indian defense capabilities yet authored,
offered the even more menacing opinion that Pakistan's ability to
act as a check on Indian power seemed to have eroded, and that
its "military competition with India may well become
unsustainable by the end of the century."18
Ethnic and Sectarian Hostilities.
Pakistan is a multi-ethnic, overwhelmingly (97 percent)
Muslim society with a fairly weak sense of national (Pakistani)
identity. This weakness already contributed to the loss of its
heavily-populated eastern province (East Bengal) in 1971. It has
contributed to separatist sentiments and violent secessionist
activities both before and since then in all of the three
"minority" provinces--Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP).
Pakistan today contains five major ethnic groups: Punjabis,
Pashtuns, Sindhis, Mohajirs (refugees or refugee-descendents from
India), and Baluch--with the Punjabis, representing about 58
percent of the total (48 percent if speakers of the Siraiki
dialect are excluded), holding a clear numerical edge. Internal
migration has resulted in considerable mixing of these groups;
however, as a rule, Punjabi-speakers are centered in Punjab,
Sindhi-speakers in Sindh (especially rural Sindh), Pashtuspeakers in the NWFP, the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in urban areas
of Sindh (Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur), and Baluchi-speakers (and
related Brahui-speakers) in Baluchistan.
Ethnic Punjabi numerical dominance, the country's
overwhelmingly Muslim character, plus the fact that Urdu (by
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world standards an exceptionally successful lingua franca) is now
spoken by perhaps 90 percent of Pakistan's population, give
Pakistan a degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious
homogeneity and "natural" unity enjoyed by very few countries of
the Afro-Asian world. On the other hand, the Punjabis' numerical
weight has been matched by their domination of the government,
armed forces, and the economy. Thus, they are, to an extent,
feared and resented by Pakistan's minority communities--a
structural impediment to the country's unity that defies easy
solution. Adding to the problem is the fact that Pakistan's
overwhelming Muslim majority is itself subdivided into numerous
competing sects; while the country's Muslims are approximately 80
percent Sunni, the Shia minority is highly mobilized politically.
Contributing further to the disunity problem is the fact
that practically all of Pakistan's ethnic groups share ethnic
identity with groups across the country's borders in Iran (the
Baluch), Afghanistan (the Pashtuns, the Baluch), and India (the
Mohajirs, Sindhis, and Punjabis, albeit in these cases their
Indian co-ethnics are more likely than not to be non-Muslims).
Thus, there is a serious problem of ethnic overhang or "transborder ethnicity" to complicate Pakistan's problem of national
integration. This would vastly complicate as well Pakistan's
national security by throwing into doubt the durability of at
least some of its international borders, while rendering its
ethnic unrest more vulnerable than it might otherwise be to
incitement from abroad.
At the moment, ethnic separatism is not a signficant threat
in the NWFP, where the Pashtunistan movement (the quest for a
separate Pashtun-led entity) is mainly moribund and, beyond that,
tends to be seen less as a product of grievances of indigenous
Pashtuns, whose integration into Pakistan's military,
bureaucratic, political, and business elites has, in fact, been
quite remarkable, than as a device exploited and fostered at
times by hostile governments in Afghanistan.19 Pashtun nationalism
is by no means a thing of the past, however, and seems bound to
become a more troublesome problem for Pakistan in the next
several years. Afghanistan, whose population is generally
estimated to be about 50-55 percent Pashtun, has experienced
almost unceasing and extremely disruptive civil strife ever since
the Soviets vacated the land in 1989.20 The warring factions have
very complex motivations and ethnic identities; but, underlying
the present struggle is a profoundly important macro-conflict
between the majority Pashtuns and non-Pashtun minorities for
control of the country's central governmental apparatus. The
eventual outcome of this struggle, which at least one author
believes may spell the end of Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan,21
will undoubtedly also affect severely, perhaps in violent ways,
the Pashtun population in Pakistan. The revolt of Islamic
extremists in the Malakand Division of the NWFP in late 199422 and
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the spectacular car bombing that took over 40 lives in Peshawar
in late December 1995, may well be early indications of this.
The focal point of the worst current ethnic violence in
Pakistan is the southern province of Sindh, and in particular its
industrial center and port city of Karachi, where, during 1995,
an extremely lethal mix of inter-ethnic (primarily, but by no
means exclusively, Mohajir versus Sindhi), sectarian, and
political animosities resulted in 25 economically-ruinous
citywide strikes and a reported 1,950 killings.23 The Sindhis, who
number fewer than 10 percent of Karachi's population, and who
command, at most, only a bare majority of Sindh's provincial
population, resent domination by outsiders and point to their own
conspicuously prominent place at the bottom of Pakistan's socioeconomic hierarchy. The Mohajirs, on the other hand, recall
earlier decades, when Pakistan was new and they shared with the
Punjabis political and economic domination of the country's
fledgling political and economic institutions. Having lost in
more recent years some of their original importance, in part due
to deliberate government ethnic preference programs aimed at
boosting the indigenous Sindhis, the Mohajirs (who still
represent as much as 70 percent of Karachi's population) have
been attracted in recent decades to the radical and often violent
agendas of the Mohajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) Refugee National
Movement. Her own major political base being in the Sindh and
among Sindhis, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto faces extraordinary
political risks in attempting to resolve the problems of this
province.24 Responsibility for the Sindh's agony has been fixed in
various places, including the cynical divide-and-rule strategies
of Pakistan's own state authorities--not least among them the
military authorities.25 Inevitably, as in Pakistan Interior
Minister Naseerullah Babar's recent hint to the parliament in
Islamabad of Indian and Afghanistan involvement in the recent
spate of terrorist bombings in the country, the government
responded by alleging the sinister presence of a "foreign hand"
in Pakistan's internal ethnic crises.26 Whether or not the
allegations were true, they demonstrated the close and
unavoidable link between Pakistan's security and its ethnicity.
Of great importance in any consideration of Pakistan's
vulnerability to foreign interference is the fact that Pakistan's
ethnic transnationalism is overlapped by--and in some respects
dwarfed by--the religious (in South Asian parlance, communal)
transnationalism arising from the broad geographic distribution
of Islamic identity in the region. South Asia's three largest
countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) together contain over 350
million Muslims--by far the largest concentration of Muslims in
the world. Hindu-dominant India, with a Muslim minority of about
110 million (12 percent of the country's population), also
happens to be the fourth largest Muslim country in the world
(after Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh).27 The spread of
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religious nationalism throughout South Asia in recent decades,
among both Muslims and Hindus, obviously poses a considerable
threat, not only to the survival of secular statehood in the
region, but to the future well-being and security of its minority
religious groups as well.28
From its start, the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir has
been complicated by each side's implied threat to the legitimacy
not merely of the other's territorial claims, but of its national
identity as well. Possession of Kashmir represented, for each
side, vindication of the basic principle of identity--the one
(India) secular, the other (Pakistan) religious--upon which each
had been formally based. The increasing merger of religious with
national identity that has occurred in both countries in more
recent decades has considerably magnified and complicated this
problem. It has, for one thing, placed India's huge Muslim
minority under greater suspicion than ever of its divided
loyalties and potential for "fifth column" activity in the event
of renewed war with Pakistan, raising a serious doubt whether
"any government in Delhi could safeguard Muslims against
displacement and worse."29 For another, it has lent to the
struggle over Kashmir the aura of a religious crusade, complete
with foreign mercenaries, dogmatic intolerance, and merciless
reprisal killings--the savage beheading in August 1995 of a
Norwegian tourist by his Kashmiri abductors being but one of
countless such episodes. It has also placed the government of
Pakistan's own policies in regard to Kashmir under attack from
radicalized Islamic groups within Pakistan itself. The
government's vulnerability to extremist elements was highlighted
by the report of the September 1995 secret arrest in Pakistan of
40 army officers, apparently with links to Islamic fundamentalist
groups, accused of plotting a coup against Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto's government.30
Military Confrontation with India and Afghanistan.
No other major state in the world has a lengthier stretch of
contested international border than Pakistan. The approximately
750-mile long, British-drawn Durand Line, separating Pakistan's
NWFP from Afghanistan, has never been formally recognized as an
international boundary by any Afghan government. The Line of
Control (LOC), running nearly 500 miles in a rough arc from north
to south through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, was
negotiated explicitly as a temporary boundary between the Indianand Pakistani-controlled sectors of that territory in the Simla
Accord of 1972.31 The passage of time has not transformed either
of these two lines fully into de facto international borders. The
failure of the Durand Line to have much impact either on the gunand-drug smuggling traffic of border tribals or on the fixing of
their national loyalties has acquired nearly legendary
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proportions over the past century. The kindred failure of the LOC
over the past 50 years or so appears well on its way toward
earning that line the same notoriety. Nor have these lines, least
of all the one in Kashmir (ironically, initially crafted as a
"cease-fire line"), served in the slightest to stabilize the
relations between Pakistan and these two neighbors. On the
contrary, both lines are noted far more as transit areas for the
passage of guerrilla forces and their arms, as staging areas for
cross-border terrorist attacks, and--on the LOC in Kashmir, at
least--for the frequent exchange of small arms, mortar and
artillery fire between the regular armed forces on either side
than for any pacifying effects they might have had in Pakistan's
frontier areas.
Pakistan claims that in Kashmir its involvement on the
Indian side of the LOC is limited to diplomatic and moral support
for the cause of Kashmiri self-determination--a cause for which,
Pakistan asserts, there is more than ample justification in
international law. As for Afghanistan, Pakistan contends that it
has no favorites among the warring Afghan factions currently
vying for power, that it is not at all materially involved in
Afghanistan's internal strife, and that it wishes only that the
government of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, which it
claims has outlived its legitimacy, should step down. Both of
these countries reject Pakistani claims to innocence, insisting
that in both cases Pakistan's covert interference is, in fact, at
the root of their troubles. While the claim that Pakistan bears
sole (or at least most of the) responsibility for these
countries' present troubles has, in fact, yet to be convincingly
demonstrated, they are justified in rejecting Pakistan's claims
to innocence. It can be argued that Pakistan's involvement on the
Indian side of the LOC in the 1990s,
was far from insignificant; that Pakistan supplied
substantial political, diplomatic, and material support
to the Kashmiri uprising; that the material support
took various forms, including the training,
indoctrination, arming, and cross-border movement of
the infiltrating forces; that the exfiltration of
Kashmiri Muslims across the LOC into Pakistan or
Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and their covert
reinfiltration, following training in light arms and
guerrilla tactics, played a very important role in
maintaining the tempo of the insurgency; that the
support was planned and coordinated in large part by
Pakistan's ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate]; and that all this was carried out with
the full knowledge and under the auspices of the
Pakistan army.32
Determining the actual scale and intensity of Pakistan's
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current cross-border activities in Kashmir is, of course, another
matter. The report in a November 1995 issue of India's premier
news magazine that "1995 has seen the highest number of trained
militants coming into the [Kashmir] Valley from across the
border, and even conservative estimates put the figure at 1,000 a
month," probably inflates the rate of influx.33 Unfortunately,
verification of such reports is flatly impossible.
The intent here, in any event, is not to fix blame for the
tragic circumstances in which Kashmir presently finds itself (an
exercise that would probably lead to an indictment not just of
Pakistan but of all parties to the conflict). Neither is it to
imply that Pakistani actions on the Indian side of the LOC do not
have their counterparts in Indian actions on the Pakistani side
of the line. That, in the face of mountainous evidence to the
contrary, would be patently ridiculous.34 Rather, the intent is
simply to point out that the pattern of conflict sustained today
by Pakistan and India in Kashmir, whatever the justification for
it or lack thereof, is extremely provocative and, insofar as
Pakistan is concerned, presents an enormous challenge to the
country's security. For example, in November 1995, Pakistani
artillery fire flattened an Indian bunker located on the LOC at a
point from where Indian forces could, and allegedly frequently
did, direct heavy machine-gun fire at passing military and
civilian vehicles using the Neelam Valley road on the Pakistani
side of the line.35 That action apparently ended the Indian
forces' year-long blockade of the strategic road. Whether or not
these facts were reported fully or accurately, the evidence is
now overwhelming that armed conflict--and not just minor
skirmishing--has become a routine feature of India-Pakistan
relations in the contested area of Kashmir. While these two
countries have displayed considerable prudence over the years, on
only a few occasions permitting their deep hostility to get out
of control and to develop into full-scale fighting, it is
impossible to assume, in the face of present developments, that
their hostility can be permanently contained.36
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs has
been continuous from about 1974, when, under Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it began supplying surreptitious military
support, including sanctuary within Pakistan, training, and arms
to groups of Afghan dissidents fighting the regime of Mohammad
Daoud Khan. This aid continued when the Nur Mohammad Taraki
regime replaced the Daoud Khan regime at the time of the Marxist
takeover in 1978, and it was given major impetus when that regime
fell to a Soviet-backed puppet government at the end of 1979.
Quite unlike its involvement in Kashmir, however, Pakistan's
prolonged activity in Afghanistan had considerable international
sanction and ultimately won it the gratitude of much of the
world. During the Afghanistan War, of course, it acted as the
main conduit for Western aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan
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resistance. By the late 1980s, the level of this aid had reached
staggering dimensions: combined U.S. and Saudi assistance alone
at that time had climbed to about $1 billion per year.37
The level and exact nature of Pakistan's unabated
involvement in Afghanistan's civil strife since the Soviet
pullout can only be guessed. Many observers claim that Islamabad
continued to funnel military support to its favorites among the
mujahideen, especially to its longtime ally, Hizb-i-Islami
chieftan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In 1993, it seems, with the change
of government in Pakistan that brought Benazir Bhutto to power,
Pakistan's support to Hekmatyar, perhaps with the encouragement
of Washington, dried up. The sudden appearance on the Afghan
scene in October 1994 of the so-called Taleban ("student")
militia has prompted numerous reports that Pakistan is behind
that group's striking military success--including a victory, at
least momentary, over the forces of Hekmatyar.38
The current geopolitical situation in Afghanistan is, by any
standard, extremely confusing. Russia, the newly independent
states of Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), Iran, and India,
along with Pakistan, all have a very large stake in the outcome
of the present free-for-all struggle for power and influence that
was unleashed with the collapse of the USSR.39 Pakistan, at least
as much as any of the other external contenders, considers
Afghanistan's pacification and the political orientation of its
leaders--factors bearing heavily not only upon Pakistan's own
future political stability and international political status,
but upon its acute concern for the opening of trade routes to
Muslim Central Asia--matters of the most vital state interest.40
Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby observe that "increasingly, the keys
to the resolution of the [Afghanistan] situation lie in Tashkent
and Islamabad."41 While that may very well be true, no one at the
moment can be sure that the ultimate resolution of this situation
will come very soon, that it will favor Pakistan's interests, or
that it will bring a century or more of conflict over the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border finally to a peaceful end.
Pakistan's Post-Cold War Options.
Pakistan has three post-Cold War options--potential
alternatives, in other words, to the Cold War policy choices that
led it to seek alliance with the United States and a major role
in Washington's anti-Communist containment strategy. They are the
Pan-Islamic Option, the Domestic Liberalization Option and the
Regional Cooperation Option.

Pan-Islamic Option. Pakistan has long thought that it could,
to some extent, compensate for both its vulnerable political
geography and its military-demographic-economic weakness relative
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to India by expanding and deepening its ties to the many coreligionist states of the Islamic world. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's
hosting of an Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974, in the aftermath
of Pakistan's loss of East Bengal in the 1971 war, and his
daughter's proposal to convene an extraordinary summit of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Islamabad in
March 1997 to help celebrate the 50th anniversary of Pakistan's
birth testify equally to the persistence and strength of this
idea.42 Pakistan's stature as the Islamic world's sole nuclear
weapon power and as the main political voice of the South Asian
region's huge Muslim population reinforced this idea. The thesis,
voiced a few years ago in Foreign Affairs by Harvard professor
Samuel Huntington, that a fundamental realignment of strategic
forces was underway in the post-Cold War world, that this
realignment would turn the international relations of the 21st
century in its most basic respects into a "clash of
civilizations" (most conspicuously setting the West versus the
Rest), and that Islamic Civilization would be involved in the
bloodiest clashes of all, gave this idea at least symbolic
support.43 Huntington argued that on-going "kin-country rallying"-the mobilizing of interstate support systems or alliances on
religious or civilization grounds--empirically demonstrated this
thesis.
Huntington's concept was bold and provocative. However, in
part because it seemed to depend upon a more thorough and rapid
decline of the nation-state structure and the ideology of
nationalism than most political theorists were willing to
concede, it has received surprisingly little support from fellow
academics. Most of them, including Fouad Ajami, Olivier Roy,
Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, have argued that Islam's "bloody
borders," as Huntington had expressed it, were much more likely
to be found on the borders of neighboring Muslim states, or
between these states and the nascently nationalistic ethnic
communities or sects within them, than on those borders
separating Muslim from non-Muslim states. Moreover, they argued
that Huntington had read far more significance into the "kincountry rallying" occurring among the world's Muslims than its
actual magnitude warranted.44
Unquestionably Pakistan is now involved in a variety of panIslamic projects, such as the previously-mentioned OIC. Pakistan
is an important and the most populous member of the all-Muslim
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a regional group formed
in early 1992 which also includes all of the five Muslim Central
Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Turkmenistan) plus Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan,
that is the largest economic bloc in the world. Then, too, there
is plenty of evidence that the rallying of Muslims to pan-Islamic
causes is a matter of some significance in Pakistan's South Asian
policy. Citing intelligence sources, the Indian news magazine
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India Today reported in September 1995, for instance, that at
least 1,600 foreign Islamic militants had crossed the border into
Kashmir during that summer to fight on the side of the Kashmiri
Muslim insurgents. While this figure may not represent the actual
foreign hijacking of the insurgency, it certainly indicates a
major external influence upon it.45
Nevertheless, Pakistan's past (e.g., the secession of Muslim
East Bengal) and its present (e.g., Afghanistan) provide
sufficient examples to suggest that the trans-state Islamic bond
has very definite limits. In Afghanistan's case alone, Pakistan
finds itself presently at odds not only with numerous groups of
Muslim Afghans (the regime of President Rabbani, and the
Hekmatyar forces), but with those Muslim states with which it is
allied in the ECO (Shia-dominant Iran or secular Uzbekistan) with
which, for a variety of reasons, it does not see eye-to-eye in
regard to Afghanistan's political future.46 Additional examples
include the seeming preference of Muslim Kashmiris for
independence from both India and Pakistan rather than for union
with Pakistan; Pakistan's continuing refusal to take back the
roughly 240,000 stranded (Urdu-speaking) Muslim Pakistanis,
called "Biharis," who have been living in 60-odd squalid camps in
Dhaka and elsewhere in the fellow Muslim state of Bangladesh (in
what used to be East Pakistan) since 1971; and Pakistan's
parallel plan, reportedly announced by its Interior Minister in
November 1995, for the compulsory deportation or "push-back" to
Bangladesh of up to 1.6 million "illegal" Bangladeshi migrants
claimed currently to be in Pakistan--a gesture that oddly mimics
the anti-Bengali Muslim stance of the fiercely Hindu nationalist
leader of India's Shiv Sena party, Bal Thackeray.47 It might even
be argued that India's 110 million-strong Muslim minority is far
more a hostage today to Pakistan's foreign policy than a willing
ally of it. Tragic it may be, but the Islamic world that
surrounds Pakistan is a world of bloody feuds and clashing
factions, rather than one that is ready to launch "the clash of
civilizations," much less to take on the West.
In sum, Pakistan, under present circumstances in the Islamic
world, is very likely to come up short of reliable Islamic
allies. The Pan-Islamic Option, for all its bluster and for all
its promise, is for most practical purposes (and certainly for
Pakistan's basic security requirements) a fiction.

Domestic Liberalization Option. A theme common to most
studies of Pakistan's post-independence political development,
especially the more recent ones, is that the very early
subordination of Islamabad's fledgling political institutions to
the supreme control and insatiable "corporate needs" of the
Pakistan Army both crippled them while it perverted the Army's
mission to provide for Pakistan's security against real or
potential external threats. The best of these studies allow that
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the "military variable" is only one of several that sets Pakistan
on its early praetorian course, and that the real threat to
Pakistan's security that arose from Partition (and in particular
from India's resentment of Partition's territorial and other
consequences), at least in part precipitated the military's
almost immediate post-independence intervention in civil
government. Pakistan's insecurity today is far more the product
of its past internal political failures than of any threatening
force in its external security environment.48 A natural by-product
of this line of reasoning, obviously, is that determined and farreaching reform of Pakistan's domestic politics--the so-called
Domestic Liberalization Option, but which is just as well
described as the Demilitarizing, Democratizing or even
"Decentering" Option (if one is contemplating reform via the
devolution of power from the center to provincial or lower levels
of governance)--can have a remarkably positive impact on its
international relations. This simply echoes the claim, of course,
of those Kantian-inclined international relations theorists who
believe that the surest way to international peace is via the
spread domestically of liberal political institutions.49
It is questionable, of course, whether Pakistan's internal
governance enjoys the positive causal connection with external
relations that the theorists are claiming, and, given the
inevitable inertial propensities in Pakistan's present internal
political structure, ethno-cultural configuration, and
demographic and socio-economic circumstances, whether the
redistributive policies implicit in the Domestic Liberalization
Option would produce within a decent time period the predicted
enhancement in human well-being or simply sharpen the regional,
ethnic, sectarian, and class polarizations that are already
tearing at Pakistan's solidarity.
Nevertheless, in principle at least, it would be hard to
deny that Pakistan could profit from a redefinition of its
security requirements that endorsed a shift in public expenditure
from the military to social and economic welfare agencies. After
all, measured against most of the standard indices of human wellbeing, Pakistan does not fare very well, often not even in
comparisons with other low-income countries (including the other
states of South Asia). According to a World Bank assessment of
Pakistan completed in September 1995, Pakistan's "total fertility
rate"50 stands at 65 percent and its infant mortality rate at 30
percent above the average for all low-income countries.51 Pakistan
also ranks in the cellar (see Table 7, p. 96) in the category of
primary and secondary schooling. Especially marked is its poor
standing in the category of female school enrollment: only 5 of
the 132 countries displayed a lower percentage than Pakistan of
females in primary school in 1992, and only 18 of them showed a
lower percentage than Pakistan of females in secondary school.52
In other standard categories of human development, such as
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literacy, life expectancy, and per capita share of Gross National
Produce (GNP) (see Table 8, p. 97), Pakistan's ranking is
similarly unenviable.
It would be even harder to deny that Pakistan has few assets
other than the military budget from which to secure the resources
needed to manage any such shift in public expenditure. Realistic
alternatives to the military budget simply do not exist.
Pakistan's Minister of Finance reportedly admitted in May 1991,
for instance, that in fiscal year 1991-92, debt servicing (53
percent) and defense expenditures (47 percent) would, between
them, consume virtually 100 percent of central revenue receipts,
and that ". . . expenditures on development programs, public
administration, and social sectors such as health and education
would have to be met from external sources."53 There are no
unusually genererous foreign donors on the horizon.
The presumed elasticity (and ready contractibility) of
defense budgets is, of course, the focus of great controversy,
and not only in Pakistan. In the United States, an end-of-Cold
War "peace dividend" worth boasting about has yet to appear, in
spite of the fact that no truly credible adversary remains. But,
Pakistan retains a principal adversary, India, on its very
doorstep.

Regional Cooperation Option. The South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which formally associates all seven
of the South Asian states (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives) in a large number of
common projects aimed primarily at stimulating regional economic
cooperation, has recorded a number of significant achievements
since its founding in 1985. One of the most recent--and possibly
the most momentous--of these achievements was the signing by all
seven countries in November 1995 of the South Asian Preferential
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), a plan for immediate mutual cutting
of tariff barriers and eventual creation of a free trade zone.54
Symptomatic, however, of the distance which regional cooperation
has yet to go in South Asia before it achieves real
respectability was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's almost
immediate decision (allegedly reacting to criticism that SAPTA
threatened to compromise Pakistan's stand on Kashmir) to refuse
Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to India--a status
routinely granted to virtually all of a nation's regular trading
partners.55 That decision paralleled countless others, affecting
virtually every dimension of India-Pakistan relations, including
even sports activities, that account for the gloom in most
discussions of the South Asian region's prospects for heightened
cooperation.56 In brief, the SAPTA accord and other occasional
moves in the direction of cooperation are not reliable harbingers
of a rising tide of regionalism in South Asia. India-Pakistan
relations, in the face of persuasive arguments that the security
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of both states would be substantially enhanced were they to
cooperate in such areas as energy and the environment,57 remain
predominantly and stubbornly hostile. Significant improvement in
their bilateral relations, even in their willingness or ability
to conduct serious and sustained talks on the matters that divide
them, faces stiff barriers. Both continue to view one another as
major threats rather than potential regional partners, and, thus,
both continue to engage relentlessly in acts of sabotage,
espionage, diplomatic one-upmanship, and sabre-rattling of the
sort once associated with the Cold War.
On top of an already existing array of counter-regionalist
properties, ranging from incommensurably huge differences in the
prospective partners' relative sizes to religio-cultural
differences having their roots deep in the subcontinent's
history,58 there are now political trends afoot in the region--a
drift, it seems, in the direction of cultural militancy and
nationalist extremism that threatens to wash away the political
center--that seem likely to add substantially to them. On the
Pakistan side, of course, exists its government's proclivity for
trumpeting its Islamic identity and its inevitable role in the
region as "guardian of the faith." While this identity has not
paid off electorally at all well for the country's rightwing
Islamist political parties, such as the strongly organized
Jama'at-i-Islami, their mass mobilizing talents and ability to
apply pressure effectively at strategic points of the
governmental apparatus make them a political factor to be
reckoned with. As for the Indian side, the noticeably rightward
drift in its politics--and of some of its worrisome consequences-have already been noted. Recent statements reportedly made by
leaders of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
calling, for instance, for the "liberation" of (Pakistan-held)
Azad Kashmir and for the building of nuclear weapons, should not
be written off as mere pre-election campaign rhetoric.59 A BJP-led
government would not produce many substantive changes in India's
foreign policies, including its policies towards Pakistan;
neither would it usher in a new era in regional cooperation.
There are far too many anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan items on the
Hindu rightwing's current political agenda to offer much hope for
that.
In spite of the relatively heavy odds against its immediate
achievement, Pakistani leaders are well advised to place this
Regional Cooperation Option ahead of the others and, in fact, to
pursue it much more energetically than has been characteristic in
the past. The Regional Cooperation Option, for all of its
shortcomings, and unlike the other two options, addresses the
problem of Pakistan's external security head-on. It focuses the
issue directly on the regional military threat. In Pakistan's
present circumstances, that threat, in both its conventional and
nuclear forms, is simply too great to dismiss. The Regional
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Cooperation Option does not dismiss it; on the contrary, it
encourages the search for ways to reduce it. It may eventually
enhance regional cooperation, but it will have accomplished its
mission if it does no more than to lessen the menace of war.
Numerous proposals for implementing this option have been
advanced. One proposal consists of so-called "conflict-avoidance"
and "confidence-building" measures (CAMs/CBMs), the breadth of
whose definitions is limited only by the human imagination. Many
such measures have been identified for application in South Asia;
the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, has been a
particularly fertile source of these.60 As Michael Krepon,
President of the Stimson Center, recently acknowledged, CAMs/CBMs
have unfortunately not succeeded in taking root in South Asia. In
fact, he argued,
the prospects for small steps to minimize tensions, let
alone to promote political reconciliation, are modest
at best over the near-term. Indeed, the greater
likelihood in the near-term is that Indo-Pakistani
relations will continue to worsen, . . . .61
At the present time CAMs/CBMs cannot on their own inspire
anything recognizably like "confidence" between India and
Pakistan. That "confidence" can only follow their successful
negotiation of a mutual stand-down from the very abrasive
military brinkmanship now being practiced in Kashmir, which only
the most determined and persistent diplomacy, convinced of the
utter futility of present behavior, could possibly achieve.
Diplomacy of that kind, unfortunately, is presently nowhere in
sight in South Asia.
Conclusion.
Pakistan faces demonstrably major challenges to its
security. For some of these challenges, Pakistan's own political
failings are unquestionably to blame. For others, however, blame
must be allocated more widely within the region and at the level
of global politics. Fashionable "post-modernist" arguments
maintaining that the Indian threat is largely contrived, that it
has been "socially constructed" by Pakistan's corrupt and selfserving ruling elite, and that the task of liberating Pakistan
from the bondage of insecurity can be accomplished mainly by
reform from within--by overturning the "meta-narrative" of
permanent India-Pakistan enmity, while at the same time
liberating the captive "subaltern" masses--are mere caricatures
of the actual circumstances in which Pakistan presently finds
itself. These circumstances, in fact, do not leave Pakistan much
room for maneuver; its options for overcoming or at least coping
with the challenges are severely limited. Turning Pakistan's back
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on South Asia (at least the Hindu core of it), a major
implication of the Pan-Islamic Option, is too dangerous, too
self-defeating, and simply too unlikely of success to make it an
attractive prospect for Pakistan's security managers. The
Domestic Liberalization Option, in spite of its immense
ideological appeal and seeming potential to improve materially
the lot of Pakistanis, tackles the tenacious problem of
Pakistan's external security mainly by trying to forget it.
Pressing in upon Pakistani decisionmakers is the unsettling
possibility that time may be running out for Pakistan, that its
backwardness relative to other countries will severely damage its
prospects in the 21st century, and that, however unpalatable the
choices before it may be, running the risk of applying them
cannot be put off indefinitely. The Regional Cooperation Option
is the only viable option for Pakistanis to pursue. There is no
insurance, however, that they will be willing to implement it.
There are a number of initial steps that India and Pakistan
might take in regard to the pivotal issue of Kashmir.62 Kashmir is
not the only, or even the most important, obstacle to normalized
India-Pakistan relations, but without some sign of progress in
regard to Kashmir--which now symbolizes their enmity more than
anything else--progress anywhere else in their relationship will
be stifled. Unfortunately, however, the problem in South Asia is
not really one of imagining steps that India and Pakistan might
take towards peace. There is no doubt at all that Pakistanis and
Indians, properly motivated, could develop such steps on their
own.
The more likely is that the governments of these two
countries are not yet sufficiently convinced that the situation
is urgent enough to warrant the prolonged and heavy expenditure
of political capital that would certainly be required to bring
both sides seriously to the negotiating table. Indians, for their
part, face vast problems of political unrest, religious
nationalism, and economic backwardness. They feel compelled,
moreover, to maintain a powerful armed force against a still more
powerful neighbor, China. At the same time, Indians display
little interest in making concessions to Pakistan, which they
believe, not unnaturally, labors to undermine India's
international prestige while contributing significantly to its
political unrest. Pakistanis, in turn, are understandably
disturbed by the scale of economic, cultural, and military power
growing beyond their eastern border, by the standing threat to
their country's fragile Islamic identity represented by Indian
secularism, and, not least, by India's mounting attractiveness to
the world's great powers. Their leaders see little to be gained
from negotiations; they are terribly vulnerable, should they
enter into them, to charges of betraying their nation's
interests.
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Redefining Pakistan's security in terms that the West might
find more acceptable will certainly be difficult, and it may, for
the time being at least, prove impossible. Until this changes,
the rest of the world can help India and Pakistan with constant
encouraging dialogue and, most importantly, with concrete and
evenhanded political, military, and economic gestures towards the
region that discourage fighting. But, in the end, making South
Asia more secure is mainly a task that South Asians must perform.
If this is so, perhaps it is our own patience and perseverance,
oddly enough, that are most in need of cultivation.
Source: Tables 1-6 are compiled from multi-source data provided
in Remy Herrera's Statistics on Military Methodological Problems,
and Sources, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1994.
____________________________________________________
Rank
Country
Military
World Rank
(among DCs)
Expenditures
____________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

China
22,330
6
Saudi Arabia
4,798
8
India
9,588
10
Iraq
9,268
11
ROK*
8,168
12
Taiwan
6,562
15
Iran
5,306
17
Brazil
4,900
18
Republic of South 3,804
22
Africa
10
Israel
3,801
23
11
Egypt
3,672
26
12
Pakistan
2,906
31
_____________________________________________________
* Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Table 1. 1990 Military Expenditure,
Selected Developing Countries (DCs)
(in million 1988 dollars)
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______________________________________________________________
Rank
Country
Number World Rank Population
(among DCs)
of Troops
(millions)
(millions)
______________________________________________________________
1
China
3,783
1
1,170.7
2
India
1,362
4
862.7
3
DPRK*
1,040
5
22.2
4
Vietnam
1,000
6
68.1
5
ROK
750
8
43.8
6
Iran
573
9
59.9
7
Pakistan
5,20
12
121.5
8
Egypt
494
14
53.6
9
Taiwan
425
15
20.3
10
Syria
412
16
12.8
______________________________________________________________
* Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Table 2.

Number of Troops, Selected Developing Countries, 1991
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_______________________________________________________
Rank
Country
1992
1988-92
_______________________________________________________
1
India
3,709
12,235
2
Saudi Arabia
883
8,690
3
Afghanistan
0
7,515
4
Iraq
0
4,967
5
Iran
877
3,632
6
ROK
414
3,524
7
Pakistan
432
3,486
8
Egypt
621
3,295
9
Thailand
869
3,270
10
DPRK
24
3,123
_______________________________________________________
Table 3.

Major Arms Importers, Developing Countries, 1988-92
(in million 1990 dollars)

_____________________________________________________
Rank
Country
Percent of
Cumulative
Production
Percent
_____________________________________________________
1
2
3

India
31
31
Israel
23
54
Republic of
South Africa
9
63
4
Brazil
9
72
5
Taiwan
8
80
6
All other DCs
20
100
______________________________________________________
Table 4.

Major Arms Producers, Developing Countries, 1950-85
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___________________________________________________
Rank
Country
Number of Defense Workers
___________________________________________________
1
China
5,000,000
2
India
280,000
3
Egypt
100,000
4
Israel
90,000
5
Brazil
75,000
6
DPRK
55,000
7
Taiwan
50,000
8
ROK
45,000
9
Pakistan
40,000
10
Indonesia
26,000
___________________________________________________
Table 5. Major Defense Industry Employers,
Developing Countries, c. 1990

_____________________________________________________________
World
Enterprise
Country
SalesB
Jobsc
A
Rank
_____________________________________________________________
34
45
64

Israel
1,410
17,000
India
1,120 173,000
Republic
710
20,000
of South
Africa
81
Israel Military Ind.
Israel
490
8,500
83
Rafael
Israel
450
5,100
99
Hindustan Aeronautics India
370
35,000
______________________________________________________________
a
b
c

Israel Aircraft Ind.
Ordnance Factories
Armscor

Enterprises ranked by turnover in military sector.
Arms sales expressed in millions of dollars.
Total number of people employed in the enterprise.

Table 6.

Biggest Defense Enterprises, Developing Countries, 1991
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___________________________________________________
Country
Primary
Secondary
Total
Female
Total
Female
____________________________________________________
Pakistan
46
31
21
13
India
102
90
44
32
Bangladesh
77
71
19
12
Sri Lanka
107
105
74
77
Kenya
95
93
29
25
Iran
109
104
57
49
Egypt
101
93
80
73
Turkey
112
107
60
50
ROK
105
106
90
91
Canada
107
106
104
104
____________________________________________________
Source: World Bank, Human Development Report 1995, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995, Table 28, pp. 216-17.
Table 7. Primary and Secondary Education,
Percent Enrollment in 1992 (Showing Female Share)*
*Gross enrollment ratios may exceed 100 percent since the
definition of primary or secondary school age varies from country
to country.
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_______________________________________________________________
Region/
Life Exp.
Illiteracy,
GNP/Per Cap.
World
Country
1993 (Yrs) Adult 1990(%)
1993 (US$)
Rank*
_______________________________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Nepal
Sri Lanka
LOW-INCOME
Vietnam
Kenya
Uganda

60
62
61
56
54
72
62
66
58
45

54
65
52
65
74
12
41
12
31
52

310
430
300
220
190
600
380
170
270
180

MIDDLE-INCOME
Colombia
Philippines
Algeria
Turkey

68
70
67
67
67

17
13
10
43
19

2,480
1,400
850
1,780
2,970

67
53
73
85

23,090
24,740

128

HIGH-INCOME
77
United States 76

>5

31*
20
12
8
39
5
15
7

WORLD
66
33
4,420
______________________________________________________________
*GNP/Per capita: The lower the number, the lower the rank.
Table 8.

Human Development, Basic Indicators

Source: Source: World Bank, Human Development Report 1995, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995, Table 1, pp. 162-63.
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CHAPTER IV
TIGERS IN THE SHATTERBELT:
ASEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE TO THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND
Marc Jason Gilbert
Introduction.
The decade between 1986 and 1996 witnessed a sea change in
Southeast Asia's security posture. At the beginning of this era,
the Cold War still shaped the agenda of its most significant
regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).1 ASEAN's primary security interests then were focused on
keeping the Cold War's great powers from enveloping the entire
region in war. Later, ASEAN was preoccupied with addressing the
Cold War's chief legacy in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam-Cambodian
debacle. Yet the Cold War provided ASEAN with a clear mandate to
develop an indigenous regional response to international
conflict. With the waning of the Cold War, ASEAN's mandate on
questions of security and regional defense remained clear, but it
became far more complex. ASEAN faced the daunting task of
encouraging intra-regional cooperation among nations long at odds
with each other, while at the same time preserving their
collective security interests--economic as well as military--in
the face of resurgent Asian powers, such as China and Japan.
Ultimately, ASEAN chose to address these new circumstances
in a manner consistent with traditional patterns of Southeast
Asian interstate politics derived from the region's status as the
Eastern anchor of what world historians often call the world's
"shatterbelt." The informality, flexibility, and gradualism that
currently characterize ASEAN's approach to security issues are,
in fact, typical of an indigenous security architecture that has
served the region well for centuries. However, while evidence
suggests that this architecture is well-designed to meet many of
the challenges posed by today's volatile Asian affairs, the
ability of Southeast Asia to maintain an independent course in
those affairs remains problematic. Only the extension of ASEAN's
approach to regional security to the whole of Asia offers much
hope to its member nations that they may play a significant role
in any Asian security regime. It is suggested here that this
development may well be Asia's best hope for peace and stability
to the year 2000 and beyond.
The Shatterbelt.
ASEAN's current security architecture is firmly rooted in
its experience as part of the so-called "shatterbelt." This is a
region of the earth that stretches from Southeast Asia across the
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Himalayas and Hindu Kush to Afghanistan, then across Central Asia
to the Caucasus and Anatolia and onward to Southern Europe. The
human terrain of this belt is complex; it encompasses lands which
have long served both as a corridor for human migration and a
terminus. Successive waves of disparate ethnic groups have
settled there without wholly displacing their predecessors, thus
ensuring that, among them, there will be legacies of both
prolonged conflict and co-existence.
This pattern of settlement is complicated further by the
belt's positioning along fracture lines separating the world's
most powerful and dynamic urban civilizations. Each of the
shatterbelt's human populations owes much to these civilizations,
but their identities depend on defining themselves as unique from
them. Experience has shown that shatterbelt states are too
internally divided and too geo-politically or economically weak
to sustain their absolute independence at all times against the
hegemonic ambitions of these civilizations.
As a result, the art of survival in the shatterbelt has
depended most often not upon proud defiance, but artful
compromise, not upon bold initiatives, but measured small steps.
Peace has been sustained not by unilateral action, but by
bilateral or multilateral agreements brokered between internal
factions, regional partners, and/or extra-regional powers. States
in the shatterbelt have experienced periods of great achievement
when observing these imperatives and utter misery when they have
not, as the recent histories of former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
and Vietnam make clear.
The Shaping of ASEAN's Modus Operandi.
ASEAN's birth was dictated by the Cold War global bipolarism
that divided the nations along the entire shatterbelt into camps
joined to opposing external powers. Locally, this division
stimulated rivalries within and between mainland and island
Southeast Asia and recast ancient enmities in terms of critiques
of the international economic order. Further, in the aftermath of
the Cold War, the region was rife with leadership structures that
favored authoritarian and/or militarist political orders that had
little use for transparency. These leadership structures were
naturally suspicious of their neighbors and doubly suspicious of
the loyalty of their own minority populations whose lands of
origin lay directly across disputed border lands and/or sea
lanes. Yet, ASEAN actually benefitted from this turmoil as it
forced its member states to confront the immutability of the
region's common traditional shatterbelt security concerns: the
fear of the loss of national sovereignty (from command over
fractionated populations to command over vital economic
resources), the fear of bilateral interstate relations with
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untrustworthy allies, and the fear of international alliances
that held out the promise of collective security but fomented
regional competition and led to subordinate relations with
neighboring great powers that could guarantee them only an
inferior place in the global division of labor.
With its Cold War experience as a base line, ASEAN was
disinclined to adopt a binding multilateral regional security
structure either of the tentative type broached by Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s or the more inclusive plan
suggested later by Mikhail Gorbachev. Nor did ASEAN intend to
ride the coattails of a coalition of Asian powers either linked
to or independent of the United States. The drawdown of
Soviet/Russian and U.S. forces in Asia, China's unstable economic
condition and objections to multilateral alliances, and Japan's
history and its inability, at least in the short term, to deter
possible Chinese aggression, left ASEAN with no acceptable
partners in any Concert of Asia. The very weakness of the postCold War U.S. presence in Southeast Asia enhanced, in ASEAN's
view, America's role as a possible regional power broker and/or
balance wheel; but the propensity of the United States, China,
and Japan to juggle power among themselves and to relegate
Southeast Asia to the status of a junior partner in Asian-Pacific
economic and security arrangements thus far has deterred ASEAN
from hitching its star to American initiatives.
A powerful internal logic also has acted to forestall
ASEAN's rapid evolution into a formal defense community like the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, like most
alliances, owes its existence to immediate and sustained external
threats. Yet ASEAN matured at a time when the chief challenge was
not to deter an invasion or force of arms, but to remove the
grounds for future aggression by eliminating conditions in which
threats to regional security could emerge. ASEAN's search for
appropriate preventative diplomacy led naturally to the
development of the confidence-building measures and patterns of
constructive engagement which now characterize its approach to
security issues. Determined to avoid the tendency of Cold War-era
diplomacy to employ multilateral defense umbrellas as a means to
define and separate nations rather than bring them together,
ASEAN sought to build regional consensus for peace upon a
foundation of trust arising from a multitude of successful
bilateral arrangements. These were expected to form an inclusive
security web, rather than a wall or line in the sand.
The benefits of ASEAN's defense posture were many. ASEAN was
able to stimulate friendly contacts between the region's
political and military establishments and surround potential
enemies with a comforting cocoon of institutional contacts,
economic ties, and transparent low-level military accords. While
promoting inclusive and expandable strategic protocols (for
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example, most recently the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone), ASEAN avoided formal defense agreements, preferring postministerial meetings, caucuses, and even state dinners to
treaties and official meetings. Many criticized this preference
as too tentative, but, as Michael Antolik has noted, "It
exemplifies what Singapore Ambassador Tommy Koh called the Asian
preference for the step-by-step, non-institutional approach."2
ASEAN in the 1990s.
ASEAN's current effort at facilitating Thai-Vietnamese
rapproachment, which has long been seen as the key to peace and
stability in the region, epitomizes the success of this approach.
Prior to 1986, only Indonesia's relations with China may have
been as dark as those between Thailand and Vietnam. Each saw the
other as an aggressive, hegemonic power with diametrically
opposed economic interests, to say nothing of ideological
orientation. Between 1986 and 1991, changes in the world economic
and political order, most particularly Vietnam's increasing need
to import capital and Thailand's need to export capital, favored
improved relations. However, differences over the role and
influence of China in the development of the Mekong Basin,
complicated by the legacy of Cold War antagonisms, helped keep
both nations apart, even as the chief issue driving ThaiVietnamese foreign policy discord--the Cambodian embroligo--wound
down. Vietnam hoped that with the success of doi moi (the
Vietnamese equivalent of Perestroika, or reconstruction) upon
which the survival of both the Vietnamese nation and its
leadership depended, the Cold War division between communist and
non-communist states in Southeast Asia would soon fade.
Therefore, with the waning of the old bipolar ideological
differences, the region's states came to realize that improved
relations among ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos would allow these states
to present a strong, united front in defense of the region's
interests.
The problem for Vietnam was an absence of trust between
itself and Thailand, sustained, in part, by the almost complete
lack of personal knowledge of each other's leadership. This lack
of knowledge prevented Vietnam and Thailand from recognizing that
a new wave of pragmatic outward-looking technocrats was coming to
the fore in both states. Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet
sought to break through these clouds of mistrust and ignorance by
making a tour of ASEAN member states in 1991. Had ASEAN not been
committed to developing consensus and bilateral relationships
among its members and neighbors as the foundation for
multilateral agreements, it is possible that Vo Van Kiet's 1991
tour (and those that were to follow in successive years) would
have achieved little.
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ASEAN's policy of inclusion, however, turned Vietnam's
overture into a prelude for Vietnam's and Laos's 1992 signing of
ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The countries'
entry into this agreement qualified them for the admission to
observer status at ASEAN's Annual Ministerial Meeting.3 By 1994,
the foreign ministers of both nations were added to the newly
established ASEAN Regional Forum, a brief, informal, allinclusive post-Annual Ministerial Meeting gathering that is the
fullest expression to date of ASEAN's vision of a security
community. As a result of these confidence-building efforts,
Thailand joined other ASEAN states in sending high-level
delegations to Hanoi, breaking decades of estrangement. By this
gradual process, ASEAN not only helped provide the necessary
political space for improvements in Thai-Vietnamese relations and
paved the way for Vietnam's and Laos's admission to ASEAN, but it
did so without angering China, for that nation was simultaneously
wooed into the Regional Forum's fold. In fact, ASEAN's
receptivity to Vietnam's initial overtures may have played a role
in encouraging the ground-breaking Sino-Vietnamese dialogue that
culminated in ministerial and summit meetings between Vietnamese
and Chinese leaders in 1993.
ASEAN's successful effort to begin bridging the
communist/non-communist divide in Southeast Asia was merely one
of the more dramatic of ASEAN's achievements since 1990. Other
successes include reducing occasional Thai and Indonesian muscleflexing as regional kingpins and working with the United States
to steer Malaysian efforts at creating what has been
characterized by one scholar as "an East Asian Economic Zone
without Caucasians"4 to something less exclusive and more
productive, such as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). ASEAN
also has encouraged a variety of schemes to promote the interregional exchange of intelligence data and participation in joint
military training and exercises. ASEAN soon may develop a "coast
guard" capacity to address commonly the piracy, smuggling, and
illegal immigration issues that have long troubled the region.
Other plans include a regional center for security studies, a
regional register of arms holdings or transfers, and a code to
govern arms sales so as to reduce fears of an arms race raised by
the somewhat inevitable modernization and expansion of virtually
all armies and navies in the region.5
ASEAN's Security Architecture to the Year 2000.
ASEAN, however, remains reluctant to effect the transition
to a European-style defense alliance. In 1994, after signing a
defense accord with the Philippines, Malaysian Defense Minister
Njaib Abdul Razak declared that Southeastern Asian states were
working to form "a network of defense ties that will enable them
to act as military allies." Yet, at the same time he rejected the
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idea that ASEAN might turn into a formal defense alliance,
arguing that this "would only heighten regional tension."6 ASEAN
seems determined to act on the principle that by not even
mentioning the word "security" in its Regional (Security) Forum,
this body is freer to promote it.
The Clinton administration has noted how wide ASEAN and its
member states have spread their Taoist web of collective
bilateral threads. His administration has even facilitated this
development by the removal of its own traditional objection to
multilateral arrangements in Asia. At the urging of ASEAN leaders
to adopt a posture more in tune with Asian realities as they saw
it, President Clinton has expressed the hope that the ASEAN
technique of building multilateral agreements on the basis of
bilateral agreements "can function like overlapping plates of
armor, covering the full body of our common security concerns."7
The measure may be taken of ASEAN's ability to contribute to
the realization of such a goal, as well as the basic strengths
and weaknesses of ASEAN's approach, by ASEAN's recent response to
China's effort to increase its influence and military presence in
Myanmar. That state's leaders, as is so often the case in the
shatterbelt, have sought to strengthen themselves against
domestic turmoil and international isolation by opening their
doors to a stronger neighbor. China's base building and massive
military assistance to Myanmar's government over the past 3 years
have been viewed with great concern by the United States and
India. Both of these governments have urged ASEAN to join with
them to oppose China's seeming projection of its power into the
Indian Ocean and to condemn Myanmar's human rights record. For
its part, India also sought to advance its desiderata of a
military alliance among itself, ASEAN, and Japan, to contain
future Chinese expansionism or, at the very least, to discourage
China from arming insurgents on the India side of the old ChinaBurma-Indian frontier.
ASEAN member states did bridle when the Myanmar government,
buoyed by Chinese assistance, resumed the persecution and
deportation of its Muslim population, but ASEAN itself remained
true to its nature. Much to the chagrin of the United States and
(at least initially) India, ASEAN employed its tried and true
instrument of constructive engagement in an attempt to wean
Myanmar away from dependence on China and into the ASEAN fold.8
The accomplishment of this task would finally bring all the major
states of the region under the ASEAN umbrella. It would also send
a typically soft, but important, message to China: there is far
more profit to be made by respecting ASEAN's influence as a geopolitical balance wheel and its value as a friendly trading block
than by viewing it as a speedbump on the highway to a
confrontation with India. As economics, and not global military
reach, seems at present to be driving China's Myanmar policy,
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ASEAN may once again be able to finesse its way toward a more
stable security environment. However, in the event of a Chinese
economic collapse or political crisis, the keepers of the Middle
Kingdom might exercise its traditional territorial ambitions in
this direction or, given its shifting position on the Spratly
Islands, in any direction. Whither then, ASEAN?
The inability of ASEAN to muster sufficient threat of force
to deter aggression is of paramount importance to those who
doubt the viability of ASEAN as a guarantor of regional security
and stability. How, they ask, can ASEAN nations defend even their
own region adequately without becoming a part of a larger, more
formal defense scheme involving some combination of Asian and
Western Powers? Some admit that ASEAN's current security
architecture is well designed to sustain ASEAN interests in a
world fundamentally hostile to smaller or weak regional national
groupings, but they nonetheless argue that the ability of such
regional groupings to secure their place in the emerging New
World Order (and their viability within it) may be limited.
ASEAN might answer that the more formal arrangements its
critics favor offer no panacea. It could argue that the European
Community and NATO proved unable to apply an early saving salve
to the open wound that was Yugoslavia in crisis, and that only
now, when the mere gangrenous stumps of that nation remain, is
NATO adopting the type of "confidence building" approach ASEAN
has for so long favored. ASEAN also could argue that Operations
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM demonstrate that coalition-building
and force inter-operablity--further ASEAN strengths--are the wave
of the future.
Further, as Robert B. Oxnam has observed, ASEAN has
succeeded better at least than American foreign policy advisers
at meeting what he calls the "central challenge in the future of
America's Asia policy . . . treating headaches before they become
migraine crises."9 If Oxnam is correct in this judgment, it would
seem that in the post-Cold War era the ASEAN model for conflict
management bears close study and possesses no little utility as a
model for the region, particularly in view of the fact that the
area of greatest tension in Asia, the China-Korea-Japan triangle,
is also the area with the fewest ASEAN-style overlapping
bilateral and other confidence-building agreements.
U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry seems to have grasped
the value of ASEAN's approach to Northeast Asia, if Eurocentrically. Disturbed by the sabre-rattling between China and
Taiwan that has accompanied the run-up to the recent Taiwanese
elections, Perry called for the defense chiefs of China, Japan,
the United States, and other Asian and Pacific nations to create
a new forum for the discussion of regional security issues. Perry
declared that "the time has come for the defense leaders of the
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Asia-Pacific region to begin forming our own web or security
ties," and suggested that Asian nations could use as a model the
Partnership for Peace Forum in Europe, whose goal is to "promote
western military cooperation with Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union without issuing formal security guarantees."10 An
inclusive, informal security forum for all of Asia that does not
even use the word "security" in its title would appear to be
ASEAN's Regional Forum writ large, with the added benefit of
providing a sturdier framework. Many observers believe that even
Southeast Asia's security problems can no longer be addressed
effectively by ASEAN's post-ministerial meetings on security
issues that seem all too quickly to adjourn to the golf course.
Some critics of Asia's lack of a single multinational
security forum would go farther than Perry. They seek a formal
alliance structure similar to NATO.11 Those who advocate any
course that does not reflect traditional regional verities,
however, may be under a misapprehension of what an Asian tiger
represents. Some Asian leaders and their Western colleagues
employ the term to mean a rising and worthy competitor. In the
shatterbelt, however, the tiger is often viewed as the vehicle
for a wandering spirit that defends its vision of dharma (moral
law) and preys upon the unrighteous. ASEAN has kept these tigers
at bay by seeking "acceptable understandings" with the great
powers, equitable relations among member states, and a gradual,
but increasingly equitable, global distribution of wealth. The
pacific, informal, and consensus-seeking strategic posture ASEAN
has thus far pursued has kept much of Southeast Asia safe from
predators, vengeful or otherwise; its successes--from avoiding
U.S-North Korea-type confrontations to promoting the region's
economic growth as the best medicine for its security problems-bid others to apply that strategy beyond the confines of
Southeast Asia.
Conclusion.
This path may be the only one ASEAN can follow given its
relative weakness, but ASEAN's achievements to date, or more
accurately, the unpleasantness of available alternatives, are
also a warning to any who might be tempted to exploit their
military and economic advantage over the region. The sources and
pattern of ASEAN's security community remind us of what witnesses
to the history of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chechnya, and Bosnia
already know: it profiteth little anyone who lets loose the tiger
in the shatterbelt.
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CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:
TOWARDS A NEW ERA
Perry Wood
Introduction.
The 1990s will be remembered as an age of transition in Asia
and the world. The old certainties of the Cold War are no longer
relevant, but the outlines of the new post-Cold War era remain
vague and uncertain. It is clear that we are headed toward a new
international system, but the nature of that system remains as
yet undetermined. It will be the leaders, policies, and events of
the next decade which will shape and define the Asian and world
environments of the 21st century.
Southeast Asia is going through its own historic transition.
For decades, the region was dominated by external powers--the
United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. In 1967, torn
by war, internal instability, and poverty, the non-communist
Southeast Asian states appeared weak and fragile; 1967, however,
was a watershed year. On August 8, 1967, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established.1 Its foundation
was really the first step towards the transformation of Southeast
Asia into a center of economically vibrant states with a valid
claim to a political leadership role in Asian and world affairs.
Today, that claim is being realized. The ASEAN states are
likely to be among the fastest growing economies in the world in
the next decade. Their economies are integrated into the rapidly
growing Asian regional economy and their importance as export
markets for American products has risen steadily, along with the
rapid rise in their peoples' standard of living. The increasing
integration of the Asia-Pacific economies parallels the
development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum, which is establishing the political and institutional
structure for even broader economic integration--a process in
which the ASEAN states have played an important role. In
addition, the ASEAN states have extended their "peace" to their
former communist enemies in Indochina--working to bring these
states out of their isolation into the regional renaissance and
realize ASEAN's "historic mission" to become an association of
all Southeast Asian states.2 Along with the end of the Cold War
and the end of superpower confrontation in Asia, these
developments have led many Asians to hope that the region is
entering upon an unprecedented era of peace, regional
cooperation, and development.
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Unfortunately, contrary trends are also apparent.
Strategically, the end of superpower dominance has left many
Southeast Asians increasingly worried about external security
matters. Indeed, some Southeast Asians believe that the new
security environment could entail a much greater risk of regional
conflict than the old Cold War era. As the superpower era passes
from the scene, other extra-regional states are assuming a higher
regional military profile as they rapidly attempt to modernize
and expand their military equipment and capabilities. Regional
concerns have focused particularly upon China. With the end of
the Cold War, the Southeast Asians fear that the larger Asian
states' growing affluence and self-confidence may encourage them
to pursue their goals unilaterally. Past experience clearly
indicates that certain of these states may not be reluctant to
use force in pursuit of their goals. Consequently, many Southeast
Asian defense experts worry that the risk of limited conventional
wars and armed conflicts of varying intensity, duration, and
scale could very easily increase in the next century. The ASEAN
states, therefore, are investing in enhanced external military
capabilities, promoting greater ASEAN security cooperation, and
sponsoring an Asia-wide forum on security issues--the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF).
The ASEAN states are attempting also to preserve strong
security ties with the United States, which they believe provides
an indispensable stabilizing presence during this difficult
transition period. But the United States appears increasingly
preoccupied with its internal affairs. Many interpreted the
failure of President Clinton to attend the APEC forum in November
1995 due to the budget impasse in Washington as a sign of this
preoccupation.3 Asians have long recognized that American
foreign policy is "Eurocentric," despite the fact that American
trade with the Pacific has exceeded its trade with Europe for
some time. There are many reasons for this focus on Europe.
American political and cultural ties to the Continent remain
strong, and the top American foreign policymakers have typically
been drawn from the ranks of "Atlanticists" and/or
"Sovietologists" whose natural orientation has been toward
Europe. The Eurocentrism of American policy has, unfortunately,
led to a secondary and often derivative role for the Pacific in
American thinking.
Southeast Asia, in particular, has suffered in neglect since
the end of the Vietnam War. This neglect reflects an unwarranted
complacency regarding the region's role in America's wider global
interests. In addition, the continued neglect of the region
ignores the enormous changes that have occurred in Southeast Asia
in the last two decades, which have led to growing American
interests in the region and the increasing interdependence of
Northeast and Southeast Asian security.
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The United States and Southeast Asia.

United States-ASEAN Economic Links. ASEAN economic
conditions affect American interests in three main ways. First,
economic progress in ASEAN is a major determinant of regional
stability. Second, commercial relations between the United States
and ASEAN have expanded sharply in recent years. Third, ASEAN has
become increasingly important to the Asian economy as a whole and
specifically to key American allies in Asia, such as Japan and
South Korea.
Economic health is a principal component of ASEAN's
definition of its own security. Economics supports security
through a variety of channels. Perhaps most importantly, economic
growth has been a central element of each member's nationbuilding strategy. The transition from colony to independent
state, particularly for countries as internally diverse as some
ASEAN members, presented a major imperative to create unifying
institutions and linkages; growing markets were a powerful force
to that end. Economic growth was also central to overcoming the
internal security threats faced by most of the ASEAN states in
the 1960s-1970s. Today, internal stability has been achieved
largely by the ASEAN states--a success due more to their economic
successes than any military operations.
The economic relationship between the United States and
ASEAN has grown dramatically over the years. The ASEAN countries
were historically important suppliers of such key commodities as
natural rubber, tin, copper, and petroleum, but have since
emerged as the locations for new and important processing,
manufacturing, and service industries. American and Japanese
investments have been important sources of stimulation for the
growth of these industries. The six ASEAN states have averaged 6
percent annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth since the
1970s. Today, the region is entering upon an economic boom
period. In 1993, the combined Gross National Products (GNPs) of
the ASEAN states topped $350 billion. U.S.-ASEAN trade is
growing at double-digit rates. From 1988-1993, American exports
to ASEAN rose 120 percent. In fact, ASEAN represents the United
States' third largest market, behind the European Union and
Japan. Total U.S. trade with ASEAN exceeded $75 billion in 1993.4
The trends suggest a continued expansion of U.S.-ASEAN links in
the future. These economies will be the "big emerging markets"
for U.S. companies in the next decade.
A similar description can be provided for the growing
importance of links to ASEAN for Japan, and to a lesser extent,
for Taiwan and South Korea. Although in some ways these countries
present competition for American firms, the main effects of their
growing links with ASEAN are beneficial. In particular, the
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ASEAN-Japan economic relationship is becoming more balanced,
taking pressure off U.S. markets. Indeed, trade growth among
Pacific basin countries is increasingly independent of other
areas, thus greatly stabilizing the world economy and
representing an expanding market for American goods. This trend
has been accelerated by the expansion of regional economic
cooperation both within ASEAN and in the broader APEC forum.
A further benefit is the indirect regional, even global,
impact of ASEAN's success and growing regional role on badly
managed and nonmarket economies. The ASEAN states carry the
American market economy message far more powerfully than any
exhortation from an industrial power. For example, there can be
no doubt that ASEAN's example of economic success had an impact
on Vietnam and the other formerly communist Indochinese states as
they pondered whether and how to take the plunge into the world
economy.

Military Access and Freedom of Maneuver. Southeast Asia is
the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. United States
Navy (USN) and United States Air Force (USAF) forces regularly
transit this strategic region en route to the Indian Ocean, the
Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea from their bases in Japan and the
continental United States (CONUS). American forward defense
strategy requires that the U.S. armed forces, especially the
navy, have relatively easy and rapid access to Southeast Asia and
freedom of movement throughout the region. The vast scope of the
Pacific makes it impossible for U.S. forces to respond in a
timely fashion to an overseas crisis in Asia or the Persian Gulf
without being deployed forward.
The freedom of unimpeded transit through the maritime
straits of Indonesia and Malaysia is central to American
strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Reduced forces and
expanding mission requirements have made shorter sea routes ever
more important to American military planners. The Indonesian
archipelago, stretching 3,000 miles from mainland Southeast Asia
to the Southwest Pacific, forms a natural bridge or barrier
(depending upon one's ability to transit it successfully) from
East Asia from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. There are
only five major sea routes through this "Malay Barrier."
Transiting vessels which want to avoid entering Indonesian waters
must either use the relatively shallow Torres Strait between
Australia and Papua New Guinea or circumnavigate Australia--both
unappealing alternatives entailing considerably longer transit
times.
Any obstruction of the key straits through the Indonesian
archipelago, therefore, is a threat to the American interest in
free and rapid transit between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Several potential problem areas can be identified. First, a
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failure to provide adequately for the safety of navigation
through the straits could result in restrictions on transit
either by leading to a major accident blocking the straits
temporarily or by causing the littoral states to restrict transit
rights. This is a particular problem in the Straits of Malacca
due to its narrow width and high traffic volume. Malaysian
officials have suggested frequently that safety requirements and
the protection of the littoral environment might require
restrictions on traffic through the straits. These risks are
increased by the numerous incidents of piracy in the Straits,
which might easily cause a major accident, especially if an oil
tanker is involved.
Second, freedom of transit through the straits could be
restricted by the ongoing legal arguments over the status of
archipelagic seas and the rights of free passage. The Straits of
Malacca lie between Indonesia and Malaysia and are recognized,
under the International Law of the Sea, as an international sea
lane with the right of innocent passage. The other straits,
however, all lie within Indonesia's archipelagic waters. The
extent of Indonesian authority over these sea lanes has been an
issue of contention between the United States and Indonesia. Some
Indonesian officials have claimed that Indonesia can close these
straits and/or establish its own transit regulations for them.
The United States consistently has maintained that these
international straits are archipelagic sea lanes under the Law of
the Sea and subject to the rules of archipelagic sea lanes
passage as stipulated in that international treaty. The number of
international straits through Indonesian waters has also been a
subject of disagreement, with Indonesia attempting to restrict
the number of archipelagic sea lanes through their waters and the
United States attempting to have all significant routes through
the archipelago designated archipelagic sea lanes to protect
freedom of maneuver through the area. The two countries continue
to discuss these matters and have to date avoided any
confrontation over the issue since this would serve neither
country's interests.
An American withdrawal from the region, however, could
threaten this informal understanding in the future. If USN forces
curtail their transits through these waters, they could
jeopardize their status as internationally recognized sea lanes,
especially for those routes not frequently used by commercial
shipping (which largely transits through either the Malacca
Straits or the Lombok-Makassar Straits). More importantly,
however, the withdrawal of any significant American military
presence in the region would force littoral states to reassess
their own security strategy. Restrictions on freedom of transit
through their waters is one action that would be quite likely.
For their own security, one of the littoral states--Indonesia,
Malaysia, or Singapore--might even attempt to deploy forces with
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the ability to close militarily one or all of the straits during
periods of rising tension. Vessels transiting all of the straits
could readily be threatened by a combination of shore-based
weapons, missile-armed fast attack craft, and diesel submarines;
mines and underwater detection equipment could also be deployed.
Such a force could seriously threaten the ability of much larger
and better-equipped navies to transit the straits successfully.
If the United States does withdraw from Asia at some point in the
future, the USN may find it significantly more difficult to
transit through this region when the next emergency or crisis
occurs in the Persian Gulf/Middle East.
The effective attainment of the American global and regional
responsibilities requires forward deployments in Southeast Asia
via rotational deployments of both units based in CONUS and units
stationed in the Western Pacific. The U.S. ability to maintain
its presence in the Western Pacific and project its powers into
these other areas depends heavily upon possessing access rights
to those military supply, training, and repair facilities within
Southeast Asia which supplement its facilities in the North
Pacific and CONUS. The establishment of access agreements,
training arrangements, and joint facilities within Southeast
Asia, thus, is considered to have a high priority by the United
States Pacific Command (PACOM).
Since the end of the Cold War and the U.S. withdrawal from
the Philippines bases, the ASEAN states generally have been more
open regarding their existing security links with the United
States, more interested in expanding these links, and more
willing to consider various levels of access arrangements. This
shift has occurred primarily because these states desire to
preserve an American military presence in the region.
The most notable of these "post-Subic" access arrangements
is with Singapore. The facilities in Singapore fall considerably
short of constituting a "base," despite media tendencies to
characterize them as such. Actually, the USN has access to only
one berth at Sembawang Wharf, although it has been able to
coordinate its use of the facilities with Australia, the United
Kingdom, and New Zealand, and thereby gain access to two
additional berths. However, the United States has good storage
and office space available in Singapore. The availability of
office space in Singapore lies behind the USN decision to locate
the Navy Regional Contracting Center and relocate the Seventh
Fleet's Logistic Support Force there. The United States foresees
using Singapore as a regional center for coordinating repair,
deployment, etc., throughout the Southwest Pacific. In addition
to Singapore's facilities, the United States also has various
levels and forms of access arrangements in other ASEAN states.

Regional Stability. The prevention of war and the

98

preservation of regional stability in Southeast Asia are two of
the United States' primary interests in the region. Warfare in
Southeast Asia--particularly naval conflict--could threaten
American interests in several ways. A significant conflict would
damage U.S. economic interests, threaten merchant shipping,
potentially lead to the blockage of key sea lanes or straits, and
perhaps ultimately destabilize some of the ASEAN nations.
In addition, the interlocking structure of alliances in the
region might force American intervention in the conflict in some
capacity. Thailand and the Philippines both have bilateral
defense arrangements with the United States, while the United
States also has security ties with all the other ASEAN nations,
although no formal alliance commitments. Australia, an ANZUS5
ally of the United States, is also a member of the Five Power
Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with Singapore, Great Britain, New
Zealand, and Malaysia; Great Britain, another U.S. ally, has a
bilateral defense agreement with Brunei. Only Indonesia does not
belong to an alliance with some significant connection to the
United States. Nevertheless, Indonesia's strategic importance to
the United States, Japan, and Australia makes American inaction
in the event of external aggression against that nation unlikely.
The presence of American forces plays an important role in
preserving regional stability in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian
states perceive the United States as a relatively benign power
with no territorial ambitions in the region, but with clear
interests in preserving regional stability and peace. The ASEAN
countries universally support a continued American military
presence as a check on the ambitions of less benign extraregional powers whom they fear may have territorial or hegemonic
ambitions in the region.

Preservation of ASEAN. The American interest in regional
stability is also served by the preservation of ASEAN, which
reduces the risk of war and works to promote internal stability.
ASEAN is the most successful regional organization in the Third
World. Since ASEAN's founding in 1967, its members have achieved
a level of political and diplomatic cooperation unparalleled by
any other regional organization in the developing world. Although
economic integration and the development of intra-ASEAN trade
have progressed slowly, the nations of ASEAN, by working
cooperatively, have been able to enhance greatly their diplomatic
influence on international political and economic issues, and
create a stable environment that has promoted economic
development, reduced the risk of war, and enhanced domestic
internal stability within each of the member nations.
Officially, ASEAN is a regional economic grouping. In
reality, it is a regional security community. But it is not,
like a traditional security grouping, concerned primarily with
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the promotion of regional security against outside threats.
Rather, ASEAN was designed as an internally focused security
community, intended to reduce tensions and the risks of conflict
between its member states in order to allow them to concentrate
on their domestic economic development and internal security. The
goal of ASEAN is to establish a "zone of peace, friendship, and
neutrality." The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation sets forth the
basic principles of ASEAN: mutual respect for the independence,
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national
identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its
national existence free from external interference, subversion,
and coercion; noninterference in the internal affairs of one
another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective
cooperation among themselves.6
ASEAN was established during the high point of the Vietnam
War in the aftermath of the Konfrontasi between Malaysia and
Indonesia. The founders of ASEAN recognized that the member
nations could not agree on an external defense strategy and, in
any case, lacked the military capabilities to give such an
approach any teeth. But they believed that if they could agree to
disagree, to accept one another's differences and commit to
resolving their differences peacefully, they could then
concentrate their resources on internal development. They
expected that as each nation pursued its own economic development
and internal political stability, and thereby enhanced its
national resilience, a widening pool of regional resilience would
be created, enhancing regional stability and reducing the risk of
war.7 They were correct.
ASEAN's success has been a central component in Southeast
Asia's rapid progression from war and poverty to peace and
economic dynamism. In 1967, few observers would have predicted
that success. ASEAN's continued success and development will
remain important to regional stability and growth in the future
as well.
Regional Trends in Southeast Asia.

Military-Security Developments. The defense establishments
within many of the ASEAN states are not sanguine about the
outlook for the future security environment. China (and its
activities in the South China Sea) has been the primary cause of
concern. These concerns, coupled with victories over their major
internal security threats and rising economic resources to devote
to defense, have led to a shift away from the Southeast Asian
states' traditional internal security focus. External security
concerns are now given increasing priority. Accordingly, the
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Southeast Asian states have begun to strengthen their own
military capabilities, with their focus largely on expanding
their air and naval capabilities. This focus reflects the
maritime nature of the ASEAN states, which all have long
coastlines and large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to protect;
the absence of land-based threats; and the conviction that the
long-term potential threat to regional security is posed by the
naval and air forces of powers from outside Southeast Asia.8
Arms purchases in the last few years by the ASEAN states all
reflect this emphasis on enhancing their maritime and air strike
capabilities: advanced fighter aircraft, maritime patrol
aircraft, missile-armed fast attack craft, larger ship types such
as corvettes and frigates, precision-guided missiles, diesel
submarines, and a helicopter carrier (purchased by Thailand from
Spain). The most spectacular acquisition was Indonesia's purchase
of the former East German Navy--39 naval vessels including 16
corvettes--for $120 million.9
There has been considerable concern expressed in some
quarters that these new defense acquisitions will fuel an arms
race in Southeast Asia.10 At this point, such fears are misplaced.
The Southeast Asian militaries for many years have lacked the
capability to meet their security needs. These purchases actually
represent very modest efforts to obtain some capability to patrol
adequately and protect their air and sea territory. There is no
evidence that Malaysian purchases are driven by Indonesian,
Singaporean, or other ASEAN states' acquisitions. Rather, all of
the states appear to be devoting a small part of their growing
economic wealth to remedying serious deficiencies in their
existing defense capabilities. Yet, such acquisitions could
certainly create an environment of tension and apprehension
within ASEAN, if member states perceive these purchases as a
threat to their own security.
For this reason, as the ASEAN states develop their naval and
air forces, greater emphasis on security cooperation is a
necessary component to preserving the ASEAN peace. Without
enhanced opportunities to discuss regional security trends and
national defense policies at the political level and interact
militarily at the operational level, it is possible that the
military procurement policies of certain ASEAN states could
generate tensions and misunderstandings within the organization.
Strengthened regional security dialogues and operational
cooperation reduce any such risks.
Public attention has centered primarily upon the ASEAN
Regional Security Forum (ARF) which was established in July 1994
at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok. The ARF is
intended to serve as a forum for multinational dialogue on
political and security issues within Asia--not just Southeast
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Asia. An outgrowth of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings, its
membership includes not only Southeast Asian states, but the
Northeast Asian states, the United States, Australia, and New
Zealand. The establishment of the ARF made ASEAN "the hub of the
Asia-Pacific confidence-building and preventive diplomacy
activities."11
Admittedly only a first, tentative step, ARF nevertheless
represents an unprecedented effort. Unlike Europe's long
tradition of security consultation, multilateral security
cooperation--even dialogue--had never been an established
practice in Asia. Mutual suspicions, historical antagonisms, and
regional divisions had made bilateral security arrangements the
norm in Asia. ARF's establishment clearly reflects both the very
real security concerns of regional states and the increasing
integration of Southeast and Northeast Asian regional politics.
Operational cooperation also has been growing rapidly among
ASEAN states in recent years. Greater coordination and
cooperation through training with other ASEAN states, of course,
strengthen the capabilities and operational readiness of the
ASEAN navies and air forces. It also makes possible joint action
in the event of a real emergency in the region. Given the limited
military capabilities of the ASEAN states, cooperative
deployments with other ASEAN militaries and/or friendly extraregional states offers significant potential benefits.
When it was formed, ASEAN deliberately eschewed any status
as a military alliance. Nevertheless, military cooperation among
the member states evolved fairly rapidly--always outside the
ASEAN orbit and always on a bilateral, not a multilateral, basis.
Today, a network of bilateral military exercises and exchanges
exists within ASEAN. Not surprisingly, they typically conduct air
and naval exercises far more frequently and successfully than
land exercises. Domestic sensitivity to the presence of foreign
troops and lingering suspicions have discouraged land exercises.
Still, all of the ASEAN navies and most of the air forces have
conducted joint bilateral training together.
There is also a sense that some of the items on the new
security agenda demand cooperative efforts in order to deal with
them effectively. Anti-piracy, counter-narcotics, maritime
commercial traffic separation and safety measures, environmental
monitoring, EEZ surveillance, fishery protection, and illegal
immigration are all issues increasingly likely to preoccupy
regional military forces, especially naval and air forces, over
the next decade. All of these issues are trans-national and can
be handled more readily through a coordinated, cooperative,
multilateral approach. Such issues also offer greater potential
for initiating regional security cooperation since they do not
require the identification of a common external security threat.
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Measures to coordinate anti-piracy operations in the straits
region between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and
Singapore, exemplify this new approach. Malaysia and Indonesia
formed a joint mission to coordinate maritime enforcement
activities in their waters related to drug smuggling, piracy,
illegal immigrants, trespassing, maritime safety, and water
pollution.12 As part of this agreement, the two states initiated
joint patrol operations in the Straits of Malacca to deter piracy
and smuggling.13 In turn, Singapore and Indonesia agreed to
exchange information on piracy and to conduct coordinated patrols
in the Singapore Straits and the Philips Channel. Since the
initiation of these patrols, the number of recorded piracy
incidents has fallen significantly.14
A revitalization of security links with Australia
accompanied the expansion of intra-ASEAN security cooperation.
Australia has gained a new prominence in Southeast Asian security
affairs by becoming a high profile advocate of enhanced regional
security cooperation and by reinvigorating its own security
activities in the region, largely through the FPDA.
The latest sign of Australia's new regional activism was the
announcement of a security agreement between Indonesia and
Australia at the ASEAN Summit Meeting in December 1995.15 The
agreement, an outgrowth of Australian-Indonesian security
relations' steady improvement over the last 6 years, stipulates
that the two nations will consult regularly on security affairs
at the ministerial level and will pursue cooperative military
activities. It also states that the two nations will consult "in
the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common
security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which
might be taken either individually or jointly . . . ."16 While the
agreement is far from a military alliance, it constitutes the
first military pact Indonesia, a founding member of the NonAligned Movement, has signed with any nation. For the United
States, the agreement was welcome; in the words of an American
official, "It's a healthy development and good for U.S. security
interests."17 The statement reflects the American belief that
Australia's security activities in Southeast Asia generally
complement American actions, since the two countries basically
share the same strategic interests in the region.
Australia promotes multilateral and bilateral security
cooperation in all forms as a means of regional engagement (the
official term is "comprehensive engagement") and as an instrument
to shape Australia's regional security environment in a manner
favorable to Canberra. This policy, initiated under the Bob Hawke
government, has been continued by Prime Minister Paul Keating.
The basic goal of the policy is to gain acceptance of Australia
as a regional actor, or, as Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has
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stated, ". . . a confident and natural partner in a common
neighborhood of remarkable diversity, rather than as a cultural
misfit trapped by geography."18 Other Australian concerns focus on
the risks of a destabilizing regional arms race and potential
long-term threats to regional security posed by such larger Asian
powers as China. Australian defense officials recognize the ASEAN
states as the front-line of Australian defense. Enhanced security
cooperation and confidence-building measures with ASEAN are seen
as important means to preserve regional stability by reducing any
potential tensions among local states, while also creating the
initial "building blocks" of regional security cooperation as a
long-term counterweight to any potential intrusion by China or
other external powers.
The main Australian defense activity within Southeast Asia
centers around the FPDA. In addition, the Royal Australian Navy
(RAN) exercises with every ASEAN nation and conducts joint
patrols with Indonesia in the Timor Gap Cooperation Zone lying
between the two nation's EEZs. Australia's ability to play a key
role in regional security, however, is restricted by its own
limited military resources and public unwillingness to support
firm military commitments in Southeast Asia. These weaknesses
will inhibit its ability to influence the regional security
debate in the long-term. Certainly, Australia cannot assume the
traditional role of the United States in regional security.

Economic Cooperation. Economic cooperation has long lagged
behind political and diplomatic cooperation in ASEAN. Although
the organization was explicitly established as a regional
economic grouping, visible progress towards economic integration
has been minimal. Similarly, intra-ASEAN trade has lagged behind
the expansion of ASEAN's trade with non-ASEAN members. The
signature of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Agreement in
Singapore in January 1992, however, may signal a new commitment
to push forward real economic integration among member states.
Under the agreement, the ASEAN states are to reduce tariffs on
goods traded within the grouping to a minimum of 0-5 percent by
2003. At the most recent ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in December
1995, the association even agreed to push forward the date for
most of the major tariff cuts under AFTA to the year 2000. While
it is true that Indonesia insisted on exempting 15 different
agricultural products from tariff cuts under the plan, the
association also decided that all products (including those
exempted by Indonesia) must be incorporated into AFTA's tariff
framework by the year 2010.19
Past efforts to expand intra-ASEAN economic cooperation have
foundered upon competitive rather than complementary economic
structures; a lack of political support; and differing attitudes
towards free trade, for, historically, Singapore is generally
pro-free trade, Indonesia is usually more protectionist, with the
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other members located between these two states. There is reason
to believe the situation has changed. In 1994, trade among AFTA
members increased 41 percent to $111 billion, while their total
trade with the world rose 30 percent to $506 billion. This
suggests that intra-ASEAN trade is likely to play an increasingly
important role in member's economies in the future.20
The political leadership appears supportive, perceiving
expanded economic cooperation both as a rational economic policy
and as a hedge against the risk of rising protectionism in
ASEAN's traditional markets in the United States, Japan, and
Europe. The leaders also believe that expanding economic
cooperation offers an important means of strengthening the bonds
between members. This new political commitment was demonstrated
at the recent ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. In addition to moving
forward the date for the AFTA tariff cuts, the leadership agreed
to liberalize key service industries (including banking,
telecommunications, and tourism), making them more open to
intra-ASEAN investment. Leaders also discussed the creation of an
ASEAN Free Investment Area to harmonize all investment rules in
the region and the establishment of a single time zone within
ASEAN to allow regional stockmarkets to operate on the same
schedule.
The goal of these changes was summarized by Singapore's
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong: "Over time, our region's
interconnectedness will be as dense as Europe's. And we will grow
closer together as a community."21 Goh's prediction shows the
direction in which many Southeast Asians would like to see their
region move. Events will show whether their hopes are realized.

ASEAN and Indochina. Central to the effort to transform
Southeast Asia from an arena of conflict and confrontation into a
region of peace and cooperation is the effort to bring the
Indochinese states into ASEAN. ASEAN has always maintained that
its purpose is to establish a regional order, not merely be an
association of a few select states. The realities of the Cold War
prevented the realization of this dream. Today, the ASEAN states
are determined to reach out to their former communist adversaries
and assist their reintegration into the regional and world
economies by offering them membership in ASEAN.
In July 1992, Vietnam and Laos both signed the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, a clear commitment by both nations to
respect the tenets of the ASEAN "peace": strict non-interference
in the internal affairs of fellow members, peaceful settlement of
disputes, respect for each other's independence, and strict
respect for the territorial integrity of fellow members.22 ASEAN
immediately granted Laos and Vietnam observer status; both
attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in 1993 and 1994.
Finally, in July 1995, Vietnam formally became a member of ASEAN.
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Burma and Cambodia attended the ASEAN Summit in December 1995 for
the first time, leading to expectations that they, plus Laos,
would also soon join ASEAN. Sarasin Viraphol, Deputy Permanent
Secretary at Thailand's Foreign Ministry, stated, "Hopefully, we
can have all ten Southeast Asian states in ASEAN by the end of
the century."23
The Indochinese states are unlikely to move rapidly to
integrate with the other ASEAN economies. The differences between
their economies--the differing level of economic development and
the remaining command economy elements in the economies of the
Indochinese states--and ASEAN's own commitment to move forward on
AFTA will likely relegate the Indochinese states to a special
status within the association for some years. The immediate
consequences of Vietnam and the other Indochinese states entering
ASEAN will be primarily political and diplomatic. First, it will
help to reduce tensions between the Indochinese states and their
ASEAN neighbors. Vietnam has a number of territorial disputes
with ASEAN states, including its claim to the Spratly Islands.
ASEAN has proven quite effective at managing such disputes among
its members in the past, and will likely work hard to achieve a
similar reduction in tensions for Vietnam and any other new
members. Second, membership in ASEAN will strengthen Vietnam
diplomatically in its conflicts with non-ASEAN members, such as
China. ASEAN's effectiveness at addressing regional and
international disputes has been improving in recent years;
ASEAN's diplomatic weight in world fora certainly is greater than
that of Vietnam. Finally, membership in ASEAN will clearly
indicate Indochina's reintegration into Southeast Asia and be a
major step in reducing the risk of future regional conflict. For
these reasons alone, the incorporation of Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos into ASEAN represents a very important step forward towards
a future of peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia.
Looking Ahead: The Great Unknowns.
The shape of 21st century Asia is being created today by the
policies of leaders on both sides of the Pacific, but the
outlines of the future remain obscure. Southeast Asia is indeed
headed towards an era of expanded cooperation, peace, and
development. Nevertheless, certain key factors with a fundamental
impact on the future of the region remain unpredictable. In
particular, two factors will play a critical role--the future of
the American military presence in Asia and Chinese policy on the
Spratly Islands.

The Future of the United States Presence. The American
military presence in Asia has been and remains an important
stabilizing force. Most countries in the region want the United
States to stay, at least during the transition to whatever New
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World Order is going to emerge. A precipitous (real or perceived)
U.S. withdrawal from the region would intensify regional
geostrategic competition and could well trigger a true regional
arms race.
U.S. forces in the Pacific fulfill a multifaceted role in
promoting regional stability and American interests. Their
objectives remain to defend U.S. territory and U.S. allies; to
preserve freedom of access to international waters and air space;
to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region so as to deter
potential regional aggressors; to be ready to deploy rapidly to
respond to regional crises in Asia and regions outside the
Western Pacific, such as the Persian Gulf; to support and
encourage regional alliances and security cooperation efforts
which strengthen regional stability and regional military
preparedness; and to enhance the preparedness of allies and
friends to deter aggression and operate with U.S. forces.
Pressures for sharp reductions in the American presence come
from a variety of sources. The most important is within the
United States. Isolationist themes have found a resonance in the
U.S. body politic. Strong support exists for focusing primarily
upon the many domestic problems that plague the United States-not the least of which are the seemingly unmanageable, corrosive
budget deficits. With the end of the Cold War, the level of U.S.
military forces and America's overall overseas presence must
necessarily decrease. The key questions are how far and from
where. Despite the adoption of reasonable military reduction
plans for the Pacific, as well as high-level political and
military assurances, many U.S. friends and allies in Asia fear
that domestic American political dynamics will lead to a rapid
wholesale withdrawal of American forces from the region.
It is clear that U.S. force posture in the Pacific will
continue to rely heavily on Japan. Therefore, domestic
developments in Japan could potentially also precipitate an
American withdrawal. The Japanese are increasingly nationalistic-rightly proud of their record of economic success, resentful of
what they see as continual and escalating harassment from the
United States, and increasingly willing to take policy positions
which diverge from those of the United States. At present,
nationalism does not seriously threaten relationships with the
United States or the American military presence. Still, all
relationships must not only be mutually beneficial, but adaptive
to new conditions, if they are to survive. With the end of the
Cold War, the United States must redefine its relationship with
Japan.
Basing and access issues will be at the forefront of this
process. The recent furor over the rape of a 12-year-old Japanese
school girl by U.S. service personnel stationed on Okinawa led to
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public demonstrations calling for the termination of American
bases on the island. The public displays of anger over the
presence of the bases reflected not just outrage at this one
incident, but long-standing Okinawan opposition to bearing the
overwhelming bulk of the burden of the U.S. military presence in
Japan. Much of the Okinawans' resentment, in fact, is not
directed at the United States, but at the central government in
Tokyo, which has neglected Okinawan concerns and failed to pursue
efforts to diversify U.S. facilities away from their heavy
concentration on Okinawa. In reality, Okinawan opposition to the
U.S. presence is not likely to force Tokyo to request the
withdrawal of American forces. The political power of the
Okinawan opposition remains limited. Nevertheless, politics are
changing rapidly in Japan, and Okinawan opposition may become
more significant in the future. It would be preferable if the
U.S. presence could be diversified to other areas in Japan.24 This
is obviously a matter that can only be addressed by Tokyo, but
Washington must be aware of these risks to the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty and the U.S. presence in Japan.
A real threat to the United States-Japan relationship is not
likely in the short term, but if the relationships are
mismanaged, such an outcome could become less improbable in the
future. Both the United States and Japan need to expand popular
support for the defense relationship. While the leadership of
both countries is firmly committed to maintaining the United
States-Japan security relationship, without broader public
support it will remain vulnerable to political disputes over
trade, burden sharing, diplomatic incidents, or simple
isolationist sentiment.
In Southeast Asia, it is clear that there are no facilities
available which will replace those lost in the Philippines. No
country is willing to offer home porting or to host the scale of
American presence once found in the Philippines. Nevertheless,
the changing strategic environment has led to some remarkable
shifts in attitudes in these traditionally nonaligned nations. It
is no longer unthinkable to accept U.S. forces openly, as long as
the terms and limits of that presence are clearly defined.
Access to Southeast Asian facilities for purposes of training,
supply, repair, refueling, storage, shore leave, and other
similar activities is viable in many countries and can be useful
to U.S. planners. In addition, American security ties with
Australia will likely become increasingly important as Canberra
assumes a greater role in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and
the Indian Ocean. Australia remains a solid American ally and can
be counted upon to allow the United States access to almost any
facility short of home porting.
Overall, the minimal basing arrangements in place appear to
provide the practical requirements necessary for preserving an
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American presence in Asia. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the United States itself will preserve the political
commitment to stay in Asia. Certainly, any rational assessment
would suggest that the United States cannot afford to withdraw
from Asia. The future of the United States and its economic wellbeing is irrevocably linked with the future of the entire Pacific
Rim. The United States itself is a Pacific nation. American trade
with Asia exceeded that with Europe over a decade ago, and the
gap has continued to grow. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China,
and, increasingly, the nations of ASEAN have become centers for
American trade and investment, as well as sources of foreign
investment in the United States. Disengagement from the Pacific
is not a viable American option. Indeed, fundamental
international political and economic trends suggest a deepening
American involvement in the Pacific over the course of the next
decade. American political and economic interests, coupled with
rapid changes within the region, certainly suggest that the time
is not right for an American withdrawal from Asia. At this
moment, Asian regional security cooperation remains embryonic,
while many Asian countries fear the growth of new, regional
security threats. America has played an important role in
encouraging regional states to cooperate and build the foundation
for better relations; withdrawal of U.S. forces would rock that
foundation. An American withdrawal would definitely not promote
American interests.

China and the Spratly Islands. China remains an enigma. The
direction of Chinese foreign and military policy will have a
critical influence on the region, but will ultimately depend upon
the resolution of fundamental political conflicts in China,
including the succession to Deng Xiaoping and the evolution of a
viable post-Deng regime. The outcome of these conflicts is
impossible to predict at this time. Still, certain basic
characteristics of any post-Deng regime are already readily
apparent.
There will be no supreme leader. No future Chinese leader
will possess power comparable to that now held by Deng Xiaoping,
at least not for many years to come. None of the current
competitors for power in China has a political support network
comparable to that of Deng. Accordingly, the importance of
coalition politics within China will increase after Deng. The new
leader will be an individual skilled at putting together
coalitions, who is able to build a majority coalition within the
Party, provincial leadership, and military in support of his
programs.
Political power is bleeding away from Beijing. In the
future, real political power in China will increasingly rest with
the provinces. The central leadership coalition will consist
largely of representatives of provincial power bases led by local
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political bosses. This has important implications for Chinese
policy. Local interests will clearly have greater influence on
national policy. Furthermore, Beijing's ability to force
recalcitrant provinces to enforce central government edicts
and/or international agreements will be very limited. For
example, the government's ability to meet successfully its
commitments to prosecute Chinese violators of international
copyright, trademark, and patent rights will undoubtedly be
seriously compromised, even if the central government is genuine
in its commitment.
Younger Chinese officials also have relatively weak ties to
the military. When one of these younger leaders assumes paramount
power, he will have to rely on one or more top military leaders
to provide him with the support of the military. As a result, the
political influence of the top military leadership in post-Deng
China is almost certain to expand. This growth of military
influence is already apparent in the double-digit increases in
Chinese military spending since Tiananmen.
There are also certain basic tasks which will face any postDeng government, including the development of a stable mixture of
economic growth and reform policies that do not threaten the
fundamental political bases of the regime. Foremost among these
tasks will be the restoration of the government and party's
popular legitimacy. Any regime which fails to reverse
successfully the growing societal alienation from the regime and
restore popular support will ultimately collapse. Nationalism
offers one key instrument in this process. For this reason,
Chinese foreign policy may reasonably be expected to assume an
increasingly nationalistic emphasis. Already, China's sensitivity
towards its status as a world power is becoming apparent, with
many Chinese arguing that U.S. opposition to Beijing hosting the
Olympic games, the denial of China membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and disagreements over human rights and arms
transfers reflect an American "containment" policy to belittle
China and prevent it from assuming its rightful leadership role
in world affairs.
In Asia, Chinese policy on a host of different issues will
be watched closely in the next few years for indicators of the
direction China is likely to take. Chinese actions on Hong Kong,
cross-straits relations with Taiwan, arms transfers, naval and
air modernization, and territorial disputes are all likely to be
viewed as important indicators by many Asian states. Ironically,
the current perception of China in Southeast Asia is being
fundamentally shaped not by its attempts to play a world
leadership role, but by its policies with regard to a group of
tiny atolls, rocks, and islands in the South China Sea, once
largely unknown outside the region--the Spratly Islands. The
Spratlys are claimed to various extents by China, Taiwan,
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Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. By themselves these
islands are largely worthless. But the Law of the Sea Convention
confers upon any state with a recognized title to islands the
right to the full complement of maritime zones, including a
territorial sea, contiguous zone, a 200-nautical mile EEZ, and
200-nautical mile Continental Shelf claim.25 This is quite a bit
of real estate to obtain from controlling an "island," which is
frequently underwater at high tide.
China is primarily responsible for the current climate of
tension and potential crisis in the South China Sea. Its military
might, coupled with its willingness to use it, has made China the
driving force in the current dispute. It has been China's actions
which have generally forced responses from the other claimants.26
Three factors can be discerned behind China's behavior:
nationalism, oil, and military/security concerns.
One of the reasons the Spratly issue has recently become
important is that certain senior officials want to assert China's
rights to the chain.27 China claims that the Spratlys "have been
part of China's territory since ancient times"28--"part and parcel
of the motherland."29 In reality, none of the claimants possesses
anything approaching a clear title to the Spratlys. China's claim
of long historical ties with the islands is not supported by the
historical record. A state cannot acquire title to an island
simply because some long dead persons of the same nationality
once happened to fish off its coast or had the misfortune of
being shipwrecked on its shores. The other states claims are on
equally shaky legal ground.30 Not surprisingly, not one of the
claimants has been willing to subject its claims to arbitration.
Nevertheless, the imperialist era, with its legacy of
unequal treaties, left all Chinese hyper-sensitive to any
infringement of China's sovereign rights, especially on any issue
involving Chinese territory. Most Chinese devoutly believe the
Spratlys to be part of China. One Chinese delegate to the 1991
South China Sea Conference in Bandung told reporters, "It is
Chinese territory. How can a country give up land that belongs to
it?"31
Economically, the big question is oil. It is difficult to
judge the actual oil potential of the South China Sea island
region. Little is known of the geology of the area. But a lack of
information has not stopped the claimants from postulating a
great treasure of black gold waiting for the owner of these
islands. An internal Chinese government document's estimate that,
in terms of resources, the South China Sea holds reserves worth
US$1 trillion32 appears totally fanciful. But China has offered
similarly inflated estimates in other contexts, citing tens of
billions of barrels in some cases; one unofficial, pro-Chinese
Navy source even argued that the area had 45 billion tons of oil
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and natural gas reserves.33 In the absence of any solid data, such
extravagant expectations will likely drive the policies of China
and the other claimants.
China's oil situation is becoming serious. Rapid economic
growth, especially in the southern and coastal provinces, and
rapidly rising urbanization generally have caused a major
escalation in China's oil consumption. The Chinese oil industry
is in chaos, and efforts to restrict consumption have proven
ineffective. While China is believed to have significant oil
reserves in its interior, the area is extremely remote and would
be costly to develop. The islands, therefore, appear inviting-promising potentially rich rewards at lower costs and with easier
transport to the dynamic coastal areas, which need the oil to
fuel their economic development.
Finally, elements within China's military, especially the
Chinese Navy (PLAN), are keenly interested in using the islands
as a justification to increase arms purchases and adopt a more
aggressive regional military posture. Persistent reports indicate
that the PLAN has opposed strongly Foreign Ministry efforts to
resolve the Spratly issue through diplomacy.34 Modernizers within
the PLAN, who have long argued that China's economic, strategic,
and national interests required a strong navy, use the Spratlys
as a prime example.35 PLAN analysts assert that the Spratlys are
strategically located along the Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOCs), part of China's sovereign territory, and vital to its
future economic development.
The PLAN apparently has allocated most of its new vessels
and equipment, as well as some of its best units, to the South
Sea Fleet, which is responsible for the South China Sea.
Furthermore, despite their late start, the Chinese have
established the largest and most capable force deployed on the
South China Sea islands. Overall, the Chinese military is clearly
the dominant force in the Spratlys. The PLAN is an enormous force
with a relatively small number of modern, capable combatants and
a large number of marginal vessels. Nevertheless, its best units
are as good as (and mostly better than) anything the other
claimants possess, while the sheer size of the fleet is simply
overwhelming to the tiny Southeast Asian navies.
The key question for the future is how China will pursue its
claims. Will China attempt to seize the islands by force or will
it pursue diplomacy? To date, China appears to be employing a
dual track policy, encompassing both diplomacy and a unilateral,
aggressive assertion of its claims. The Foreign Ministry has
consistently promoted a nonaggressive line, advocating joint
development and offering to postpone sovereignty considerations.
But China's actions on the ground have not tallied with this
approach. The dual character of China's strategy may be the
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result of internal bureaucratic disagreements within the
government, a deliberate strategy, or some combination of the
two. In 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pledged to the
ASEAN Foreign Ministers that China would not use force to assert
its claims.36 But Qian's statement apparently did not rule out the
possibility of Beijing occupying more islands; in 1995, China
occupied Mischief Reef and placed markers on several atolls
within waters claimed by the Philippines. Previously, China had
only occupied islands in areas claimed by Vietnam. China has
ignored ASEAN suggestions that it sign the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, which renounces the use of force in the settlement
of regional disputes, as the "basis for establishing a code of
international conduct over the South China Sea."37
The contradictory nature of Chinese policy on the Spratlys
has raised regional tensions, which have been further aggravated
by the vagueness of China's claims. Official Chinese maps only
serve to heighten concern over the issue. The meaning of the
demarcation line, keyed on the maps as the "national boundary"
line, is unexplained.38 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas
attempted to clarify the meaning of this claim line during a July
1995 meeting with Qian Qichen in Beijing. Qian told Alatas that
China made no claim on Indonesia's Natunas Islands, but refused
to explain the purpose of the line, telling Alatas "you draw your
own conclusions."39 Whatever the purpose of the line, the map has
certainly been a diplomatic disaster for China. According to one
analyst, the boundary line on the maps "looks like a large tongue
extending from the coast of southern China sweeping along the
western coast of the Philippine Palawan and the eastern coast of
Vietnam and reaching the northern coast of Malaysian Borneo."40
Sinophobic Southeast Asian strategists find in these maps the
confirmation of their fears and convictions that the Chinese are
bent on regional domination and conquest.
China's actions in the Spratlys have been a major factor
influencing the strategy and planning of the Southeast Asian
militaries as they move towards an external defense orientation.
While arms expenditures are still modest among ASEAN states, fear
of China remains a force which could generate much greater
spending, particularly if the United States withdraws from the
region as many fear. In this event, a real ASEAN arms race cannot
be dismissed as a impossibility.
The ASEAN states not only do not agree on how to deal with
China, but those with claims in the Spratlys remain suspicious of
each other. The Philippines and Vietnam would like ASEAN to
confront China over the Spratlys. Malaysia, while suspicious of
China, believes that this approach would not work. According to
one Malaysian diplomat, "The more pressure you put on China, the
more allergic it becomes."41 In turn, Thailand, which has no
claims in the South China Sea, has a very different view of
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China--as a potentially useful counterweight to other powers.
Indonesia, despite its own long-standing suspicions of China, has
attempted to broker a resolution of the dispute by adopting a
neutral stance and sponsoring several international conferences
on the South China Sea. If China were to exploit these
differences successfully, targeting one ASEAN member for an
aggressive approach, while adopting a conciliatory approach to
the other ASEAN claimants, it could lead to rising tensions in
the organization and weaken its ability to operate effectively.42
From the U.S perspective, the Spratly issue poses several
problems. It is certainly a definite hazard to regional stability
and may pose a long-term threat to ASEAN's unity and
effectiveness as well. The territorial disputes in the South
China Sea may also endanger both commercial and naval transit
through the region. The major sea lanes, while bypassing the
Spratlys themselves, would be included within any EEZ or
Continental Shelf claim made by a successful claimant. The main
perils would come from the establishment of air defense, military
exclusion, and/or some other form of security zone in areas which
cross the SLOCs. Nations would most likely establish such zones
if oil exploration and development became significant in the
area, since the zones would be designed to protect any oil
installations from rapid and unpredictable attacks. If military
conflict did occur, several additional threats are possible,
including illegal interdictions of merchant shipping by one or
more claimants or mining operations leading to mines drifting
into the sea lanes.
The United States does not judge the merits of any of the
disputants' claims; rather, it supports freedom of navigation and
a peaceful resolution of the dispute through regional (not U.S.)
mediation. America's low profile is clearly the only viable
approach. Unfortunately, many ASEAN officials believe that the
United States has not made its opposition to the use of force
sufficiently clear to China. They believe that the Chinese have
concluded that they can use force to resolve the dispute without
provoking an American reaction, as long as they exercise caution
and limit its use.
If their fears are valid, the United States may wish to
clarify its position, since a military resolution of the Spratly
dispute is not in America's interests. It could greatly extend
Chinese power in the region, potentially threaten freedom of
transit, and resurrect armed confrontation in Southeast Asia-short-circuiting the current efforts to promote peace and
cooperation in the region.
Renewed tensions would also have important implications for
the security environment in Northeast Asia. Japanese defense
officials, for example, are highly suspicious of China. An
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aggressive Chinese solution to the Spratlys would certainly raise
Japanese threat perceptions of China. Japan and China already
have their own territorial dispute over the Senkaku Island chain.
Furthermore, Japan also has vital interests in freedom of transit
in the South China Sea, which China could threaten.
Resolution of the Spratlys dispute may well be one of the
keys towards shaping 21st century Asia, with one path leading
towards peace, development, and enhanced regional cooperation and
the other toward renewed conflict and confrontation among
competing regional powers (such as Japan, China, and Indonesia).
The Spratly issue is one more area where the preservation of a
strong American presence and a clear American commitment to
regional stability may be vital in the short term to realize the
long-term hopes of 21st century Asians and to meet America's own
security interests.
Conclusion.
In the 21st century, Southeast Asia will be a fundamentally
different region from the Cold War battleground of the latter
half of the 20th century. Southeast Asia will be a region of
growing wealth, dynamism, and economic opportunity. It will be a
region of increasingly capable militaries, with greatly enhanced
air and naval capabilities. The United States will have to shape
its policy carefully in this increasingly multipolar, strategic
arena, with an eye toward the activities and interests of the
ASEAN nations, as well as the outside powers active in the
region, such as Australia, Japan, and China, and perhaps Russia
and India. Whether it will be a region characterized by peace,
stability, and expanding regional cooperation or a region of
confrontation and conflict will depend heavily upon the policy
choices and events of the next 10 years.
The role of the United States during this period will remain
important. The United States is no longer the resident hegemonic
power in Southeast Asia as in the 1950s-1960s. Its relative
military and economic weight in the region have declined and will
continue to decline in the future. But the United States remains
primus inter pares, first among equals. Furthermore, intrinsic
American interests in Southeast Asia are increasing, while
Southeast Asia's importance for American global security
interests remains strong. To protect these interests and shape a
positive regional environment in the 21st century, the United
States cannot afford to turn its back on the region.
The preservation of a viable American military presence in
Asia will be critical during this period of transition. Regular
deployments through the area, bilateral exercises, and port
visits provide visible demonstrations of American engagement in
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Asia and enhance regional stability. An American withdrawal would
have the opposite effect.
Regional security, however, cannot remain primarily the
responsibility of the United States. The ASEAN nations are
already engaged upon a significant military expansion program.
The United States should encourage their efforts through foreign
military sales, training, joint exercises, and other means to
assist in the reasonable development of their military
capabilities. At the same time, the United States should
encourage the ASEAN nations to continue to enhance their
bilateral and trilateral security cooperation, as well as their
efforts to improve the transparency of their defense programs.
The strengthening of the ASEAN militaries and enhanced mutual
cooperation and understanding among them would strengthen the
ASEAN nations' own ability to preserve regional stability, create
the basis for meaningful U.S.-ASEAN military cooperation in an
emergency, and reduce the burden on the U.S. military.
As the Southeast Asian states enhance their military
capabilities, the continued development of the ARF will help
promote regional understanding and reduce potential tensions.
More importantly, perhaps, the ARF will also play an important
role in promoting understanding and reducing tensions between the
ASEAN states and the Northeast Asian states. As Southeast and
Northeast Asia become increasingly integrated and interdependent,
this function of the ARF will become critical to regional
stability and confidence building.
Policy flexibility, a willingness and ability to deal with
all of the actors involved, and coordination with U.S. friends
and allies will be at a premium as Southeast Asia becomes a
multipolar theater integrated into the broader Asian
international environment. The decline in U.S. relative power and
growing Asian policy assertiveness will force the United States
to adopt a different foreign policy approach to the region. A
successful American regional policy will have to place primary
emphasis on cultivating regional support for its positions,
demonstrate greater understanding of the region, and devote more
attention to the area in the future. ARF, APEC and other less
formal institutions and exchanges will assume an increasingly
critical role in this process.
The development of an informal cooperative relationship with
ASEAN to enhance regional stability and economic growth is
strongly in America's interests. The United States and the ASEAN
states share many common interests and a commitment to regional
cooperation. The ASEAN states will never accept a dependent or
"allied" relationship with the United States. Rather, they will
remain determinedly independent. Still, their common concerns and
shared interests form the basis for an independent, but
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coordinated, approach to regional affairs which can work to build
a 21st century Asia congenial to both the United States and the
indigenous states.
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